

A
POLITICAL AND MILITARY
RHAPSODY,
ON THE
INVASION AND DEFENCE
OF
Great Britain and Ireland.

BY THE LATE
GENERAL LLOYD.

ILLUSTRATED WITH THREE COPPER-PLATES.

To which is annexed,
A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE AUTHOR,
AND A
SUPPLEMENT BY THE EDITOR.

PRO ARIS ET FOCIS.

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R H A P S O D Y

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INTRODUCTION.

A PAMPHLET on the present armaments, and on the *Invasion of Great Britain*, was lately published in Paris, that is, in 1790, by a Mr. Dupont, some time since President of their National Assembly, and considered there as a patriotic writer and orator. In this ostentatious and calumnious publication, after accusing Great Britain of a variety of crimes, of her dreading, and wishing to overturn the new constitution of France, he exhorts, with national zeal and acrimony, his countrymen to support, and to strengthen the Family Compact: he boasts that France, Spain, and the United States of North America, whom he is pleased to enumerate with his allies, are an overmatch, at sea, for Great Britain and Holland. He anticipates the triumphs that would follow a national war, and lays it down as a preliminary, that peace should not afterwards be restored, until the Bank of England shall have become bankrupt, and all her naval arsenals shall be

destroyed. He talks, not a little vauntingly, and superciliously, of the exhausted credit and finances of Great Britain, and of the comparative superiority of riches in France, by means of the recent sequestration of the clerical revenues. And he proposes schemes, particularly by numerous Privateers, and Cruizers, for the ruin of the British commerce, and the crippling of the British Navy.

Here follows, "verbatim," a specimen of Mr. Dupont's style and modesty, "If the war be *short*, it shall be in the heart of your own country, and with all the impetuosity of the French nation. If it be *long*, the conquest shall be obtained by the last *Crown*. What is to prevent the inspection of the English *Bank*, by our national Grenadiers? Great Britain has yet no idea of a *national* war with France, of its activity, its obstinacy, its ferocity, and of the irresistible energy of the veteran warriors, and of the new warriors of France. We say not this *boastfully*; we ought to conquer you, as we are superior in number, and treasure. As soon as we have got together a sufficient force to protect our passage, *we will come over among you*. News from



“ from America, or from India, is naturally
 “ long coming. We are, however, certain,
 “ that the power will be *theirs*, who shall be
 “ masters in Europe. If now you refuse peace
 “ to us, and our allies, upon our *honour*, we
 “ will come to seek for it in *London*, and
 “ there we shall *assuredly find it*. Reply
 “ quickly, for the disarming must commence
 “ within a *week*, or hostilities in a *month*.”

“ *Risum teneatis Britanni & Hiberni.*”

There are French writers on every art and science, who are an ornament to their country, and to human nature; but in that respectable list, I cannot class Mr. Dupont, and far less should I compare him to heroic names of antiquity. He is neither an Agamemnon, an Ulysses, nor a Nestor; but, in argument, and not improbably in heroism, bears a nearer resemblance to Thersites. I take notice of him, merely because I know that multitudes of his countrymen are inflated with similar ideas of their power and prowess. Indeed, diffidence is not a characteristic feature of our neighbours.* Whenever the brazen throat
of

* All the successive factions in France, down to the present moment, have inveighed with equal inveteracy, envy,

of war shall summon Britain to arms, we may expect to have our ears stunned with invasion: our enemies without, and their emissaries within, will ring the changes on these exaggerated perils; and, probably, without any substantial hopes of permanent conquest, they may flatter themselves of being able to confine us to mere defensive operations; to embarrass us with additional expence and taxes; to intimidate, and disconcert the nation; and to injure public confidence and credit. For these reasons, I shall take a more comprehensive view, and enter into a more minute discussion of this subject, than has ever yet been attempted. Such discussion will, at least, administer some consolation to the inexperienced, and to those of weak fibre. It will from thence be obvious, that unless the nation, and its governors, are destitute of judgment, patriotism, and courage, we may be invulnerable at home, and that we should rather solicit than dread the execution of these insolent threats.

The following celebrated Essay alone, will enable the reader to form some critical judg-

and vindictiveness, against Great Britain; and have been busied in concerting plots for her destruction. It was one engine of their popularity.

ment

ment on this interesting topic. The Author, General Lloyd, had before eminently distinguished himself, in his Commentary on the last seven years War in Germany, and on the Elementary principles of the Military Art, two volumes of which, in Quarto, with Plates, were published by himself; and, lately, a third volume, from his manuscripts, by Lord Fielding. His Treatise on the invasion, and defence of England, was printed in London, in 1779, during the latter part of the unfortunate American war, at the critical period when the fleets of France and Spain, rode triumphant in the Channel; when our veteran regiments were mouldering across the Atlantic, and invasion, invasion, was thundered at our gates.

A very few copies of this publication had been distributed by the Author amongst his military and other friends, when lucrative overtures were made to him to suppress it, and to part with the remainder of the impression. Perhaps it might have then given rise to a public and parliamentary scrutiny, and might alarm those to whom the safety and defence of the nation was entrusted. But I think it will be manifest, that France was infinitely more interested than Great Britain

in its suppression; because it unfolded secret stratagems and plans of her cabinet, in maturing of which she had expended large sums. It will appear, from the following history of this able Engineer, General, and Author, that all the alleged fears of communicating, through this publication, improper information to the enemy, were absurd phantoms; that in 1744, and 1754, France had this identical plan of invasion chalked out to her by General Lloyd, who was then engaged in the service of that nation, and of the Pretender.

It was just 39 years after the first sketch of this plan of invasion, that the present Rhapsody on the enemy's objects, and the means of defeating such attempts were digested, and printed; and after the author had been engaged in a variety of hot service, as a field officer, in the Prussian, Imperial, and Russian armies. From this we may conclude, that the subject had been arranged, corrected, and improved, with all the military perspicuity and judgment with which General Lloyd was so conspicuously endowed.

This Treatise reflects much light on a late
litigated

litigated and important topic—the propriety of the fortification system, and security of the British marine arsenals on the Channel coast. And as that system still continues to be reprobated by many, the public, and the parliament, if they chuse, may derive from hence intrinsic information. Without the critical talents of an engineer, one might almost, *a priori*, infer, that where nature has left us weak or exposed in any political vital part, that there art should be substituted. In our own formation, we may draw this principle and instruction from the Divine Architect. But, at the same time, I do not presume to assert or maintain, that the Fortifications which, of late years, have been, and those which are yet intended to be erected round Plymouth, and Portsmouth, are the most judicious and effectual for securing these Naval Arsenals. Whether, in their general plan, outline, and position, there may not be errors of dangerous magnitude; whether the projected Lines, and Forts, may not be of too great extent; whether they are calculated to swell the stationary military force beyond its just proportion to the moving force of the Nation; all these disputed and interesting topicks, I leave to the discussion

of abler criticks, and to Parliament.* But, supposing they can bear the test of severe scrutiny, I shall endeavour to demonstrate, that they are not, alone, sufficient for the defence of the Channel frontier.

The Editor of this unrivalled Treatise, considers himself as conferring an essential favour on the nation, by snatching it from obscurity, and restoring it to its merited rank and notice. Are those to be considered as the public's friend, or foe, who point out to them their vulnerable and crazy parts, and the means of self defence; or those who would lull them into apathy, negligence, and security? Which of these most deserve the epithet of parricides? Who is ignorant that the foundings of our coasts, the plans of our forts, and harbours, the charts of our roads, and country, are sold at every geographer's shop? that, in peace at least, all these are as open to the view and access of Frenchmen, as of natives? Can any one be so simple, and credulous, as to suppose that an enemy, so near and vigilant, has not frequently revolved and digested every practicable plan for

* See a late Publication, intituled, "An Examination of the Duke of Richmond's Fortifications."

our domestic destruction, as well as for our neighbours on the Continent? We shall produce convincing proofs to this effect, in the following pages. Their publicity will have the good effect, not only of instructing, but of rendering future Ministers more vigilant and circumspect in discharging this part of their duty. Defence, says a profound writer and politician, is of much more importance to a Nation, than even opulence. But, notwithstanding this importance, I have good reasons to believe, that publication and notoriety alone would produce beneficial consequences, together with seasonable preparation, and prevention. There is more meant here, than I chuse, at present, to express, or proclaim.

Ever since the suppression of this publication, a printed, or manuscript copy of it has been sought after, with extraordinary avidity, by the first military and political characters, and was considered as a valuable acquisition. The Editor knows London Bookfellers who have been repeatedly offered ten guineas for a single copy: and, some years ago, at the sale of General Lloyd's effects, after his decease, a manuscript copy, without the plates, was purchased, for a British Minister of State, at the price

price of one hundred guineas. The Editor also considers it as a duty to the public, and to truth, to add, that, some months ago, he saw a Treatise, under nearly the same title of the present, advertised for sale by a London Bookfeller, with whom he is unacquainted. He did not take the trouble to inspect more of this compilation than the plates; and these he, at one glance, saw were a spurious imposition.

The annexed short account of General Lloyd, is communicated by Mr. Drummond, a gentleman descended from an ancient and noble family in Scotland, whose ancestors were ruined by their unfortunate attachment to the exiled house of Stuart; a gentleman who has since atoned for the mistaken zeal of his family, and for his own juvenile and unavoidable connections, by rendering eminent political services to Great Britain. In General Lloyd's other works, there is no history either of himself, or the place of his nativity,

N. B. Mr. D. was born in France.

Mr.

MR. DRUMMOND'S LETTER

TO THE

EDITOR.

MY First knowledge of General Lloyd was in France, in 1744. He was then, as I understood, a Lay Brother in some religious house. Mr. Gordon, my tutor, recommended him to my father, as a proper person to teach me Geography, and Field Engineering, in which line Mr. Lloyd had given specimens of superior talents to some Scotch and Irish officers in the French service. He appeared to be between 20 and 30 years of age, was a Welchman by birth, and said to be of a respectable family. He had received a liberal education; and, although designed for the church, he said he had been some time with a Lawyer, before he went to France. His aim then was the army; but having no friend

to

to procure him a commission, he was persuaded, by some British priests, to take the habit of a Noviciate, or Monk. Nevertheless, his genius still continued for the military line, and he was engaged to attend my elder brother, and myself, who joined the French army under Marshal Saxe, in 1745. Mr. L. was with us at the battle of Fontenoy, which, I believe, was the first actual service he ever saw. My station, on that day, being a Cadet in the corps of Engineers, as well as a Lieutenant in Lord John Drummond's regiment of Royal Scotch, Mons. de Rochauard, the chief engineer (under whom I acted), saw an acuteness in Mr. Lloyd's manner of drawing, and making sketches of the ground about the villages of Fontenoy (which was a part of my duty to examine and plan), that he got an order from Marshal Saxe to allow Mr. L. to wear our corps uniform, and to attend me, on horseback, as an assistant draughtsman, with the pay of a sub-ensign.

When the expedition to Scotland was set on foot, Mr. Lloyd was appointed *third Engineer*, with the rank of Captain, by a commission from the Pretender. He then went to Nantz, and was with me on board the Elizabeth,

Elizabeth, in the action with the Lion, Capt. Sir Piercy Brett, in the Channel. He behaved gallantly; was wounded in the right shoulder; and, after the fight, we went out of the Elizabeth on board a brig, which carried us after the young Chevalier to Scotland, where we attended him till that Prince arrived at Carlisle. Mr. L. was dispatched from thence with letters to our friends, in Wales: he did not join us again, but went into South Wales, where he re-assumed the character of a Priest, and became a spy, to look round the coasts of Wales, and of the Channel, for an expected French fleet. In this tour, he examined all the coasts from Milford Haven round the Bristol Channel, to Bridgewater, and Barnstaple Bay; continuing his survey from thence to Plymouth, and Dover, and from the Downs to Margate, and London. No man ever was more correct with his eye; he saw at once the advantages and disadvantages of ground; and his remarks were made with so much penetration and judgment, that all his observations were to be depended upon. At length, by some accident, he became suspected; and was taken up in London by a General Warrant. When I came to London, a prisoner of war, in the winter of 1746, after the battle of

of Culloden, I found my friend Lloyd at Carington's, the messenger, in Jermyn Street; where I, with some of my brother officers, were lodged for safety. I rejoiced to see him; but it was not known that he had been with us in Scotland, otherwise he must have been tried as a rebel, and have suffered as such; his mission, knowledge, and great abilities, having made him a considerable object and character of that time.

In 1747, I got him relieved, by means of my relation, a noble Duke, and I then employed him under the denomination of a tutor, seeming never to have known him before. In the same year, he went with me to France, and followed me to the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, where he became in high esteem with Marshal Lovendhall. During that siege, he obtained the rank of *Major*, and was of infinite service in mounting batteries, in choosing ground, and exploring mines, as well as in opening sluices. When I went to Spain, in 1748, my father recommended Major Lloyd to the Earl Marshal, who was at that time in great reputation with the King of Prussia. This nobleman recommended Lloyd to his brother, Marshal Keith; and when I returned
from

from my Spanish voyage, and survey of the coast of Terra Firma, in 1754, I met with him in Paris. At which time, there being a plan laid for an invasion of England, Lloyd was recommended to the Marshal duc de Bellisle, then Minister of war, who had also appointed me to come to England as Commissary General, to superintend all the French prisoners taken before the formal declaration of war, in 1756. Lloyd's former knowledge of the British coast, the exactness of his descriptions, and his genius as a spy, afforded him great advantages on this occasion; in consequence of which, he resigned his Prussian rank, accepted a new Field Officer's commission, in the French service, with an appointment of five louis *per diem*, to re-survey the British coast, and to report thereon to the Duc de Bellisle. He accordingly came to England, in 1756, re-assumed the habit *Bourgeoise*, and, having nothing of a military look, he went where he pleased, as a trader, or rider. Thus he re-examined the British coast, and laid the foundation of his much esteemed Treatise upon the natural strength of Britain; pointing out all that could be done by invasion, and all that might be done by defence. His report, however, made the French Ministry

change

change their intentions of invading Britain; and the Mareschal Duc de Richlieu was better pleased at being sent to Minorca, than to attempt a landing at Torbay.

Lloyd then quitted England, and went to Germany, where he was employed some years in the Austrian and Russian service, and promoted to higher rank. From my remaining in Great Britain, after 1756, and quitting the army, as well as going to the West Indies, in 1758, I lost my friend till about 1776, when I again met with him in London, under the title of General Lloyd. He then told me that he had made his peace here; and afterwards informed me, that he had obtained a pension upon the Chelsea, or Ordinance establishment.

JOHN DRUMMOND.

London, Farnham Street,

Nov. 5, 1790.

PART

PART II.

Consists of Extracts from General Lloyd's Military History, respecting the various modes of invasion, and defence, of all the European nations. From this, I have selected those parts only, which relate to Great Britain and France. The Reader will readily perceive, that these additions tend, essentially, to the elucidation of the interesting topics now under discussion; to collect into a focus all General Lloyd's opinions, and reflections on this subject; and to increase the value of the Rhapsody, as he was pleased to term it.

PART III. OR, SUPPLEMENT,

Is from the Editor's own stores. It appeared to him indispensable, and equally in illustration of the main object and outline of the present Treatise. It exhibits Great Britain, from infancy to manhood, struggling, throughout a series of eighteen centuries, against foreign and domestic assaults, and, in her turn, retaliating upon her aggressors and
C
rivals.

rivals. At the same time, it supplies a portion of what G——l L——d, in his Rhapsody, had recommended, and left unfinished—an Estimate of the relative and absolute Force of Great Britain and France. It will naturally occur to the judicious reader, that the errors, misfortunes, and shipwrecks, of our rude ancestors, furnish their posterity with important practical lessons in difficulties of a similar nature.

I should also apprize the reader, that there are two essential circumstances in which I have ventured to dissent from G——l L——d: these are, certain parts of the Channel frontier, which I conceive to be as inviting to the attack of an invader, as either of those he has principally dwelt upon, and so ably illustrated: 2dly, the general system of Military Tactics. I have also suggested a variety of practical expedients for augmenting our internal security and strength, and for enabling us to encounter an implacable enemy with rational prospects of success. Every impartial judge must assent to this aphorism, that they who cannot, or will not foresee and provide against danger

of

of such magnitude in every shape, are unworthy of both the station and name of Ministers, or Statesmen.

In order to demonstrate still more satisfactorily, the importance of the subject of this Publication, both to the Monarch, and to the Nation at large, I shall transcribe a quotation from a late celebrated British Author, Dr. Smith, in his *Wealth of Nations*. "The *Sovereign* has only three important duties "to attend to; 1st, *The duty of protecting the Society from the violence and invasion of other independent Societies*: 2dly, *The duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the Society from the injustice, or oppression, of every other member of it; or, the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice*: 3dly, *The duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works, and certain public institutions.*" He adds, "an industrious, and, upon that account, a wealthy nation is, of all nations, the most likely to be attacked." Britain and Holland are each in this predicament.

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Dr. Smith, in his *Works of Nature*. "The
Sovereign has only three important duties
to attend to, the duty of providing the
security, the justice and freedom of civil
society, and the duty of providing the
protection, as far as possible, every member
of the society from the injustice, or op-
pression, or every other member of it; or
the duty of establishing an exact admini-
stration of justice. The duty of erect-
ing and maintaining certain public works,
and certain public institutions." He adds,
"an institution, and upon that account a
primary matter is of all nations, the more
likely to be neglected, British and Foreign
are alike in this respect."



A
RHAPSODY

ON
FRENCH POLITICS, &c.

IT is impossible to calculate, with any degree of probability, the duration and event of a war, unless we are acquainted with the political system, principles of government, and resources of the contending powers. I shall, therefore, give a short view of them, which will enable the Reader to form some judgment of the present state of affairs.

CHAP. I.

A general view of the Politics of France during the two last Centuries.

WHILE the House of Austria was all-powerful in Europe, and possessed of many provinces on the west side of the Rhine, now united to France, it was evident that the French nation could have no other permanent system of politics, but that which tended to reduce that House within narrower bounds, particularly in the Low Countries, and towards the Rhine. Accordingly, we find France continually employed in raising disturbances in Germany, Italy, Spain, &c. and exciting the different powers of Europe and Turkey against Austria. Richelieu having reduced the Hugonots, took an active part at the latter end of the war, which had been maintained in Germany for near thirty years; and by the treaty of Westphalia, the French, as one of the guarantees, obtained a right to interfere in the affairs of Germany, of which they have availed themselves on every occasion to embarrass the House of Austria. More than



than once, they brought her to the brink of destruction, and had it not been for the powerful support and assistance of the maritime powers, particularly of England, she must have fallen a victim to the ambition of France. Those powers who feared Austria, very naturally looked up to France for protection, and increased her strength by the addition of their forces.

During the minority of Lewis XIV. the administration of Mazarine was almost totally confined to domestic occurrences, which were sufficiently embarrassing to occupy his whole attention.

Lewis XIV. on taking the reins of government, pursued the system of his predecessors with regard to Austria. Having, in the beginning of his reign, met with great success in war, and added some provinces to his crown, he became ambitious, from that principle, rather than from necessity, (for he was already sufficiently powerful to have nothing to fear from Austria) Lewis did not cease to embroil Europe, almost during his whole reign. In the course of his wars, he found himself checked, chiefly by the maritime

powers; England was out of his reach; without ships of war nothing could be done against her. Seconded by able ministers, in a few years, to the astonishment of all the world, he raised a powerful fleet, and, for a little time, maintained a superiority at sea, of which he availed himself in an attempt to reinstate James II. on the throne of England, but without success. The confederacy formed against the French monarch on the continent became so powerful, particularly towards the close of his reign, that the whole force of his kingdom was scarce sufficient to resist the progress of the allied armies. The marine was of course abandoned, and sunk nearly into the insignificant state in which he found it. Soon after Lewis XV. had mounted the French throne, Cardinal Fleury became prime minister; happily for France, who wanted peace to recover from the innumerable losses which the ambition of Lewis XIV. had brought upon her. This prelate, from principle, as well as temper, pursued invariably a pacific system; the wars excited by the turbulent spirit of Alberoni for the kingdom of Naples, and that on the *Rhine*, occasioned by the *pretensions* of Augustus II. to the throne of Poland, were transitory, and of very short duration.

duration. The House of Austria having imprudently engaged in that quarrel, Fleury availed himself of her distressful situation, to tear Lorraine from her, which connected and compleated the French frontier on the German side.

On the death of Charles VI. a new and general war broke out in Germany, wherein the maritime powers engaged also. Cardinal Fleury wished to keep France neuter, believing either that Austria would find sufficient employment from the several Princes who formed pretensions to the Emperor's succession; and that by remaining neuter, the French might mediate and dictate the terms of peace, without partaking of the dangers and expences of the war: Or, perhaps, judging that France, recovered from her losses, and strengthened by her new acquisitions, would always be a match for Austria hereafter, whatever might be the event of a war. The cardinal, however, was over-ruled, and a general confederacy was formed against the House of Austria, which tended to annihilate her entirely: Indeed the success did not answer the hopes and expectations of the confederates, and things remained in great part,

as they were at the commencement of the war. The King of Prussia acquired Silesia, the King of Sardinia increased his possessions in Lombardy, and a settlement was procured for Don Philip, in the same country. The French and Spanish trade suffered greatly in the course of this war; for the expences of the land armies in Germany and Italy were so excessive, that no effort could be made by these two powers to establish a marine. Our trade and navigation increased, and furnished the means to pursue the war on the continent. France in the mean time excited disturbances in Scotland, which soon were quelled; because, for want of a marine, she could not support them, had she really meant to do it.

The last war offers us a new system of politics adopted by the French, contrary and opposite to that which they had for many ages prosecuted. The House of Austria being no longer an object of fear or jealousy, they engaged in a confederacy, calculated for her aggrandizement, at the expence of a Prince whose alliance they had heretofore, and ought always to have courted. However formidable they might believe France to be, Austria had
likewise

likewise increased in wealth, power, and, above all, her administration, in regard to finances, &c. was much improved. It seemed, therefore, highly advantageous for the French that there should be Princes in Germany, able, in some degree, to check the power of Austria. Prussia, was, of all others, the most proper to be opposed to her, as they had done it with success during the preceding war. There is no explaining a system so very contrary to the apparent interests of France, unless we suppose that court had an after-game to play, as circumstances might offer, during the course of the hostilities.

The French originally engaged to furnish only twenty-four thousand men, avowedly to deliver Saxony; and, if that had been effected, it is probable they would have forced the contending parties to conclude such a peace as they approved of. They had a numerous army to enforce their mediation. I cannot think they intended seriously to promote in the least the greatness of their ancient rivals in power, and much less at the expence of Prussia, whom they will find a powerful and necessary ally, in case of any future war with the former. The negotiations at Teschen
last

last year, and the part they acted there, evince that they are not real friends to the House of Austria.

By engaging partially in the war in Germany, it is probable the French thought they might direct their principal attention to their marine, and to the defence of their colonies. All their schemes were defeated by the extraordinary efforts of the King of Prussia, and the allied army. Their new-raised fleet being beat and dispersed, our superiority at sea enabled us to overcome every obstacle; we conquered all we attacked, and reduced the House of Bourbon so low, that we might have prescribed any terms of peace. Unhappily we mistook entirely in the choice of our acquisitions, some of which, so far from being advantageous, have been one of the principal causes that brought the present calamities upon us. We attend too much to the contracted, and very often selfish, views of the merchants; we act upon too narrow a scale, like traders, and seldom as a powerful nation. In forming treaties, a Minister should have the whole globe before his eyes, and by no means confine himself to this or that province, or branch of trade; these are not to be overlooked,

looked, but they must never serve as a foundation for a treaty, unless you mean to reduce the nation to a company of mercantile people. Towards the end of the war the Duke of Choiseul became all-powerful in the French Ministry. He is a man of a bold, extensive, and enterprising genius. His country found in him the vastness of Richelieu, the activity of Louvois, the magnificence of Seignelay, the amiableness of Pomponne and they dismissed him. He projected and concluded the Family Compact, which unites the different branches of the House of Bourbon in the closest connection, and we now see the effects of that master-piece of politics.

The great losses that the French suffered during the last war, the imminent danger with which the taking of the Havannah, in particular, threatened the rest of the Spanish dominions in America, very naturally drew the whole attention of both nations to us. It was obvious that while we were superior at sea, notwithstanding the disproportion of our land forces, in any future contest, their Colonies would always be exposed to the same danger, and if lost, might not always be restored at a peace. They have therefore
attended

attended to their marine alone; and have pursued this measure with such industry and activity, that a fleet has been raised by them which astonishes Europe, and must be very alarming to England. It is impossible to foresee how far success may correspond with their force or their ambition. Their views are great, and tend to reduce us within very narrow limits. That nothing should divert them from their main object, the French have, with the utmost care, avoided and prevented a German war, which might have engaged a part of their forces, and frustrated the general design against our country.

The present state of affairs enables us to resolve a political problem, often discussed within and without doors, *viz.* Whether continental connections are useful or otherwise to this nation? I need not recapitulate the arguments for and against them; suffice it to say, that while we paid allies on the continent, the attention of France was so intirely taken up in the different wars in Germany, that she could not raise a marine in any degree proportioned to ours; that we have constantly maintained a decisive superiority at sea, which increased the power, glory,

glory, and political influence of the nation, notwithstanding the immense sums which were sent abroad for such connections; that since we have abandoned the continental system, France has acquired an unlimited influence in the different courts of Europe; without anxiety on that side, she has been enabled to direct the whole force of the House of Bourbon against England alone, and God knows what may be the issue of this, I fear, unequal contest. Let us draw a veil over such an alarming prospect: Let every man exert himself to the utmost of his power for the service of his King and Country, that we may avert the storm which hangs over our heads, and baffle the efforts of our combined enemies.

Whoever considers the position of England, and of its Colonies, will perceive that our very existence depends on this circumstance alone, *viz.* that we should be superior at sea; all our politics ought therefore to be directed to that object singly. Had we millions of armed men, equal in discipline to the Prussians, they can be of no use to defend our trade or Colonies; and if we are reduced to defend England, all is over. Why

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has our fleet been neglected? Why have the national funds been consumed and exhausted to multiply land forces, instead of being applied to raise a powerful fleet, which is the only force that can protect us? It is impossible to explain this by any principle of reason; our militia alone are more than sufficient to repel any invaders, if our fleet be superior to theirs; and even the idea of an invasion in that case is absurd. Standing armies appear an useless burthen; and now, to our cost, they will be found totally inadequate to the defence of England and its Colonies.

Having abandoned continental connections, it became more than ever necessary to apply all our resources to the fleet. The question is by no means, whether it be equal or superior to what it was at any other period? I ask, why it is not superior to the fleet of the House of Bourbon? Does it arise from want of funds or men? Why do we not appropriate the sums employed in levying numberless corps, to build ships and raise twenty or thirty thousand marines? Why are not the new levies converted into marines? With proper encouragement this may
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be done, and unless it is done, we sink under the superior forces of the enemies.

Land forces are nothing. *Marines* are the only species of troops proper for this nation; they alone can defend and protect it effectually. During the peace they garrison all your ports in each quarter of the globe; in time of war your fleet is instantly manned; and by employing many of them, fewer seamen are wanted in proportion. Besides, a fleet having on board twelve or fifteen thousand marines, is equal to almost any enterprize against the enemy's settlements, and keeps them in continual anxiety in every part of the world. By this means the expence and delays attending the embarkation of a considerable body of land forces, destined to attack the enemy, would be spared, and the success become more certain. Every other method to prevent the final ruin of this country will be hurtful or ineffectual. *A powerful fleet and thirty thousand marines, I repeat it, will save us from destruction, and nothing else.*

CHAP. II.

Of the Force of Nations, particularly of France, Spain,
and Great Britain.

NO Author, that I know of, has given any data which can enable us to calculate the force of nations; it is therefore with diffidence that I propose my ideas on the subject. I think that the power and strength of a nation depend on the number of its inhabitants and the quantity of their industry. This can be found and estimated only by the yearly revenues raised on the subject, which bear a given proportion to the yearly production of the whole nation. It is the revenue which enables the Sovereign to maintain fleets and armies. It is the number of inhabitants which furnishes men for the one and the other; and in these I place the absolute force of a nation; for its relative force will depend upon position, quantity of industry, strength of contiguous powers, military system, nature of the government, &c. which vary often in the course of a few years. It is therefore necessary we should attend only
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to the absolute force of nations, when we compare them with each other, in order to form a general scale, by which we measure their strength.

France contains above twenty millions of inhabitants: the yearly revenues of that kingdom amount to above sixteen millions sterling, five of which being appropriated to pay the interest of the national debt, eleven only will remain free, and according to our system, the absolute force of the French nation will be thirty-one.

Spain contains more than seven millions and a half of inhabitants in Europe, and above two in America, with a yearly revenue of five millions; so that her absolute force will amount to about fifteen. Consequently the absolute force of the House of Bourbon will be found equal to forty-six.

To this sum may be added that of our Revolted Colonies, which increases still the force united against us.

I wish that others, better informed than I am, would calculate the force of my own
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country upon this principle, and compare it with that of the House of Bourbon: though the contrast might appear very unfavourable to England, I do not doubt but her relative force, compared also with that of her enemies, would make amends for the enormous disproportion in point of inhabitants and revenues.

CHAP. III.

Of the Analogy between the Form of Government and the
State of War.

DESPOTISM acts with the rapidity of a torrent; like it it leaves desolation and solitude behind, or it declines into a lethargy. In despotism there is no system; its motions are instantaneous, and arise from trifles, or the caprice of the moment. They are extremely violent, but transitory. If you can resist, or more safely avoid, their first impetuosity, you will easily conquer in the end.

Monarchy, though not so violent and rapid in its motions, is sufficiently strong to collect and exert the national forces. When endowed with wisdom, it directs them, so that they procure the most general and permanent advantages. It is like a majestic river, which, if kept within bounds, and its waters judiciously distributed, embellishes and enriches the country. But when Administration is too violent, this beneficent river becomes a torrent, and ruins the country: if weak, it

branches out into a thousand small rivulets, which finally dwindle to nothing.

As in monarchies the whole power of the state is centered in one man, and the exercise of it depends upon his will alone, to prevent a sudden and capricious use of it, which in a short time might ruin the state, it ought to be a maxim established in this kind of government, that the administration should be confined to many people, that the departments should be separated, and that the council of state should be numerous, because the government of one man being naturally quick and violent, it requires a number of checks to prevent an improper use, or rather abuse, of such extensive powers.

As all military operations require vigour and constancy, it is evident that a monarchical government is singularly adapted to war. Different from despotism, regular plans and systems may be pursued, and the government is sufficiently strong to execute them with the necessary vigour. As the subjects are attached to the Sovereign chiefly by the idea of glory, they cheerfully concur with him in supporting an offensive war; if successful, their ef-
forts

forts increase, and therefore are not easily checked. Misfortunes, and consequently a defensive war, allay their courage. They soon perceive they do not fight for themselves, and feel only the miseries of the war, which they suppose is carried on to gratify the ambition and caprice of the Sovereign, or of some favourite. Hence it is, that monarchies in general are more adapted to an offensive than a defensive war.

Pursuing the metaphor adopted above, I will say that a republican government is like a great river, formed by a multiplicity of springs and rivulets, different in that from a despotic, or a monarchy, which arises from one alone. If the comparison be just, it follows, that in this kind of government there should be a sufficient force to collect and unite the different springs, and give the whole that *precise direction* which is most advantageous. A republican government, however, labours under this very great disadvantage: It is almost impossible to determine what degree of power ought to be vested in the executive part of the state, so that it should be sufficient to answer every purpose of government, and how to form such checks as may effectually

prevent any abuse of that power to the danger of the state. Is it too much, liberty is gone; is it too little, anarchy ensues. The very long duration of the republic of Venice would induce one to conclude, that those wise republicans had resolved this very difficult problem.

The extreme difficulty of *collecting, uniting,* and *directing* the national forces in a republican government, shews that it is by no means calculated for war, and much less for an offensive one. Its principles being founded in equality, it is evident that war of every kind ought to be avoided, because it necessarily throws too much power into the hands of one or few men, which finally destroy the government. It is also from the want of unity and sufficient force to exert the powers of the state, that all confederacies, however formidable, have failed in their schemes, if the war has been of any duration. The famous league of Cambray, the leagues formed against France at different times, and against Austria; that against Prussia in the last war, and a hundred more, were dissolved without producing any effect proportioned to their forces.

Republics,

Republics, unless formed upon military principles, as was that of the Romans, are totally unfit for action. Nothing could unite the Greek republics against Persia, till the time of Alexander the Great, when they had nearly lost their liberty; but when attacked, what prodigious efforts did they not make for the common cause. It is certainly true, that republics, unless forced by the immediate sense of their danger, never have that unanimity and vigour necessary to carry on a war with any probability of success, and therefore are proper only for a defensive war. There, indeed, their efforts increase in proportion to the danger with which they are threatened; and if the motives arise from civil or religious principles, they generally become invincible. When such motives disappear, and the sense of danger vanishes, each party pursues its own interest, and the confederacy is dissolved.

I am so convinced of the truth of this reasoning, that I have not the least doubt, if we could hold New-York, Long Island, Rhode Island, and Philadelphia, and cease to make those fruitless and unmeaning excursions in the American woods, that the Congress and

the rebel people, no longer united by the sense of fear, would soon dissolve their confederacy, and a more favourable opportunity would offer of restoring peace and union between them and the mother country. The troops employed on the American Continent might enable us to strike some capital stroke in the West Indies, which would constrain our enemies to bring a part of their forces to that country; for in the West Indies is their weak part, and there they may be attacked with advantage.

CHAP. IV.

Of the French Invasion expected: their objects: the difficulties which they have to encounter: and the advantages on the side of Great Britain.

WHILE the terrors of an invasion and its consequences hang over our heads, it is the duty of every man to contribute with his person and advice to the support of the state, and point out the means which appear proper to defeat the designs of our enemies. With this view I have wrote the following discourse on the supposed invasion, and hope it may serve, in some measure, to render it fruitless, and inspire government, as well as the nation in general, with that confidence which the situation of our affairs require. Without confidence, his Majesty cannot avail himself, with any prospect of success, of the national forces.

The enemies, superior at sea, and moreover, having a land force sufficient for any purpose, may have three objects in view. The first and most capital would be to land a powerful

powerful army in England. If success should follow their operations, it is evident we must conclude a peace on any terms, and the war is soon brought to an end. This enterprize is decisive, and therefore preferable to any other.

Their next object might be to take possession of the Western provinces, and to maintain themselves there for a few months only, without making any further progress into the country; then our commerce would be totally intercepted, and our whole attention confined to the immediate defence of the state; so that our foreign settlements would, in a short time, fall of course into their hands. Such an expedition is very bold, but it is equally dangerous, and it might prove fatal to their army. It is possible, therefore, that their show and parade should be intended only to keep us at home, and ruin our trade, while, with the rest of their forces, they attack our colonies, Gibraltar, Minorca, &c.

Finally, to increase our distress, the combined enemies may land fifteen or twenty thousand men in the Bay of Galway, and
cover

cover themselves with the Shannon. The inhabitants of Connaught, equally poor and ignorant, might be induced to join them, and it would not be an easy matter to drive their army out of that country, if their fleet could support their army with provisions. Such a scheme offers all the advantages of *the* former, without being subject to the same difficulties as *the* second; the season being now far advanced, it is probable they may not think it eligible to attempt an invasion in England for the present, and next year we shall be much better prepared to receive them. Perhaps they may then find it too dangerous an undertaking, and without adopting any of the two first plans we have supposed, they will attempt to land in Ireland, or only shew themselves in the Channel. However, as an invasion of England, with a powerful army, may be attended with fatal consequences, I shall confine my observation to that alone, and endeavour to shew how it may be frustrated.

The appearance and force of the combined fleet prove the intention of bringing affairs to a speedy conclusion, and had they met with us, and fought with success, I have not the
least

least doubt they would have invaded this kingdom with a formidable number of troops. Every thing was then, and is now prepared for that purpose : when I consider their immense superiority, and foresee the probable event of a battle, I cannot help applauding those councils which tended to avoid it, as well as the prudence with which they were followed. Time and delays, at this moment, and at this season of the year, are a victory. Had we beat the combined fleet, little more would have been attained, whereas the loss of a battle might have been fatal.

While our fleet is entire, though we may, for a time, be forced out of the sea, yet am I persuaded that no invasion can take place. It is always a dangerous enterprize, and not to be attempted while there remains a possibility of our appearing at sea ; which may happen from a thousand circumstances arising from wind and weather, in the winter especially, when the combined fleet must separate, and all communication with the army they may have landed must be cut off. Our fleet, in the mean time, may intercept their convoys, and block up the harbour when they have established their *dépôts* ; so that in a short

short time their troops must perish. It is not enough that they debark an army, it must be continually supplied and protected from France, otherwise, however numerous, it cannot make any progress or penetrate into the country.

If, contrary to our hopes and expectations, the British fleet is beat and drove into some harbour, and the enemy does land a powerful army, we must not despond, nor by groundless fears facilitate the success of the invaders: a just and entire confidence in government is necessary to our preservation, and the common danger should produce an union of all parties in the defence of their country. It is needless to trace the causes which have brought our affairs to this crisis; such a task would only lead to sow division and discontent, when concord and harmony are most required. But I would beg leave to recommend to the stockholders not to be alarmed, and let their fears prevail over their reason. If to secure their property, they draw on their bankers, and attempt at once to realize their securities, they will infallibly bring ruin and destruction on themselves and families. For though there be a sufficient sum to answer every

every purpose of trade and circulation; as well as to pay the interest allowed on such securities, successively as it becomes due; yet is there not in this, nor in any other country, money enough to pay off all the principals, and if it is attempted, a bankruptcy must ensue; the monied men are ruined, and the whole nation is thrown into a convulsion, which may prove incurable, particularly if the enemy is in the country. Whereas if they remain quiet, and repose a proper confidence in Government, we shall, no doubt, be able to repel the danger which threatens us. The resources of this country are numerous, they are great, and when properly exerted, will enable us to overcome our enemies, however formidable, and force them to lay down their arms.

Though the frontier of a country, as is that of England, may be very extensive, and therefore seems very difficult to be defended; yet upon a due examination, it will be always found, that such a frontier can be attacked only in few points, and that these points are fixed and determined by the nature and position of the countries at war. An army, like a traveller, must necessarily depart from a given

given point, and proceed to a given point in the enemy's country. The line which unites these points, I call *the Line of Operation*. It is manifest that all deviation from this, and all delays in pursuing the march, are so much time lost; and in the end, will force an enemy to return either for want of subsistence, or by bad weather, &c. To diminish the difficulties which oppose the progress of the main army on the Line of Operation, sometimes a corps is made to act on another line to create a diversion; but such a corps can never produce a solid advantage, if you attend to the main point, and frustrate the designs of the principal army.

When the frontiers of the contending powers are contiguous, the magazines formed in the country which attacks may for some time supply the invading army, until by a victory it is enabled to take some capital fortress, and secure a tract of the enemy's country sufficient to form a new *dépôt* to support the whole, or a great part of the troops, during the winter. If this cannot be executed, it is evident the attacking army must, after a fruitless campaign, return to its own country. In
proportion

proportion as an army advances into the enemy's country, new *dépôts* must be continually formed, and these as near as possible; for when they are at any considerable distance, the convoys arrive slow, require strong escorts, and are so precarious, that the army can neither move nor act, especially if the country is close and the defending enemy active: let him give his whole attention to attack the invading army's communications, and he must live day and night on their Line of Operation. In general, commanders mistake the principles of a defensive war, and very absurdly endeavour to check and stop the progress of an enemy, by opposing him in front in some advantageous post, which method is, for the most part, ineffectual or dangerous. You are often forced to a general action, whose consequences may be fatal, as victory will enable your adversary to fix himself in some part of the country, from whence, the ensuing campaign, he begins his operations sooner, and with additional advantages. This cannot be done if you avoid a general action, and employ the greatest part of your forces on his Line of Operation; which is the only effectual and sure means to stop his progress;

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let him advance in front, the length of his line will weaken it, and offer your attacks certain and decisive success.

If the frontiers are not contiguous, and be separated by the territories of other Princes, by forests, deserts, mountains, and above all by the sea; it is clear, that so many difficulties will occur in such an undertaking, as that of an invasion, that it is almost impossible it should succeed.

An army which acts over a branch of the sea, *must occupy some convenient and safe harbour*; gain a great and decisive battle; or by skilful manœuvres force the enemy to abandon such a tract of country as will, in a great measure, support the assailant; for if he depends in the smallest degree on shipping, and a precarious navigation for supplies, he cannot prosecute any solid operation, and successive campaigns will be consumed in fruitless and unmeaning excursions; troops must, however, return to the shore to take up their winter quarters, and at last his men and money being exhausted, he perishes totally, or abandons the enterprize with loss and ignominy.

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From hence it appears, that an offensive war must be prosecuted with the utmost vigour and activity; for nothing less than compleat victories can render it successful. Consequently a defensive war must be carried on with caution and prudence, and above all things, a general action is to be avoided. You oppose the enemy in front by occupying strong posts, and with the remainder of your forces you act on his flanks and rear; which in a short time will reduce him, though much stronger, to fall back and approach his *dépôts*. If King Harold had followed this doctrine, it is probable we should have known William the Conqueror by his defeat only.

Let us now apply the principles established above to the present case.

It is evident that *Brest* is the point from whence the French must depart; because all their operations, even when they have landed, are connected with and depend upon their fleet. But as all operations which depend on navigation, are, from its nature, precarious, and liable to a thousand difficulties, they must have likewise a place of arms in this country, a spacious harbour, as near
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their own coast as possible, &c. and besides these advantages, absolutely required, the place must be so situated that by marching a few miles inland, they can occupy such a post as will render them masters of a tract of country behind their army sufficient to supply it with subsistence on their stops; without which, no progress can be made, nor can they remain for any considerable time in any part of the country. The plan which offers these advantages, is the most eligible of any they can fix upon.

Plymouth answers perfectly this description. It is a safe and convenient harbour, near the coast of France; and by marching only to Chudleigh, the invaders will be masters of Cornwall, Devonshire, and part of Somersetshire, where they can find provisions in abundance; which will enable them to prosecute their operations, and penetrate further into the country, or if they chuse to remain there, it would be a difficult matter to drive them back, as they would have a fleet at Plymouth; and our trade being once destroyed, we must conclude a peace on the terms they chuse to impose upon us. I am happy to find that such measures have been

taken by Government for the defence of that very important place, as leave us no room to fear for it.

When a *coup de main* only is intended, you must debark as near the object you have in view as possible, because the success depends on secrecy and surprize: but when you propose to wage war in a country, you are to land your troops at a distance, that you may have time to bring your stores on shore, fortify a camp, take some capital position, and then proceed gradually towards the point you have in view. General O'Reilly, in his expedition against Algiers, adopted another mode, and failed in the enterprize; he lost great part of his army, and his reputation as an officer.

Next to *Plymouth*, the only place which can serve the purpose of the enemy, is *Portsmouth*. It has two fine roads, St. Helen and Spithead, and a very safe harbour. The town and the dock on the land side are fortified, and cannot be taken without a regular siege, the undertaking of which is very difficult, though we had no ships to defend it. The island of Portsea lies very low, and does

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not furnish the necessary materials to carry on the works, required on such occasions. The enemy must occupy Gosport with part of his army, while the remainder carries on the siege, and if we are masters of Portsdown, and can confine him to the island, we are always able to succour the place, and force him to retire, which he would find no easy matter. The lines of Gosport are of no use, and those towards Portsdown are against us, if the invader is in the island, being calculated only to stop an enemy coming from Portsdown, which I presume he never will be permitted to occupy. The lines of Gosport are equally imperfect; a good *fort* should be raised on a rising ground, a few hundred yards off, which would render it impossible for the enemy to attempt any thing on that side. In case he should ever land in the island of Portsea, a few redoubts must also be added before the front of the works which cover the dock, to prevent his approaching near enough to throw shells into the dock, which he might now do, as those works are not advanced far enough into the country; an unreasonable respect for private property having occasioned their being kept so far back.

When I considered at first the position of the *Isle of Wight*, I thought that an enemy might occupy it, and with fifteen or twenty thousand men keep possession of the whole ground; but having lately examined it with proper attention, I believe now that it is absolutely impossible. This island runs from East to West, and is generally intersected with very high mountains, whose basis run quite to the shore. On the South side of the island they rise by ranges, like an amphitheatre, almost perpendicular, forty or fifty feet high, and the summits, excepting in a very few places, to above a thousand; so that if any troops are posted on them, there is no possibility of landing. The only place where it is less difficult is in Brading Bay, opposite St. Helen's Road. This is a small creek between two very high hills, which being occupied, will prevent a landing. On the South side is a bay, where the shore is low, and very proper for debarking troops; but Sandown Fort defends that bay very well. From thence to the Westernmost point and the Needles, no place is found where a landing can be attempted if there is the least opposition: Besides, the coast is so open and dangerous, that a boat, much less

less a fleet, cannot lay at anchor an hour without the utmost risk of perishing. From the Needles to Ride you may land any where, and a fleet may anchor in safety, there being a sufficient depth of water for men of war to come through the Needles, and all the way up to Spithead. The channel between the *Needles* and *Hurst Castle* is narrow, but it is safe for the largest vessels. The Castle does not seem sufficiently strong against ships of force; but if two considerable batteries were erected on the two points which project into the sea opposite the fortress, I believe that pass would be perfectly secured.

Though the difficulties which occur in landing on the South side of the Isle of Wight, and indeed of approaching it, seem insurmountable, yet if no opposition is made, it might be effected; however, if we consider the extent of the island, the great number of very high mountains, and of places to land from our side, it will appear that twenty thousand men would not be able to occupy it in such a manner as to prevent our taking it from them. They must fortify all the shore opposite the New Forest, as well as all the downs or mountains behind them; for

there is no one spot on the whole island where the most extensive fortrefs could, in any degree, secure the possession of it to the French. If it is placed on the South shore, there is neither bay nor harbour; and by our occupying some neighbouring mountains, the garrison would be starved in it. The same difficulty will occur if placed in the centre, or on the Northern shore, at Cowes, Yarmouth, &c. from whence I conclude, that while England exists as a nation, an enemy cannot keep the Isle of Wight a month, though there were thirty thousand men in it.

From *Portsmouth* to *Harwich* there is no harbour or road which can, in any degree, answer the purposes of an enemy, who intends to land a considerable army, and make war in the country. The difficulty, though very great, does not consist in debarking forty thousand men; it is also necessary, as I have already demonstrated, that they should have a commodious and safe harbour, a place of arms, and be so situated as to keep a sure and easy communication with France, especially with Brest. Such a place is not to be found on the whole coast, except Plymouth, and Portsmouth, of which enough
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has been said already. The Dutch fleet, they say, came up the river very well; but how long did they remain there? A few hours only. Consider, besides, the great difference there is between coming from the coast of Holland with twenty men of war, to make a ridiculous bravado, which lasted twenty-four hours, or coming from Brest with a fleet, and four or five hundred transports to invade us, and to carry on a war into the heart of our country. The one is easy, the other impracticable.

Though I am convinced such an attempt neither will nor can be made in Suffex, Kent, or higher up; I do not think it impossible, that in order to facilitate the operations of their main army, the enemies may threaten different and distant parts of the coast; but no solid operation can, in my opinion, be executed but in the West.

Upon this supposition, it appears that our troops are too much scattered, and cannot be brought together without a great loss of time, wherever they may land.

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Whenever a tract of country is to be defended, reason points out the necessity of occupying some *central positions*, with strong corps to the right and left, to stop the enemy till the whole can be collected. *The Line we have to defend extends from Plymouth to Dover.* Portsdown is the central point in that line, I would therefore recommend, that a third part of our army be placed there and in the New Forest; another third on *Hall Down Hill*, beyond Exeter; and the remaining third *in the limits between Sussex and Kent*, on that branch of the river Medway, called the Teise. If an attempt is made to the Westward, the body encamped at Portsmouth will march thither, and join that on Hall Down, which I suppose instantly in motion where the invasion is attempted. The body placed in Sussex may remain there, and by a movement to the right or left, be any where, as occasion may require, and easily repulse every attempt made on that coast.

Should the enemy land at Plymouth, which I think most probable, for the reasons already assigned, the regiments now there will be able to dispute the ground, until those on Hall Down can come to their assistance; and
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it does not require twenty-four hours march. Opposed in front by the corps at Plymouth, which is covered by the works now raising there, as well as by the natural strength of the country, and attacked in the rear by the troops coming from Hall Down, an enemy, though far superior in number, would find himself greatly embarrassed. Surrounded by the sea, by strong forts, and a stronger country, occupied by fifteen or twenty thousand men, without ground sufficiently extensive to form a line, I do not conceive it possible how he could avoid a total overthrow. There is not a spot about Plymouth, if properly occupied, and protected by the most inconsiderable works, but will require a siege to force you, which cannot be undertaken while you have any body of troops in the neighbourhood.

The same difficulties, and much greater, will occur to an enemy in the island of Portsea; he can neither subsist there, nor from the adjacent country, if we have a camp on Portsdown, and another in the New Forest.

From what we have said, it seems evident that no invasion can take place, until our fleet, intirely drove out of the sea, is forced
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to hide itself for a considerable time in some harbour; and that such an invasion cannot be prosecuted with any probability of success, unless the enemy is master of Plymouth or Portsmouth. Let us now proceed to examine the consequences, in case such an event should happen.

Supposing the enemy is in possession of Plymouth, he cannot remain there for ever; he will, in a short time, be forced to penetrate further into the country, in order to procure supplies of provision, or abandon his post for want of them. To remain there with any safety, he must occupy and fortify Mount Edgecumbe, and the ground behind the King's Brewhouse, as well as all the ground between the Tamar and that branch of the sea which runs under Mr. Parker's garden to the bridge at the three mile stone, coming to London; he should moreover have a body of troops in Mr. Parker's ground. Forty or fifty thousand men would not be sufficient for the purpose, because these being separated from the sea and the Tamar, could not, in case of an attack, support each other; and if one only of them is defeated, the others must fall successively, and in a very short time. The greatest

greatest part of the invader's army will naturally be posted between the Tamar and the sea, by the bridge above mentioned, which puts the Docks, Store-house, and Plymouth behind them; this distance is near five miles, and requires twenty thousand men to defend it, which they cannot easily do, for the ground rises gradually from the shore to Dartmoor, so that you have every possible advantage in attacking their posts. The most sure method, however, would be to attack the corps placed at Mount Edgecumbe, which being beat, the others must be destroyed. *Mount Edgecumbe is the key of Plymouth, and must be kept with care.*

Though the enemies are in possession of all the different posts above mentioned, and have thereby a place of arms, and a fine harbour for their fleet, with which, for a time, they may put an intire stop to all our trade and navigation, yet it can only be for a time. The *combined fleet* cannot always remain there, and the army consisting of fifty or sixty thousand men, cooped up in such narrow limits, cannot subsist by the supplies brought from France. They must therefore advance into the country or abandon it. The only decisive
operation

operation they could execute would be, to leave ten thousand men at Plymouth, and with the remainder proceed directly to Hall Down, between Chudleigh and Exeter, which is about thirty-six miles from Plymouth. This position is very strong, whether it is taken with the front towards Exeter, or towards Plymouth. There is no passing between the enemy's right, and the sea; and by an easy movement on the left, he is in the mountains, through which all the western roads must pass towards Cornwall. By taking this position, the enemy would be master of Devonshire and Cornwall, which would furnish subsistence in abundance, and having Teignmouth, Torbay, and Dartmouth very near, he would also receive from France whatever he wanted. Possessed of these advantages, and having a very strong country easily to be defended, it would become difficult to drive him back; and while his fleet, destroying our trade, rode triumphant at sea, we should be reduced to accept of any peace he chused to dictate. It is therefore incumbent upon us to post ourselves so, that we may be near enough to prevent an invading army from penetrating into the country, if we cannot hinder it from taking Plymouth. The means and method of
doing

doing this (of confining him to the shore) depending chiefly on the nature of the country, I shall therefore give a description of it, so far as it relates to military operations.

All countries are either *open* or *close*. By an *open* country, I mean that where an army, or a considerable body of troops, can almost any where find sufficient room to form in, and to act; consequently, by a *close* country, I mean that where an army, in the course of many miles, cannot find room to form and act in. By the word *defile*, I mean a narrow pass formed by mountains, hills, forests, rivers, morasses, hedges, &c. where the road is so contracted, that few men only can advance in front. In the first species of country, it is evident, that superior numbers must prevail, if the troops are equal in goodness, and the commander knows how to avail himself of that superiority; for this plain reason, that he can bring a greater number of men into action at any given time, and at any given point, than his adversary. Whereas in a close country, number is nothing, and disposition is every thing. In such a country, points only can be attacked, and by a given number of men only. So that if you occupy
these

these points, though otherwise much inferior to the enemy, you may bring more men into action than he, and consequently prevail: besides, these points may be such as to enable you to attack him in front, flank and rear at the same time.

England, in general, is of this last kind; the western country is not only very hilly, but also for the most part full of inclosures. As you come from Exeter towards London, it is so inclosed with hedges and ditches, that for many miles together, you do not find ground sufficiently open to form twenty battalions upon; so that the high road, where an army can alone march, is one continued pass, or defile, winding at the foot of the mountains, or through the inclosures, of which you may see the specimen in Plate II. Those mountains and hedges, being properly occupied, an enemy cannot advance a step; and if he is once engaged in them, he can never extricate himself out of the narrow labyrinth, and will be forced to lay down his arms.

There are two roads, which may be called military roads, from Plymouth to Exeter; the one

one passes by Ivy Bridge, Chudleigh and Ashburton. The other by Ivy Bridge, Totness, Newton Bushel, and over Hall Down Hill to Exeter. On the first road there are but two places, viz. Hall Down, four miles beyond Exeter, and a heath two miles beyond Chudleigh, where any considerable body of men can form upon. The remainder of the road is one continued defile, intersected by mountains, rivers, hedges and numberless rivulets, besides the Teign and the Dart, which come from Dartmoor, and fall into the sea. Though these are not very deep, yet being near the mountains, they are very rapid, and when the rain falls (which is frequent in the West) become very dangerous torrents; their beds are full of large stones, and the banks high, so that you can get over them only at the bridges, where the high road passes. The whole country between this road and the sea coast, from Exmouth to Plymouth, is exactly the same, so that an army can march but in *one column*. If to avoid the difficulties and dangers which arise from such a disposition, the enemy should separate his forces, and advance in two columns, along the two roads above mentioned; there being no communication by means of cross roads, you may attack either or both

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columns

columns separately, for they cannot support each other until they come to Hall Down: nor in all that tract of country is there a single spot where you may not attack the enemy in front, flank and rear, since the road is continually winding round the foot of the hills.

Between the Teign and the Dart the ground is rather more hilly, and more easily defended. There is but one narrow road, which goes from Dartmouth to Newton Bushel, near which the tide flows. A few miles from Dartmouth, a branch of it turns off to Totness, and several paths from towns on the coast, as Torbay, Paygnton, &c. come into the main road, leading to Hall Down or to Plymouth. However, a body of men landing between Dartmouth and Teignmouth, must finally pass through Newton Bushel in their way to Exeter, or through Totness going to Plymouth. There goes likewise from Dartmouth to Plymouth a road over the mountains, by Modbury. All these roads are equally difficult, insomuch that no wheel carriages are used by the farmers, who carry in their harvest on horses. The only proper places between Plymouth and Exmouth where
ships

ships can approach, are Dartmouth and Teignmouth; but as the entrance is very narrow, and entirely commanded by mountains, a few battalions would easily prevent a landing.

From Teignmouth, towards Exeter, there runs a very high mountain called Hall Down or Haldon Hill, already mentioned. The top is a fine plain, where a numerous army might camp and act. All the roads, as I have said, to and from the West, pass over it; but an army can come upon it only by the two roads, leading from Newton Bushel and Exmouth, both very difficult. On the South side towards the Teign and Newton Bushel, the hill is rapid. On the West side it falls gradually, and forms many small hills, whose bases form very deep ravins: these hills project quite into the sea, which does not admit of any convenient place for landing troops, and is moreover so shallow that no ships of burthen can approach the shore. Upon the whole, the country from Exeter to Plymouth is so extremely close and difficult, that a few men, properly disposed, will stop, and ruin a numerous army.

From Exeter, where most of the western roads join, there are but two roads towards Salisbury, which may be practicable for an army; to Axminster there is only one. At this place begin the two, one to the left through Yeovil, Sherborne, Shaftesbury, and over the Downs; the other to the right by Bridport, Dorchester and Blandford, to Salisbury. The first road as far as Shaftesbury is intersected by numberless hills and vallies, extremely close and cultivated, so that an army can march only in one column. There is scarce a spot where you cannot occupy some post across the road to prevent an enemy from advancing, while the hedges on both sides, lined with your infantry, would so embarrass him, that he could neither advance or retire, or indeed make any defence on the ground for want of room to form a line. From Shaftesbury to Salisbury the road passes over a narrow down, having on one side a high ridge of mountains, which runs towards Blandford, and Cranbourn chace, and on the other a deep and wide valley very close. This down is also cut by a great number of ravins, so that very often there is not room to form a single battalion. If the ridge of mountains, and the valley are occupied,

occupied, no army can proceed on the high road; nor can it be separated into several columns, without exposing them to be beat in detail, as from the nature of the ground they cannot support each other. The road which goes by Bridport is extremely difficult till you are about two miles beyond that place; then the country opening as far as Salisbury, becomes less inclosed, and offers every where ground sufficient to form a numerous army upon, and very proper for a general action, if you are superior in cavalry.

From Salisbury two roads go towards London: the first by Andover, Basingstoke, Basingstoke, Egham, Staines, &c. Near the seven mile stone a branch goes by Stockbridge over some very high hills, and joins it at Basingstoke: this branch passes through an open country, which however being very high, offers many excellent camps. The first is also carried for some miles through an open country; but about Andover, and from thence to Basingstoke, and Hartford-bridge, it is very close. The other road goes by Rumsey, Farnham, &c. through a country which is still more close than the former, and in proportion

portion affords greater advantages in attacking the enemy.

It is needless to prosecute this description any further, because I am persuaded, that no army, however numerous, will ever be able to penetrate forty miles into the country, if proper methods are taken to oppose it, and if we know how to avail ourselves of the numberless resources which may be drawn from the face of the country. And I have no doubt, from the known experience, firmness, and abilities of the commander in chief*, but that the event, should an invasion take place, will justify the high trust that his Majesty has placed in him, and fully answer the expectations of the public.

The description I have given is exceedingly imperfect, as no map, plan, or drawing, can convey a true military, and adequate idea of any country. The eye alone, and a good one, accustomed to view ground on a grand scale, very different from that of a parade, can do it effectually. I think, however, that what I have said, if read with

* Lord Amherst.

attention,

attention, accompanied with the map annexed, (*Plate 1.*) will shew the lines on which the enemy can act, as well as the advantages or disadvantages of the country, through which such lines must necessarily pass. The commander in chief, and his officers, upon examining the ground, will easily fix the particular *points* where to act, while these points, and the *motions* of the enemy will shew *how* to act, as circumstances may require.

CHAP. V.

Observations on the method of ranging the Troops, and of making War, &c. and additional detail of the Invaders difficulties.

THE French army has, no doubt, some advantages over ours at present (the veteran regiments being almost all in America): it is composed of old corps, which have been accustomed to exercise and discipline for many years: the officers of the higher ranks have seen service, and many of them have commanded separate corps during the last war. The habit of being united for a long time *together*, gives them a facility in manœuvring, a consistency and adherence of parts, if I may so call it, not so easily broke as in new levies; all which must insure them a great superiority in a plain and open country, and in a general action. In a close country, where the combat is partial, and confined to particular posts, valour and a good disposition will supply, in a great measure, the defects inherent to new corps.

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Though in point of discipline, our enemies, at present, enjoy some advantages over us, we possess so many over them, in every other respect, that, if we avail ourselves of them, there can be no room left to fear the event of the invasion, with which we are now threatened.

1st, The face of the country forces them to march in one column; and this difficulty alone overbalances almost every other advantage.

2dly, They have but little cavalry, which from the nature of the country, may not, if we chuse it, ever have an opportunity of acting.

3dly, They can have no heavy artillery, and not many field pieces, compared to what we can bring into the field.

4thly, They can have no other provisions but what they bring with them, which, however abundant it may seem, will last only for a very short time.

5thly,

5thly, They can never have a sufficient number of horses and carriages to transport their stores, artillery, baggage, provisions, &c. which will retard their march, so that they cannot advance above a mile or two in one day.

6thly, When they proceed from the shore, they can form no magazines in the country, and must be supplied from their original *dépôt*; and when their line of communication is protracted to a certain length, half their army will not be sufficient to escort their convoys, which you may, and must intercept. This will not only retard their progress, but very soon stop them entirely, and force their army to go back. They have but this alternative, to gain a great and decisive victory, or abandon the enterprize. They cannot remain on the spot, in a close country, surrounded by mountains on every side, and those occupied by our troops: and we have nothing to do but to profit of these advantages, and avoid a general action.

7thly, They cannot send detachments, or deviate from the great road, without being exposed

exposed to certain destruction: whereas we, availing ourselves of every cross road and path, can without risk attack their whole line of march, and soon throw it into confusion. They can act on that only; whereas we can act where, and when we please.

To these natural advantages we may, I think, procure others from a different manner of ranging the troops, and of carrying on the war.

The present mode of ranging the infantry three men deep, armed with muskets only, is subject to many and very great defects.

First, The line becomes too extensive, and is therefore weak; it cannot advance in any ground, particularly in a close one, without the greatest difficulties and delays, contrary to the very principle of military operations, which should be as quick as lightning.

Secondly, It is inadequate to almost every purpose of war, as well against infantry as cavalry, and proper only for fighting at a distance. If you approach the enemy, the line is too weak, the arms too short for a
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shock, and veteran troops will have a decisive superiority. Placed behind entrenchments, hedges, ditches, &c. which naturally offer great advantages, you can make no resistance from the moment the enemy attacks them, so that unless you keep him off by your fire, he penetrates somewhere, and you must abandon the whole, or be taken in flank, and cut to pieces.

To remedy these defects, I humbly propose, that the infantry be ranged four deep, and that the fourth rank be armed with a Pike eleven or twelve feet long, two feet of which must be made of steel, two inches broad, to cut on each side, without an hatchet, or cross bar, that it may easily pass through the hedges. This fourth rank must be composed of the tallest and strongest men.

This formation will render the line less extensive, stronger, and much more active, is proper for every operation, and particularly adapted to our country, every where inclosed with hedges and ditches. In a plain, no infantry formed in the usual manner can resist its shocks an instant, or even approach your line, much less if this is placed behind an entrench-

entrenchment, or hedge. Moreover, if you form a battalion or two into squares, protected by some howitzers on the flanks, no cavalry, however brave, can overturn them. The three first ranks protected by a row of Pikes, which project before them at least five feet, will feel the advantage, and soon find their superiority in whatever ground they are attacked, as well as in attacking the enemy : —(Plate 3.)—Let an experiment be made, the event will shew the superiority of the method I propose over that now in practice. It is a novelty. Very true; and this novelty will not a little disconcert the enemy.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Order of Battle.

THE order of battle now adopted in Europe is, in many respects, defective and absurd. The infantry and cavalry formed three deep make the line so very extensive, that it loses all its activity, which is the soul of military manœuvres, and alone can insure success: insomuch that it may be established as an axiom, that the army which moves and marches with the greatest velocity, must, from that circumstance alone, finally prevail. Our military institutions exclude every idea of celerity; hence it is that our victories are never compleat and decisive, and that our attacks are reduced to some particular points, which gained or lost, the battle is over; the enemy retires generally in good order, because from the extent and slowness of our motions we cannot pursue him with any vigour; he occupies some neighbouring hill, and we have to begin again. Moreover, the position of the cavalry in a line on the flanks of the infantry,

is

is such that it retards the motions of the whole, because none can advance unless the whole line does; besides, it cannot from its situation there support the infantry, or be supported by it: the moment is lost before you can bring the cavalry where it is wanted. The reason assigned for placing the cavalry on the flanks is absurd, *viz.* to cover the flanks of the infantry.—Pray, is not the flank of the cavalry much weaker than that of the infantry? since it cannot in any manner form a flank to protect itself, much less will it protect the flank of the infantry. Three or four battalions, armed with Pikes, and formed into oblong squares, are the only flanks which can effectually cover the line against infantry or cavalry, and they must have, besides field-pieces, ten or twelve-pounders, and a few howitzers, (*Plate 3*).

Cavalry must never appear but in the moment it is brought to action, action being the very essence of the cavalry. When the ground, or other circumstances, do not permit you to bring it to action, it must be kept back behind the infantry, whose flanks, secured as I propose, have nothing to fear. If you think your line too weak, though it is
much

much stronger than any other formed in the usual way, let every third or fourth battalion in the line be formed into squares, as those in the flanks, and be assured nothing can resist their efforts, much less overturn and break the line.

In the manner our line is now formed, not a third of the army is engaged, and that successively; so that numbers are of no use, and only serve to retard its motions, and increase the expence. To remedy these defects I would humbly propose, that all the infantry be formed in such a manner, that between each battalion, or regiment, an interval of one hundred and fifty yards be left; behind these intervals I would have the cavalry placed in two lines at a proper distance, each squadron separately, with intervals to manœuvre upon. (*Plate 3.*)

The first advantage resulting from this disposition is, that you may extend your line to any length, without any danger. The second, that you bring the whole into action at once, and though the enemy be double the number, you may out-flank him, and are in reality stronger than him, for you
 attack

attack his whole front with superior forces. The third, that the motions of the whole line are more rapid, as each regiment or battalion moves and acts by itself; and though some may be more advanced than others, no inconvenience can arise from it, because if the enemy is imprudent enough to break his line to attack such advanced battalion, upon the right and left, he will find others formed into squares to take him on both flanks; and if he advances a certain length out of his line, you order your battalion to stop, or even retire *à la débandade*, and in that instant you order some of your squadrons to move forwards through the intervals full gallop, and to charge pell-mell; as one horseman acting in this manner has more real activity than seventy who advance and attack in a line as usual. I saw once three hundred horse attack a column of seven or eight thousand foot in this way, which they defeated and dispersed in three or four minutes. The fourth advantage is, that if your line is broke in some places, the enemy cannot avail himself of the disorder, because your cavalry advances, and gives the infantry time to recover. The fifth, that if your infantry breaks that of the enemy in any point, then advance

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your

your first line of cavalry to attack and disperse it, the whole moving forwards rapidly at the same time, which will infallibly produce a general slaughter, and your victory is complete and decisive. The last advantage of this order of battle which I shall mention is, that it is *general, and equally adapted to every species of country*, when an army can act in the least. In an open country you combine the action of cavalry with that of the infantry, and heavy artillery. In a close country, where an extensive line cannot be formed, the original formation of the troops enables you to act separately, as the ground may require, by corps, detachments, brigades, or regiments, and that always with superior vigour and activity. *It is peculiarly adapted to our country*; I hope, therefore, it will be received and applied on the present occasion.

CHAP. VII.

Of the general Method of making War.

OUR armies, however numerous, are united in one body formed in two or three lines. Between this army and that of the enemy, at a certain distance, the light troops, very often amounting to twenty thousand men, form another army, which is called a chain to observe the enemy, prevent his coming upon you unawares, and cover the march of the grand army. Sometimes also detachments of them are sent to escort your convoys, or to cover a certain district, while the army acts on another line. These light troops, though very numerous, they consider only as mere scouts to observe the enemy, infomuch that on a day of battle they are not to be found, and seldom or ever take part in the action. Whether you advance to the enemy, or the enemy comes to you, the light troops disperse to the right and left, and you hear no more of them till the next day. Why on such occasions they do not form on the right and left of the army, at a convenient

distance, and attack the enemy on the flanks, is to me as inconceivable as the use now made of them appears ridiculous and absurd. Four or five hundred men including one hundred hussars, distributed into small parties in the woods, behind the hedges, near the high roads, would observe the enemy much better than ten thousand men. The motions of such a body as that of an army of light troops, are too slow, and always before the eyes of the enemy, so that he can mark them, and make some capital manœuvres without your knowledge. Whereas a chain of small parties going every where, unite or disperse in a moment, and are always invisible, so that it is impossible for the enemy to make any kind of movement without your having timely notice.

The great defect of the present method of acting is, that however numerous your army may be, if it is formed in one body, your motions are extremely slow. Secondly, the enemy may direct his march so that he out-flanks you. Thirdly, you must have a great body of troops between you and him to watch his motions. Fourthly and finally, by marching against him in a line whose direction is perpendicular to his front, you cannot out-flank

flank him. To remedy these very capital defects, I would beg leave to propose another mode of distributing the troops of which our army is composed.

In order to explain what I have to say on this subject, I must premise, First, that a man or body of men, as an army, can defend themselves only in front; consequently, if you can attack them on either, or both flanks, you will easily beat them, and much more so if you come upon them in the rear. Hence it is that Nature points out the danger, and raises that *panic* with which an army is seized when the men apprehend that they are attacked in the rear; conscious of their weakness, they generally fly in confusion. Sometimes the face of the country obliges an enemy to contract his front, as when he comes upon you in columns: then the moment is favourable to attack him, before he has time to form his line. Sometimes by your throwing up some Redoubts before your front, (*Plate 3.*) he is obliged to break his line, and to advance in columns: this likewise is an occasion to attack him with advantage. Both are, however, too generally neglected. Men, for the most part, fix on a given spot to fight, which

they will not quit, though the enemy in his progress gives many opportunities to a successful attack. They make their arrangements on paper, and by the slowness of their movements abide by them, being utterly unable to form and execute new dispositions, as circumstances may require.

Besides the circumstances just mentioned, which *force an enemy* to contract his front, there is a method of extending yours, so that you may always out-flank him, though he be much superior in number. If you can *form on a portion of a circle*, whose branches project beyond his flanks, and the enemy persists in advancing within that circle, or remains in a line as usual, while you extend yours in a curve, so that you come on either, or both his flanks, it is evident that if you attack him in that disposition, he must be beat (*Plate 3.*) I therefore propose that your army be divided always in five parts, three placed in the centre, one fifth on the right, the remaining fifth on the left, and each advanced more or less, as the nature of the ground permits. They must not be behind the enemy, and liable to be cut off, as happened to the Prussians at Maxen, unless the whole of your
army

army is opposed to the enemy's flank ; then indeed you may place one or both corps nearly behind him, if the ground is advantageous. They must, however, wherever posted, have some certain and secure retreat, otherwise you expose them to great risk, and perhaps to utter ruin and destruction.

The advantages arising from this distribution of the troops are many. First, In whatever ground you act it is equally applicable. Secondly, The motions of the whole army are more simple and quicker. Thirdly, The enemy can make no manœuvres without your knowledge. Fourthly, Whether he advances to the right or left, (for he cannot, without exposing his army to the most imminent danger, advance against your centre,) your corps which he is attacking may fall back, or be supported by the centre, while the other attacks the flank opposite to it. If the enemy keeps his ground and waits your attack, then you act against both his flanks at the same time ; or by lengthening your line to the right or left, enclose his flank while you attack his front. In short, while you can force him to attack within a portion of a circle, the victory is yours. This method, I repeat it,

is general, equally proper for all cases; but more particularly advantageous, and even necessary for a defensive war.

Every army acts upon two lines, that on which it stands, and that which is drawn from the post it occupies, to the province it means to cover, or the places from whence it draws its subsistences. An army acting offensively, departs from a given point where its *dépôts* are lodged, and goes to a given point in the enemy's country. It is often and indeed generally adviseable for those on the defensive to avoid a battle; because the consequences are, or may be fatal. But it does not follow that you are to remain inactive: what is then to be done? The answer is obvious. The centre must occupy some advantageous post, strongly fortified, while the two corps or wings must act day and night on the enemy's line of operation. If this is executed with vigour, he will soon be reduced to the necessity of attacking your centre, which you may avoid by taking a new position, and gain time or wait for it, while the two wings attack his flanks during the action; or else he must fall back to be nearer his *dépôts*, or finally send strong corps against yours; and as these
retire

retire not on your army, he loses his time and labour. By this disposition of your troops you cover your country effectually, and prevent the enemy from advancing towards your centre. The further he advances the more danger he runs ; for his line of operation will be the longer and the less easy to be guarded. If, on the contrary, you act offensively, the enemy may find a thousand strong camps, from whence you cannot force him by any attack on his front ; but if you act by corps, as I propose, and direct your march on either flank, which enables you to act on his line of operation, you will in a few days force him to abandon his camp, and fight you on your own terms, or abandon the country. If he permits you to approach him, you may not only force him to abandon the country, but oblige him to retire in a given direction. I do not therefore understand a General where he says, the enemy was posted in such a manner that he could not be forced. I admit it could not perhaps be done by attacking his front ; but unless his subsistence grows under his feet, he may be forced to abandon any camp, if you act on his flanks and line of operation, which he cannot prevent but by taking another position.

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The march of an army is justly considered as one of the most capital operations in the art of war; I shall therefore beg leave to point out the principles on which it is to be formed.

First, That it be executed in the least time possible.

Secondly, That the columns may be formed into a line with the greatest facility.

It follows from hence, that if the whole line, or lines, could march in front from one camp to another, this would be the most perfect way of marching, because no time would be lost in forming the columns for the march, or in replacing them in a line. Every officer will conceive that I mean a common march, when you advance in front towards the enemy; for if you move on his flanks, you have nothing to do but to make the army, as it stands in two or three lines, march on its right to left; then you are in order of battle, by a simple movement to the right or left, on the ground where you stand. But as no country is sufficiently open for an army to advance in a line, for any considerable distance,
you

you must of course break that line, and march in several columns. The more numerous these columns are, the better for the reasons above mentioned. The worst of all consequently is, that when you can march in one column only, because it supposes that the whole army is in a defile, and exposed to be cut in pieces by very few men, who occupy the ground through which such a column is passing. This must be the case with the French, if they attempt to penetrate into this country, as appears from the description we have given of it.

CHAP. VIII.

Tables of Distances.

*The MILITARY ROADS from PLYMOUTH to LONDON, forming
a junction at EXETER and at SALISBURY.*

	Dist. in Miles.			Dist. in Miles.	
	betw. places	from Plym.		betw. places	from Plym.
PLYMOUTH			PLYMOUTH to		
To Ridgeway	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	5 $\frac{3}{4}$			
Lemin Bridge	2 $\frac{3}{4}$	7 $\frac{3}{4}$			
Woodland	2 $\frac{3}{4}$	10			
<i>Ivy Bridge</i>	1 $\frac{3}{4}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	<i>Ivy Bridge to</i>		
Wrangalin	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	15	Winton	5 $\frac{3}{4}$	17 $\frac{1}{2}$
Brent	1 $\frac{3}{4}$	16	<i>Totness</i>	4 $\frac{3}{4}$	21 $\frac{1}{2}$
Harburton	2 $\frac{3}{4}$	19	<i>Newton Busbel</i>	11 $\frac{3}{4}$	33
Dean	2 $\frac{3}{4}$	21 $\frac{3}{4}$	Red Lyon	2 $\frac{3}{4}$	35 $\frac{1}{2}$
Buckford	$\frac{3}{4}$	22	HALL DOWN	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	42
<i>Ashburton</i>	3	25	Kenford	2	44
Beckington	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	28 $\frac{1}{4}$	Alphington	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	46
<i>Chudleigh</i>	5	33 $\frac{1}{4}$	<i>Exeter</i>	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	48
Stillington	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	41			
<i>Exeter</i>	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	<i>Exeter to</i>		
Honiton Clyft	4	47	Heavy Tree	1	44 $\frac{1}{2}$
Rochbere	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	49 $\frac{1}{2}$	Bifshops Clyft	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	48
Honiton Bridge	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	56	Newton Poplar	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	55 $\frac{1}{2}$
<i>Honiton</i>	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	59 $\frac{1}{2}$	Sidford	2 $\frac{3}{4}$	58
Offwell	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	Cullyford	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	65 $\frac{1}{2}$
<i>Axminster</i>	6	69	<i>Lyme</i>	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	72
Ford	2	71	Shaderton	2	74
Street	4 $\frac{1}{4}$	75 $\frac{1}{4}$			
Crewkerne	6 $\frac{3}{4}$	82	Chidiok	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	78 $\frac{1}{2}$
Hafilbeer	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	84 $\frac{1}{2}$	<i>Bridport</i>	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	81
East Chirnock	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	87			
West Coker	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	88 $\frac{1}{2}$	Stapleton	10	91
<i>Yeovil</i>	3	91 $\frac{1}{2}$	<i>Dorchester</i>	5	96
Babylon Hill	1	92 $\frac{1}{2}$			
Sherborn	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	97	Piddle River	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	100 $\frac{1}{2}$
<i>Milborn Port</i>	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	99 $\frac{1}{2}$			
Stour West-over	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	106	Milford	4	104 $\frac{1}{2}$
Stour East-over	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	108 $\frac{1}{2}$			
<i>Shaftesbury</i>	4	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	<i>Blandford</i>	8	112 $\frac{1}{2}$
Ludwell	1	113 $\frac{3}{4}$			
White Street Hill	4	117 $\frac{1}{2}$	Woodgate's Inn	12 $\frac{3}{4}$	125 $\frac{1}{2}$
Fovent Hut	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	121			
Over the Plain by the Race Ground	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	126 $\frac{1}{2}$	Coombe	8	133 $\frac{1}{4}$
Mount Harman Hill	3	129 $\frac{1}{2}$			
<i>Salisbury to</i>	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	131 $\frac{3}{4}$	<i>Salisbury to</i>	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	136 $\frac{3}{4}$
LONDON	82	213 $\frac{3}{4}$	LONDON	82	218 $\frac{3}{4}$

*The MILITARY ROADS, TOWNS and VILLAGES on those
ROADS from PORTSMOUTH to LONDON; and from DOVER to
LONDON.*

Dist. in Miles.			Dist. in Miles.		
	betw. places	from Port		betw. places	from Dover
PORTSMOUTH to			DOVER to		
Portsea Bridge	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	Buckland	$\frac{1}{2}$	
Cosham	$\frac{1}{2}$	5	Yowel Turnpike	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$
PORTSDOWN	$\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	Lidden	2	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
Purbeck's Heath	2	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	Halfway House	3	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
Bere Forest	1	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	Barham Down	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$
Horndean	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	Bridge	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	12
Petersfield	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	Canterbury	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	15 $\frac{1}{4}$
Sheet Bridge	1	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	Harble Down	1	16 $\frac{1}{4}$
Rake	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	23 $\frac{3}{4}$	Bleane Hill	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 $\frac{3}{4}$
Lippock	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	26	Bocton Street	1	20 $\frac{3}{4}$
Over the Heath to			Ospring	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	24 $\frac{1}{4}$
Hind Head Hill	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	31 $\frac{1}{4}$	Green Street	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$
Milford	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	37 $\frac{1}{4}$	Radfield Street	$\frac{1}{4}$	28 $\frac{1}{4}$
Godalming	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	39	Rapchild	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	29 $\frac{1}{4}$
Catharine Hill	3	42	Sittingbourn	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	31
Guildford	1	43	Key Street	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	33 $\frac{1}{4}$
Ripley	6	49	Newington Street	1	34 $\frac{1}{4}$
Cobham Street	4 $\frac{1}{4}$	53 $\frac{1}{4}$	Raynham	3	37 $\frac{1}{4}$
Esher	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	56 $\frac{1}{4}$	Chatham and Ro-		
Thames Ditton	2	58 $\frac{1}{2}$	chester	3	40 $\frac{1}{2}$
Kingston	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	61	Stroud	2	42 $\frac{1}{2}$
LONDON.	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	73 $\frac{1}{2}$	Gads Hill	2	44 $\frac{1}{2}$
			Chalk Street	3	47 $\frac{1}{2}$
			Northfleet and		
			Gravesend	3	50 $\frac{1}{2}$
			Dartford	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	55 $\frac{1}{2}$
			Crayford	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	57 $\frac{1}{4}$
			Wellen	3	60 $\frac{1}{4}$
			Shooter's Hill and		
			Woolwich	3	63
			Greenwich and		
			Deptford	3	66
			LONDON.	5	71 $\frac{1}{2}$

See

*Sea-port Towns and Villages along the CHANNEL COAST
between FALMOUTH and DOVER, and between DOVER and
SHEERNESS, with the Distances between each, by the Roads,
&c. &c.*

Counties.	Towns and Villages.	Dist. in Miles.	
		betw. places	from Lond.
Cornwall	<i>Falmouth</i>		271
Devonshire	<i>Plymouth</i>	55	216
	<i>Dartmouth</i>	30	204
	<i>Torbay</i>	6	191
	<i>Teignmouth</i>	9	183
Dorsetshire	<i>Exmouth</i>	7	168
	<i>Sidmouth</i>	9	158
	<i>Lyme</i>	16	143
	<i>Weymouth</i>	24	129
	<i>Poole</i>	31	110
Hampshire	<i>Isle of Wight</i>	21	86
	<i>Christ Church</i>	10	100
	<i>Lymington</i>	10	90
	<i>Southampton</i>	18	76
	<i>Portsmouth</i>	14	73
	<i>Chichester</i>	18	61
	<i>Pagham or Selsea</i>	6	67
	<i>Little Hampton and Arundel</i>	18	65
	<i>Worthing</i>	8	62
	<i>Shoreham</i>	15	56
Sussex	<i>Brighthelmstone</i>	7	62
	<i>Rotten Dean</i>	4	55
	<i>New Haven and Lewes</i>	5	56
	<i>Seaford</i>	4	59
	<i>Cockmare</i>	2½	65
	<i>East Bourne</i>	8	64
	<i>Pevensey</i>	5	60
	<i>Hastings</i>	12	64
	<i>Winchelsea</i>	7	67
	<i>Rye</i>	8	63
	<i>Dungeness</i>	12	77
	<i>New Romney</i>	4	71
	<i>Hythe</i>	8	63
	<i>Sandgate Castle</i>	2	72
	<i>Folkestone</i>	2	72
	<i>Dover</i>	7	71
	<i>Deal</i>	10	72
	<i>Sandwich</i>	5	67
	<i>Ramsgate</i>	5	73
Kent	<i>Broadstairs</i>	2	72
	<i>Kingsgate</i>	1½	72
	<i>Margate</i>	5	
	<i>Feverham</i>	44	
	<i>Sheerness</i>		

A TABLE of the Distances and Stages by Sea between PLYMOUTH and HARWICH, &c. &c.

	Leagues.	Dist. by land in miles from Lond.
From Plymouth to		217
Portsmouth	50	73
Dover	40	71
Nore	17	40
Landguard Fort and Harwich	34	58

A TABLE of the principal projecting Headlands on the Channel Coast between CORNWALL and the NORE, and their Distances by Sea from each other.

	Dist. in Miles.
The Lizard to	
Brill and Start	69
Portland Point	51
St. Aldan's Head	24
St. Catharine's Point	27
Selfey Bill	22
Beachy Head	42
Dungeness	30
South Foreland	24
North Foreland	16
Isle of Shepey	27

A TABLE of the Distances between Sea-ports in FRANCE to Sea-ports in IRELAND and GREAT-BRITAIN.

	Leagues
From Brest to Galway	180
Shannon	150
Corke	100
Plymouth	60
Torbay	70
Cherbourg to Portsmouth	26
Havre to Newhaven	29
Abbeville to Pevensey	27
Boulogne to Rye	14
Calais to Dover	7
Dunkirk to Deal	14
Margate	15
Nore	25
Harwich	33

Distances by Land, between the principal Sea-ports on the Coast of FRANCE, from DUNKIRK to BREST, and from BREST to BAYONNE; and the Distances of each from PARIS.

	Miles.	Dist. from Paris in Miles.
From <i>Dunkirk</i>		132
to Gravellines	10	130
Calais	10	129
Boulogne	16	120
Montreuil	20	101
Abbeville	25	81
Dieppe	36	83
Fécamp	27	93
<i>Havre</i>	19	96
Caen	30	111
<i>Cherbourg</i>	58	163
Granville	52	157
St. Maloes	16	170
St. Cas	18	186
St. Brieuc	18	200
Morlaix	41	246
<i>Brest</i>	32	276
Quimper	32	267
L'Orient	34	241
Vannes	25	217
Nantes	55	190
Rochelle	66	220
Rochfort	15	225
Bordeaux	66	230
Bayonne	88	350

Note. Consult that useful collection (in one Vol. quarto) with descriptions and plans, of all the principal Harbours, Soundings, and Coasts of France, entitled *Petit Neptune Français*, printed by W. Faden, 1793.

PART

PART II.

EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL LLOYD'S MILITARY
HISTORY RESPECTING AN INVASION OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND OF FRANCE, AND THE PRINCIPLES
OF DEFENSIVE WAR.

CHAP. I.

The difficulties a French army would encounter in advancing from Exeter to London.

WHEN we penetrate with our great and very heavy armies into an enemy's country, it is with a view to conquer some provinces, fortresses, &c. and finding nothing upon the road to subsist upon, we have fixed and determined points to lodge our stores and provisions, from whence they are transported to the army, which must proceed from these given points to other fixed and determined points in the enemy's country, if you carry on an offensive war; or from a given point in your own towards another on the frontiers, if you are on the defensive. The line which unites these points, on which

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every

every army must act, is called the *line of operation*, and of all those we have mentioned, is the most important; for, on the good or bad choice of this line, the final event of the war chiefly depends: if it is ill chosen, all your successes, however brilliant, will in the end be found useless. Let us illustrate this doctrine by an example: (an invasion of England from the side of Plymouth).

We will suppose an (enemy's) army of forty thousand foot, and ten thousand horse, besides those required for the train of artillery, bread waggons, officers horses, &c. which will amount to as many more. This army is at *Exeter*, and proposes to advance to *London*, and has its magazines all at *Exeter*. I have only thirty thousand men. I encamp as near *Exeter* as I can; and by occupying advantageous posts, I will force him to employ a fortnight in marching to *Dorchester* or *Blandford*. Till then I oppose the enemy in front, with small parties only on his flanks: but when he is arrived thirty or forty miles from *Exeter*, from which place alone he draws his subsistence; instead of opposing him in front with all my forces, I place ten
thousand

thousand on his line of march, ten on his left flank, and the remaining ten along his line of operation, which goes from his camp to his depôts at Exeter. The last will be distributed in four or five corps along that line, and form a chain from one end to the other, so that a single waggon cannot pass unobserved, and consequently will be taken or attacked by some one or other of these parties. A hundred men will destroy as many waggons, by dispersing the drivers, taking away or killing the horses, breaking the carriages, &c. The enemy must, therefore, send a strong body of troops, ten thousand men, for example, to escort a great convoy. I then make a motion to the right with my whole army, so that my left comes across his left, my center and right go many miles beyond it. In whatever manner the escort is distributed, as part in the front, part in the center, and part in the rear of the convoy, I say that neither ten nor even twenty thousand can preserve it; because these are chained to their convoy, and cannot quit it, nor the station they occupy; whereas my troops can engage, and attack, how, when, and where they please: they can attack and amuse the escorts, in a pass or a wood, which

of course obliges the whole to stop, while two or three thousand men, in small parties, attack the chain of waggons from one end to the other. If they succeed in some places only, the whole will soon be dispersed.

It would be adviseable to attack that part which proceeds at the head of the convoy, with the greatest part of your forces, if it goes ten or twelve miles from the camp; because you may then cut it off entirely, and the whole convoy, and the remaining part of the escort, unless the enemy falls back immediately to assist them, which is no easy matter, as you have the centre and left of your army on his flanks, and rear in his retreat; and most certainly he will arrive too late to prevent the ruin of his convoy, which is our object.

If instead of being only thirty or forty miles from Exeter, as we suppose, he is a hundred, at Salisbury for example; I always suppose that all his provisions, without exception, come from thence, or from any where else, a hundred miles off. I say that such an enemy as we suppose cannot remain a fortnight in that camp, though the convoys
meet

meet with no other difficulties but such as arise from the length of the road, bad weather, accidents, &c.

It is impossible to collect and maintain a sufficient number of horses, carriages, &c. to supply an army of fifty or sixty thousand men, including those who follow the camp, with provisions, stores, forage, &c. and to supply the convoy, drivers, &c. in their journey to and from the camp two hundred miles we suppose, which cannot be performed in less than twenty days. I am so convinced myself of this, that if you place twenty thousand foot, and five thousand horse on any spot, so that they subsist only upon what is brought from one given point, a hundred miles off, they must in a week go and meet their convoy, disperse, or perish.

Now if to these natural and unfurmoutable difficulties, you add those which an able leader can create, by acting on the principles we have established above, it will appear evident, beyond contradiction, that no army, great or small, can act in a line of operation of a hundred miles, provided you can keep

the field; of course you must avoid a general action.

The more the country is inclosed and intersected by woods, mountains, rivers, passes, &c. the more difficulties the enemy will meet with: the more cross roads the more advantageous for you; because they enable you to act on his line of operation. In such a country you may in almost every spot lay snares for his parties, even for his whole army, with success. Whoever weighs what we have said will be convinced that the ideas and fears of a (French) invasion were vain and absurd.

If he (the invader) attacks you, he must immediately bring you to a general action, that he may be enabled to besiege some place of importance, form new depôts, and advance further into the country, until he forces you to abandon the whole, or make peace on the terms he prescribes: it is your part to avoid a general action; for while you have an army in the field, and know how to manage it with advantage, he may, though much superior, be forced to abandon his project, and retire with a ruined army. Were
you

you in condition to venture an engagement, with probable hopes of success, *you must not do it*, because if you are beat, the consequence may be fatal, and by conquering you only force him to retire, which you may do without any risk, if you adhere to what I shall say on the subject. When he drives you, retire gradually from one strong camp to another; skirmish often, but never fight a battle.

A general should scarce ever fight, when on the defensive, but to preserve some important place, and to hinder the enemy from taking winter quarters in his country, or force him to abandon it, if he is in possession.

CHAP. II.

Reflections on the Invasion of the Metropolis of Great Britain, from the Side of France.

ON the coast of England there are *three* harbours, where a great fleet may ride with safety. The enemy must take one of them. Suppose it done, and that the English have not a ship left. *Suppose farther, that there is a French army of sixty thousand men encamped on Blackheath, and off London bridge.*

I say there are two hundred thousand men in England who have bore arms. I will put the half on horseback, and the other half remains on foot: mix them as circumstances may require. Then I place fifty thousand men in Surry and Suffex, and as many in Effex, who act on the enemy's line, which on that supposition must go towards the *Downs; there being no other place where his fleet can anchor.* Such a disposition being made, and only half the number of men we propose employed, I ask any officer, any man of sense, what will become of the enemy's
army

army on Blackheath, or in any other given point, sixty or seventy miles from the coast? It must perish; for undoubtedly no army can subsist on a line of such length, as is that from France to Blackheath, over a branch of the sea, and penetrate into the country, while we have an army of thirty or forty thousand men only to oppose their supplies. No army can subsist in a country, unless it draws all, or the greatest part of its subsistence from the country itself, and of course possesses a great tract behind it, and on every side to the right and left: for if you can act on the enemy's line he must retire; and though he should be in possession of such a tract of country as we suppose, he cannot keep it, unless he is master of one or more strong places, to enable him to separate his troops, and put them into winter quarters.

When the combined fleet (of France and Spain, 1779) appeared on our coast, the nation, unaccustomed to see an enemy so near, seemed much alarmed. I then thought it my duty to examine the possible results of an invasion, and pointed out the means of defeating it, determined and fixed the lines on which the enemy must have acted, had he

he landed, and the different positions the English army must have occupied on such lines, to prevent him from advancing into the country, or keeping the post he had taken on our coast. When I consider this subject in a military light only, I wished almost that the enemy had made such an attempt; because once for all they would have seen the absurdity, and danger of it, and we should for ever have been cured of our fears.

The Russians and Austrians in 1760, far from being able to keep Berlin, were extremely happy, after two days stay, to get away, though they had, undoubtedly, fifty thousand men. This must always be the case if you attack an enemy in the centre of his dominions: whence it follows, that you must begin at one or other of the extreme provinces.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Reflections on the Invasion of the Coast of France from Great Britain; and from the different Sides of the Continent.

HAVING described the frontiers of the principal European powers on the Continent, we must now return to consider *that of France on the British channel*. This frontier extends from Dunkirk to Ushant, and round that point along the Bay of Biscay, to Bayonne: in this line however there is but *one harbour*, where a great fleet can be built, equipped, and ride in safety, which is *Brest*. Ships of the line are also built at Rochfort, and equipped there; but few in number, and only few can be kept there in safety: they soon perish, because the water is sweet, though the tide runs very high and violent up the Charante.

In speaking of the line of operation, on which an army acts, we have laid it down as an axiom, not to be controverted, that if it is of any considerable length, or intersected

fectcd by mountains, passes, rivers, and of course, if it goes over a considerable branch of the sea, no solid enterprize can be executed on such line, though your forces are much superior to those who oppose you. - A pirate may land twenty men on the coast of France, or any other, rob a hen-roost, burn a few houses, and run away to their ship, in spite of France, and its two hundred thousand men, because such an expedition is executed in a few hours.

In the late war, England, at a prodigious expence, made several attempts on the coasts of France; the result was burning some fishing boats, and by accident, I believe, some houses, and were happy to come off. Their last exploit at St. Cas was, we know, very unfortunate. Whose fault was it? No doubt it was the fault of those who planned those fine expeditions. Could we have burnt the enemy's docks, stores, &c. at *Brest and Rochfort*, it would have been of great importance, and worth trying: but every other object was by no means equal to the risk or the expence, and never ought to be undertaken. No forces the English can bring on the coast will be sufficient to take Brest, or any other capital

capital place. But for a moment I will suppose the French are asleep; that the English fleet and fifty thousand men are at Brest. What then? Why they must, in a short time, return home, if they can: for surely they cannot remain at Brest, which in a short time will be surrounded by a French army, who will besiege you in it: you must therefore abandon it, or advance into the country; advance in the name of God! You are at Rennes, the capital of Britany. What then, I ask once more? Why, you will be surrounded, your communication with Brest and your fleet cut off, and your army perishes by the sword, or by famine.

What I say of Brest, which indeed is the only place on the coast where a fleet can for any considerable time ride with safety, is equally applicable to every other point on this coast, or any other coast whatever; if your army meets with any, though very inconsiderable resistance. For while your enemy can keep the field, and act on your flanks, you cannot remain on any given spot; and if you advance, you only precipitate your ruin.

The

The frontier of France, towards Germany, begins at Basil in Switzerland, and runs in various directions from thence to Dunkirk, in French Flanders. I shall divide this long line into three parts, and consider each of them separately. The first part goes from Basil to Landau, and covers Alsatia; it is near 130 miles in length. The second part goes from Landau to Sedan, on the Meuse, covers Lorrain on the side of the Electorate of Treves, the Dutchies of Deux Ponts, Luxemburg, and Limburg; it is 190 miles in length. From Sedan down the Meuse, to Charlemont in French Flanders, and thence to Dunkirk, goes the third part, and is about 150 miles; so that this whole frontier is about 470 miles.

The first part of the line is covered by the Rhine, on which are placed Hunninghen, New Brisac, Strasburg, and Landau; all which are very strong. Strasburg has a bridge over the Rhine; on the back part of Alsace runs a chain of mountains, which separates it from Franche Compté and Lorrain; the distance between these mountains is from ten
to

to fifteen miles. An army encamped near Strasburg, covered by the Rhine, and the fortresses above mentioned, could, with ease, prevent an enemy from passing that river, or at least from besieging any of them; and without taking them all, he could not possibly separate his army, and take his winter quarters in Alsace, while the French have any considerable force encamped or cantoned in the mountains above mentioned. I am therefore surprized the Austrians ever made an attempt on that side, and much more so, that the French were so very much alarmed at it. For my part, I am confident that an able general, at the head of thirty or forty thousand men, so far from being terrified at the approach of an enemy, or opposing his passing the Rhine, would wish to see him shut up between the mountains, the river, and the fortresses; because he would see the facility of preventing his repassing it at all, and of cutting him off entirely. Look at the map, and judge.

The second part of the French frontier, viz. the line which goes from Landau to Sedan, is very strong both by nature and art,
having

having several strong places on it; and the country before it no less difficult, being very mountainous, and consequently full of narrow passes. The direction of this line is concave towards that part of Germany; so that an enemy who advances on that side must have his depôts on the Rhine, at Mentz, or Coblentz, or at Maestricht and Namur on the Meuse; in both cases the army, which I suppose encamped at Landau, can hinder him from advancing from the Rhine, by acting on his line of operation on that side, while another of forty thousand men, placed on the Meuse, near Sedan, will prevent any army from advancing into Lorraine, or Champagne on that side, as is evident from the inspection of the map.

Whether we consider the strength of this line, the direction of it, or finally, the obstacles which the country before it offers, it will appear that no enemy can approach it, much less attack it with any prospect of success. A small corps posted at Luxemburg might indeed advance from thence, and ravage a few villages in haste, but no solid enterprize can, we think, ever be executed on that side.

The

The third and last part of the French frontier runs from Sedan down the Meuse to Charlemont, from thence to Dunkirk, and is 150 miles in length. It has been the scene of successive wars for near two centuries, the most expensive, bloody, and durable of any recorded in the annals of mankind; of which the author proposes giving the history on the same plan this work is wrote.

This line is stronger by art than nature, having a prodigious number of strong fortresses and posts upon it; moreover, it projects in many places, so that an enemy can enter it no where, without having some of them in front, and on his flanks; his depôts must be at Namur, Mons, and Tournay. An army of forty thousand men placed on the Sambre, and another of equal force about Condé, will so bridle his operations, that he cannot advance a step without imminent danger: for that army which we suppose on the Sambre, by masking Namur, penetrates into the country to Brussels, &c. which will force the enemy to retire, and abandon his own frontier. In the present state of Austrian
I Flanders,

Flanders, and the adjacent parts of Holland, nothing could prevent the two armies from over-running the above mentioned countries in one campaign.

In the war for the succession of Spain, at the beginning of the century, ten successful campaigns brought the allies no farther than Landrecy, not thirty miles from the Austrian frontiers; a very inconsiderable defeat at Donain obliged Prince Eugene to raise the siege of that place, and in a short time abandon his conquests, the fruits of many victories.

I know most people suppose, that this was owing to the defection of the English: had this never taken place, perhaps the Allies might in time have advanced to the Marne, and sent parties to the Soyne: but will any officer suppose, that an army marching that line from Mons, Tournay, &c. could separate and take winter quarters on the above mentioned rivers, while the French were in possession of Picardy, Normandy, and Champagne? No, it is impossible: the great fault of the French generals, when on the defensive, was to oppose the enemy in front, whereas

whereas they should have operated against their flanks.

The final event of this long and bloody war shows the strength of this frontier, and the prodigious resources of the House of Bourbon.

From the description we have now given of the French frontier, towards Germany and Flanders, though very incomplete, it appears that an enemy, though his dominions were on the Upper Rhine, opposite to Alsace, would find it extremely difficult, or rather impossible, to conquer that province, from whence alone he could penetrate into Lorrain, &c.

That the second part of the French frontier, from Landau to the Meuse, cannot be attacked by any German power marching up the Moselle, between the Rhine and the Meuse, the event of the different wars, waged in Flanders, prove the superiority of the French; I mean the superior advantages they possess in acting on that frontier, which are indeed so very great, that no forces can be collected and supported in Flanders by the House of Austria, the English, Dutch, or the

German Princes, which can preserve that country against the efforts of the French : most certainly the Austrians alone cannot do it.

The French frontiers, towards Switzerland, Savoy, and Spain, are too strong to be invaded by those powers. The idea of passing the Var, and conquering Provence, is too ridiculous to deserve serious discussion.





A MILITARY SKETCH OF THE LINE TO DEFEND,
from PLYMOUTH to DOVER.



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
A MILITARY SKETCH OF THE LINE TO DEFEND,
from PLYMOUTH to DOVER.



EAST

N E W

SCALE of British Miles.



GENERAL FACE OF T

ON THE WESTER


Chiefly between Plymouth

Engraved by W^m

INCLOSED

COUNTRY


the Enemy

A historical map of a fortified area, likely a military installation or a strategic location. The map is enclosed within a rectangular border. The central part of the map is labeled 'INCLOSED COUNTRY'. A river or stream flows through the center of the map, from the top towards the bottom. The river is flanked by a series of small, rectangular structures, possibly fortifications or buildings. To the left of the river, there is a large, irregularly shaped area labeled 'the Enemy'. This area contains several long, thin rectangular shapes, which could represent military units or fortifications. The map also shows various other features, including a network of roads or paths, and several small, irregular shapes that might represent hills or other terrain features. The overall style is that of a historical engraving, with fine lines and a somewhat aged appearance.

OF THE COUNTRY
 TERN ROADS,
 mouth and Exeter.
 by W^m Faden.



MOUNTAINOUS

COUNTRY




The PIKE and the PIKEMEN.

Note
The men
have been
drawn at
a greater
distance
than they
ought to be,
in order to
shew more
clearly their
respective
attitudes




Rank
arm
with
Pike

The Army formed in a portion of a Circle



The Army formed in a Line, with Redoubts and Epaulements in Front, and Battalions armed with Pikes on the Flanks.



THE
SUPPLEMENT

AND

PART III.

CHAP. I.

A Sketch of the successive Invasions of Great Britain, by the Romans, the Saxons, the Danes, the Normans; with Comments.

THERE are no civilized nations on our globe, which have not, at one period or other, been over-run by invaders. If the Northern nations have been less harrassed with these tempests of human avarice and ambition, they are more indebted to nautical and geographical ignorance, and to their uninviting situation and poverty, than to their prowess or martial pre-eminence. How long

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those

those parents of navigation, the Phœnicians, had exported tin from the South corner of Britain, before the arrival of its first conquerors, the Romans, is, I believe, a chronological problem, and as yet unsettled. The probability is, that such traffick had existed for several centuries.

Julius Cæsar provoked, as he pretended, at the assistance given by the Britons to their oppressed neighbours the Gauls, embarked with his victorious legions from the opposite coast of France, from Calais or Boulogne, or both, and landed, A. C. 54, near Sandwich, in Kent, on the banks of the river Stour, a few miles to the north of Dover. A fair wind transported his fleet in nine hours from one shore to the other. The success of a powerful and martial nation, habituated, during the space of seven hundred years, to military discipline and victory, may easily be anticipated, when opposed by a banditti of naked but resolute savages. The military weapons and armour of the Britons consisted principally of bows and arrows, spears, short swords, and shields; and like the ancient Greeks and Romans, they fought alternately in chariots or cars and on foot. Internal dissention rendered

dered them still more unequal to resistance and concert. Their island was divided into a rabble of twenty-eight petty states and subordinate clanships, under the dominion of Kings and Druids, who were priests, prophets, and judges. Cassivelaun was the name of their heroic king and generalissimo pitched upon to oppose the Romans.

Cæsar in his first short expedition, did not penetrate beyond the shore, and in his second and last, but a few miles to the North of London. Ninety-seven years elapsed before a third invasion was revived under Claudius; and, by the perseverance of several succeeding Emperors, the reduction of the Island to a Roman Province was finally accomplished. Whether from the difficulty of access, or the insignificance of the object in those days, the Romans contented themselves with the subjugation of the south part of Britain. This, however, was upwards of a century contested with them, in many bloody encounters, by the natives, conducted by their celebrated leaders Caractacus, Boadicea, Arviragus, Galgacus, &c. To repel the incursions of the Northern Picts and Scots, the Roman emper-

rors and generals erected, at different intervals, a chain of forts and parapets across the narrow parts of the island, extending from the German ocean to the Irish channel; one of them between the Firth of Forth and the Clyde, the other between the Tyne and the Firth of Solway. The last was seventy miles in length, and consisted of a strong rampart and ditch, with forts and towers interspersed, and was guarded by two Legions. More effectually to facilitate and secure their conquest, the Romans made several longitudinal and transverse roads, diverging in opposite directions from the metropolis, and extending to the remotest parts of their possessions in this island. They first introduced stones and bricks into the British architecture. Until then the natives were lodged in wretched wooden hovels, collected together in forests, surrounded with ditches and ramparts, and dignified with the appellation of towns. The principal Roman stations were London, Dover, St. Alban's, Colchester, Malden, Lincoln, York, Chester, Gloucester, Caer Leon, Bath, and Winchester. Under their protection, ninety-two considerable cities and towns had progressively risen in this island; of all which

London

London was the metropolis, and its inhabitants favoured with the privileges of Roman citizens.

From the arrival of the Romans in Britain, to their departure, fills a space of about five hundred years. During that interval, they had greatly depopulated the island in the recruit of their armies on the continent, and were under the necessity of finally abandoning it, and of recalling their legions for domestic defence. The departure of these celebrated and enlightened conquerors, and the overthrow of their Western empire, was a calamity which Britain, equally with the rest of Europe, had great reason to deplore. The imperial seat of arms, arts, and legislation, was soon after supplanted by ignorance, superstition, turbulence, and violence.

During several successive centuries, after the downfall of Rome, and the deluge of Northern barbarians, the greatest part of Europe continued immersed in anarchy and stupidity. In the eighth century a similar inundation of ravage and ruin was spread, by Mahomet and the Arabians, over a large portion of Africa and Asia. Britain was a

sharer in this general calamity, and chaos of mankind; in this dissolution of civil society.

Six centuries of the British history, after their emancipation from the Roman yoke, is filled with a frightful catalogue of defensive warfare against the Saxons, Danes, and Normans. The island, as before observed, had been stripped, by military levies, and emigration, of its vigorous youth, and left, in a state of debility and consumption, by the Romans. Under Maximus, one of the Roman generals and emperors, upwards of 200,000 Britons of both sexes, emigrated by choice or compulsion, to the continent; one half of whom seated themselves on the opposite shores of Britanny in France. To this abdication of military tyrants succeeded civil dissensions, anarchy, and famine, with predatory incursions and barbarous devastation of the Picts, Scots, and Irish. After repeated resistance and revolts, the Romans had been successful in their jealous policy of disarming the native Britons, which gradually rendered them a timid disorderly multitude, and an easier prey to their martial neighbours, to whom the use of arms was familiar. These complicated calamities urged the distracted
natives

natives of the South to fly from the smoke into the flames, to implore assistance from the Northern parts of Europe, from those daring freebooters, the Saxons, Jutes, and Angles, who, under Hengist and Horfa, landed P. C. 458, on the isle of Thanet and coast of Kent, some miles north of Dover Straits.

By subsequent intermarriages, by the aid of Picts and Scots, by a successive influx of succours from the Continent, and by a long series of wars, of barbarous ferocity and massacres, the south part of Britain, called England, became gradually partitioned into seven independent states. In these violent scenes of warfare, and exertions of national valour against foreign invaders, which continued to rage during one century and a half, Vortimer, Pendragon, Arthur, Cadwallo, and Cadwallador, are enumerated amongst the distinguished princes and heroes of Britain.

The Saxon heptarchy, as might naturally be expected, was not of long duration. Its jarring members, after exhausting themselves in mutual carnage and depredation, were by degrees cemented into one monarchy. This union of the mutinous rivals was effected prin-

cipally under Egbert and Alfred, A. D. 827, about three hundred and seventy-eight years after the first arrival of those foreigners in this island. The latter Prince is commonly reputed not only the founder of the English monarchy, but likewise of the first English university, Oxford, and of a more regular system of legislation, into which was incorporated the meritorious customs and common law of the Saxons. Britain might then be compared to a shattered hulk in a tempestuous ocean, and had not time to repair its damages before another hurricane, still more furious, was ready to overwhelm it.

In the ninth century swarms of Northern pirates from the borders of the Baltic, composed of Danes, Jutes, Norwegians, and Swedes, began to infest the coasts of England, Ireland, and Normandy, which they long kept in terror and alarm. Egbert and his son twice defeated their grand army with prodigious slaughter. Alfred fought in one year eight battles with them, and in the course of his life, fifty-six land and naval actions. Throughout the ninth and tenth centuries these infernal confederates, in rapine and murder, made irruptions, with a numerous
naval

naval and land force, by almost every river and creek between Northumberland and Cornwall. By inflexible perseverance, and a continual succession of re-inforcements, by treachery, disunion, and faction among the English nobility, these vagrant robbers and fiends, these destructive pests of science, arts, and civilization, established themselves in England, and three Danish Kings successively domineered over that turbulent monarchy.

It was the misfortune of England to become once more a prey to foreign invaders. About the middle of the eleventh century, Harold, by surprize, faction, and audacity, and without proximate pretensions of birth, had seated himself on the English throne, and had, at the same time, to contend against a fresh irruption of barbarians from the Baltic, and against domestic insurrections, when William, Duke of Normandy, laid claim to the English sceptre. William was a descendant of those Danish and Norwegian pirates, who, a century earlier, had spread themselves over Normandy, and into the Mediterranean, as far as Naples and Sicily. Although of spurious and mean descent by his mother's side, William was related by blood to the legitimate
Kings

Kings of England, and had been formally adopted, in preference to Harold, by Edward the Confessor, the great patron of the Normans. At this period these foreigners had attained to an exalted character in the English church and state, and most of the bishops were William's countrymen.

With these important advantages, and the Papal benediction, William embarked, in the autumnal and equinoctial season, with a fleet of 3000 ships, and 60,000 disciplined troops, the flower of all the warriors of the Continent, conducted by a martial nobility, incited by military emulation, and the stipulated spoils of England. A direct and short voyage, of little more than twenty leagues, would convey them from the mouth of the Somme to the opposite coast of England. Without interruption in their passage, this formidable army landed, P. C. 1066, at Pevensey, in Suffex, in the vicinity of Hastings, and a few miles to the north of Beachy-head. Immediately before their arrival, the Danes had been stirred up to annoy the north of England; they had debarked in the Humber, Harold had just defeated them, with great slaughter, when
news

3/60
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news reached him at York of William's actual descent in Suffex.

Errors, which in the ordinary occurrences of life admit of excuse and remedy, are in war frequently irreparable and fatal. Harold's plan of operations was rash and injudicious in the extreme. His army was weakened by the recent encounter with the Danes, and by the disunion of its leaders; he, notwithstanding, rushed, with headstrong impetuosity, to a general and decisive engagement with his rival; to an offensive instead of a defensive war. After a long and desperate conflict, William's discipline and generalship prevailed, and Harold, with almost his whole army, were left amongst the slain. The theatre of this important action was about eight miles from the shore, on the gentle declivity of a range of hills, now called Battle, and a fortnight after the arrival of the enemy, whose loss was estimated at fifteen thousand men. In reading with attention the disposition of the two hostile armies, the military critic will see, that Harold opposed the phalanx, hollow square, or parallelogram to the order of battle recommended by General Lloyd, which is exactly similar in every respect

spect to that adopted by the Norman Conqueror; and that the impetuosity of the English in breaking their line, and falling into the snare of the enemy who counterfeited flight, was the primary cause of their overthrow. The ground was in their favour, and so was the battle for several hours.

William, though victorious was cautious in advancing to the metropolis: he judged it prudent to turn considerably aside, to march along the coast, and to attack Dover, in order to secure a retreat in case of adversity, together with a landing place and depôt for fresh supplies. It, indeed, contributed not a little to his future success, that the strong garrison of this ancient key of England, and natural fortification, immediately surrendered. London, after a faint resistance, followed the dastardly example. But notwithstanding this career of victory, the inhabitants of Kent continued intrepid and unsubdued. They bristled in armour and defiance to oppose the usurper, and unanimously gave him choice of immediate battle, or a compact and confirmation of being governed by their ancient laws. With these favourable terms the subtle tyrant was glad to feign compliance, and soon after,
by

by the influence of the clergy, and defection of their leaders, the whole nation peaceably acquiesced in the change of Kings. Indeed the English had been early accustomed to the deposition and change of monarchs; and in many preceding and subsequent reigns the lineal succession was trampled upon, and decided by the sword.

Happily for Britain, this is the last successful effort of foreign usurpation. The mask of moderation and justice was soon thrown aside; and never was conquest more humiliating, nor King more absolute, than this spurious Norman. With him the feudal system was introduced, in tyrannic pomp; and the people became alternately oppressed with either monarchical or aristocratic tyranny: or with these double scourges of feudal jurisprudence. He degraded all the ancient nobility of England, and confiscated their estates, in order to provide for his military followers. During several generations after him, no Briton nor Saxon was promoted to offices of rank or trust. He laid waste many towns and villages in Hampshire, to make a forest for game and deer, which were guarded with distinct and sanguinary laws; and the hunting

hunting and shooting of which was then the principal amusement of an illiterate nobility. In the neighbourhood of this forest, Winchester had been the principal residence and also the mausoleum of royalty, from the union of the Saxon heptarchy, until some reigns after the first Norman.

Throughout these four successive conquests, the first and the last of which were one thousand years distant from each other, we may remark, that the south of Britain was uniformly the contested prize of the invaders; that the first descent of three of these assailants was either on the Kentish coast, or very near it; and that by the Danes both the channel and east coast were exposed to a wider scope of insult and desolation. It also appears in all those invasions and conquests, especially of the Saxons, Danes, and Normans, that the survivors of the native Britons of the south were, without distinction of rank or sex, deprived of liberty and property, degraded to the condition of slaves and cattle, and many of them exposed for sale. The fastnesses of Wales were the principal asylums of the surviving wreck; and even at this day the descendants of those Britons seem almost
a distinct

a distinct nation. Finally, that the indiscreet expedient of bribing the Danes, with large sums of money, to desist from their depredations, had a contrary effect, and encouraged them to a renewal of similar outrages.

France, during the same period, cannot boast of any pre-eminence over Britain, in her infant resistance against foreign usurpers. Her annals equally proclaim her involuntary submission and servitude to the Normans, and to the northern barbarians.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the English Crusades against France, and against the Infidels in Palestine. The Incorporation of Ireland, Wales, and Scotland, with the English Monarchy. Curfory reflections on the Political and Military State of England during the last 700 Years. Of the modern and remote Acquisitions to the British Empire. The comparative Growth of France.

AFTER the Norman invasion, a considerable portion of the seven following centuries of the British history, at least so far as it relates to our subject, is filled up with a turbulent narrative of crusades against France; with religious crusades against the infidels in Palestine; with various acquisitions of internal and external strength; with domestic factions, plots, conspiracies, and executions; with papal and clerical usurpation, bigotry, and fanaticism; and from the rude state of agriculture and medicine, with frequent visitations of famine and pestilence. The scourges of Asia, Zingis, and Tamerlane, who triumphed during this period, did not extend their

their savage hostilities to the western nations of our hemisphere.

In the Norman invasion, and the unprofitable appendages in France thereby added to the English monarchy, we may trace the first seeds of those fatal animosities and bloody contests, which have continued to waste their respective inhabitants and treasures during a series of seven hundred years. In Edward the Third's reign, and fourteenth century, these national prejudices and jealousies were re-kindled with fresh fuel and conflagration. From this reign down to the end of Henry the Fifth, who, and his son after him were crowned at Paris, the English continued throughout one entire century, to acquire the ascendant, and to maintain their dominion over many provinces in France. It is also worthy of remark, that during this victorious career of England, when she conquered many western and southern provinces in France, and held her principal sea-ports on the channel coast, when Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, were amongst the catalogue of her trophies, that she was not only unsupported by Scotland, but had, at the same time, to defend herself against that brave northern neighbour, whose

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imperious

imperious nobles were pensioners and partizans of France. England might then be said to encounter France with her right hand, and Scotland with her left. Nor should we disguise that a similar mischievous policy of supporting adherents in France was successfully practised and cherished by the English monarchs.

After Henry the Fifth's brilliant reign, we may date the declension of the English power over France. This reverse of fortune was not a little promoted by the latter declining to risk any general action: a wise military maxim inculcated by dear bought experience, and which in the end preserved them from subjection. About one century after, that is, about the middle of the sixteenth, in Mary's odious reign, the surprise and capture of Calais compleatly emancipated France from the usurpation of Britain, which she had been compelled to submit to during five hundred years. Calais, whose memorable siege, two hundred years before, had occupied Edward the Third eleven months, was now by stratagem taken in eight days. It had been an annual expence to the crown of 19000*l.* which was then one-third of the charge of government in time of peace. It was of no use to the
defence

defence of England, except perhaps as a military school, and as a convenient door and access into France; and probably Havre de Grace, at the mouth of the Seine, would have been a more important station, to a maritime invader.

On the other hand we may remark, that there are few instances in this whole interval of five centuries, after the Norman invasion, wherein the French ventured to set foot in England: one of these was by the express invitation of the English nobles, and mandatory anathemas of the Pope, during the turbulent reign of John; another during the civil wars of Henry IV. when they plundered and burnt Plymouth; and in the next year landed 12,000 men at Milford Haven to assist the rebellion of Owen Glendour and the Welsh: in the weak calamitous reign of Henry the VI. they pillaged Sandwich: they renewed these transient insults in the unfortunate reign of Edward VI. and once in an unsuccessful expedition against the Isle of Wight, in the reign of Henry VIII.

The Romans acted with far superior policy and judgment to the English, in not ventur-

ing upon any foreign invasion before they had reduced all Italy under their dominion. They spent five centuries of incessant domestic war in laying the foundations and platforms of their internal strength and solidity, before they embarked in the conquest of the adjacent small island of Sicily. England, on the contrary, was hurried, with premature and fruitless ambition, into wars against France, and into religious crusades against the infidels of Palestine. In this epidemical fanaticism, our ancestors acted a conspicuous part, and some of our monarchs were at least signalized for exploits of valour.

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, two domestic acquisitions, of immense moment in their future consequences, were made to the English crown and strength; and two centuries later, a third and precious diadem was added to these. The reader will perceive that I allude to *Ireland, Wales, and Scotland*.

The Irish, like the English, had smarted under the incursion of the Northern pirates from the Baltic. After these, Henry II. 1172, was invited by some of the discontented
princes

princes of Ireland to invade that island, which was then sunk in extreme ignorance, and poverty, and distracted with public discord. Similar motives had induced the English to invite the Saxons into Britain; and in both instances the auxiliaries became masters. There were then three principal sovereignties in Ireland, besides many small independent states, tribes, and clans, who, like all hords of barbarians, were constantly exercising rapine and violence against each other. In consequence of these civil dissensions, and probably an inferiority in military tactics, Ireland seems to have submitted almost without resistance, to a handful of private adventurers from England. Dermot, King of Leinster, gave his daughter in marriage to one of the leaders of this expedition; and his submission was soon after more generally acquiesced in, and voluntarily ratified to Henry in person, who, besides the English monarchy, held extensive, hereditary, and acquired possessions in France.

Edward the First was assisted by both the Irish and the Welsh in his conquest of Scotland; and Edward the Third had six thousand Irish in his army at the battle of Crecy in

France. The vassalage, however, of Ireland to England was long merely nominal, and even unprofitable to the invaders. During five centuries after the 2d Henry, the Irish remained savage, untractable, and rebellious; and scarce a reign elapsed without an insurrection in that island. In many of these instances, however, they were the stupid instruments and dupes of a faction in England. Hume observes, " that the horrible and absurd
 " oppressions which the Irish suffered during
 " many centuries, under the English govern-
 " ment, had fired them with indignation and
 " the spirit of resistance. From this ill-
 " judged policy, the natives were treated as
 " beasts, and became such. They were often
 " excluded from law, justice, and protection,
 " and joined the rancour of revenge to untamed barbarity." Henry the Eighth, about three centuries ago, was the first who added the title of King of Ireland to the other English titles of sovereignty. But it was not until the latter end of Elizabeth's reign, that this fertile island was reduced into legal subordination; nor until that of her successor, James the First, that it gave hopes of becoming an useful acquisition to the English nation. Elizabeth founded a sumptuous University
 at

at Dublin; and James the First, with meritorious sagacity, contributed to its civilization, by the introduction of English laws, agriculture, and arts, together with colonies of Protestant subjects from the south and north of Britain.

The infamous confederacy of the natives in the massacre of forty thousand of these colonists, during the civil wars of Charles the First, originated from papal intrigues, bigotry, and oppression, and their apprehensions of total extermination. The English had been exasperated, by cruel treatment, to act the same vindictive tragedy against both the Romans and the Danes. Afterwards, under the insolent usurper, Cromwell, most of their lands were wantonly confiscated out to those English, who had advanced money to his parliament, some amongst his soldiers in lieu of arrears, and some sold to the rich corporation of London. In truth, until the present century, Ireland, was governed by a spirit of rank folly, arrogance, and tyranny, to which nations, as well as individuals, are too prone. It was a leaky ship, an ignorant crew, and steered by unskilful pilots. In the wild projects and prejudices of the English

monarchs for conquering France, they neglected infinitely more useful occupations of domestic union, industry, and improvement. The same error or infatuation has continued in substance though not in form, down to the present day, to infect the British cabinet; and is one, amongst many other proofs, that habit, more than reason, governs mankind and statesmen.

Wales until the first Edward's reign, had been, in a great measure, defended by its inaccessible mountains and defiles against the Saxon, Danish, and Norman invaders. It had, throughout many ages, remained a distinct and independent principality of the ancient Britons, and had frequently molested the English borders with predatory incursions. But after various repetitions of restive homage, and ineffectual struggles against Edward the First, it was finally incorporated, 1272, with the English monarchy, accepting as its nominal prince, the heir apparent to the English throne.

The Scotch history is a doleful repetition of predatory warfare and domestic faction. Throughout almost every reign, from the Norman

Norman invasion to the sixteenth century, the Scotch had infested the English frontiers with rapine and devastation. The Northern and Southern inhabitants of the same island were incessantly occupied, like ferocious savages, in tearing each other to pieces. They might be compared to two nations of rival gladiators, who made fighting their amusement and trade. The Scotch King and Parliament, as well as the Irish Chieftains, had been forced to do homage to Henry the Second. In the thirteenth century, Edward the First again reduced Scotland under the English subjection; and it was re-conquered by Edward the Third: but in all these instances, it found means soon after to revolt, and to shake off the yoke. Scotland, in its resistance against English encroachments, had pre-eminent advantages over Ireland, by being combined into one monarchy; and afterwards in being assisted by France, with whom she was long united in an offensive and defensive league. Without this extraneous assistance, Scotland could never have so long maintained her barbarous independence against her more powerful neighbour. After Edward the First's encroachments, a war with France generally

generally produced hostilities with Scotland, and invasion of the English frontiers.

So late as Elizabeth's reign, in the sixteenth century, the Scotch had very little to boast of their attainments in law or order, in arts or commerce. Their ruling constitution consisted, in fact, of an ignorant and turbulent aristocracy, and belligerent clans of submissive vassals. It was, says Hume, of little consequence to them how their laws were framed, while their exorbitant aristocracy had it so much in their power to prevent their execution. The beginning of the seventeenth century, when the union of the crowns of Scotland and England commenced, in the person of James the First, forms a most important and happy epoch to all the inhabitants of this island. It was indeed time for those shocking scenes, which pollute every page of British history, to terminate; those bloody encounters by which more than one million of lives were sacrificed in battle. The union of the two Parliaments, at the beginning of the present century under Queen Anne, drew into a focus the united strength and resources of the whole island. Until this complete assimilation and coalescence
with

with England, the government of Scotland had, from the beginning, been exposed to incessant sedition and convulsion; and after groaning for ages under a factious nobility, it was, in the last century, infected and debased by a dismal fanaticism.

Let us next survey, with equal brevity, the political and military state of England during this period. Some reigns after the Norman invasion, the kings of England were more absolute than those of France, who were kept in subjection by a powerful and mutinous aristocracy: but in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the regal scale sunk in England, and aristocracy reached its summit. The confederacy of a few powerful barons was then capable of shaking and overturning the throne. Between these contests of king and barons, and of pope and clergy, England was long agitated, and plunged headlong from the extremities of one faction into another. The feudal system was every where productive of discord and civil war. The great Charter, extorted from John in the thirteenth century, and other old statutes and privileges were all sufficiently clear in favour of liberty, but they were incessantly violated.

violated. Voltaire, however ironically, might with truth say that some centuries of the British history should be written by the hangman. It is notorious, that in the contentions for the throne, between the York and Lancaster factions, the greatest part of the ancient nobility were exterminated in the field, or on scaffolds. These long and bloody wars, which continued throughout six reigns, from Henry IV. to Henry VII. were at length healed up by the union of the contending families. But other disgusting scenes of domestic calamity were impending.

During the Saxon Heptarchy, the Christian system of religion which had been first imported into England, by the Romans, was again established, and had supplanted the gross idolatry of the Saxon oracle Woden. After the Norman invasion, England was, for many centuries, the most superstitious of all the remote provinces under the papal hierarchy. Crusades, and intrigues with the court of Rome, continued throughout many ages the principal occupation and policy of our own and of all the other European courts. But, about four hundred years ago, Wickliffe, an Oxford priest, the parent of the Lollard

Lollard sect, sounded the alarm of clerical imposture, profligacy, and usurpation. This reprehension of papal arrogance and rapacity, both in theory and practice, was revived with more asperity by Luther and Calvin; and soon after the dismemberment of the English church and nation from the papal yoke was effected under a bigotted and tyrannic monarch Henry VIII. By this great event, by the revival and diffusion of literature, and above all by the important invention of printing, a general spirit of resistance and reformation, both civil and religious, was excited throughout England.

The religious casuistry and factions, to which this innovation gave birth, continued to ferment during several generations, and to produce sad spectacles of fanaticism and animosity. The infernal plot in James the First's reign, to blow up the king and parliament with gunpowder, is one amongst many other instances of this mischievous frenzy. Puritanical fanaticism, the opposite extreme, which, in Cromwell's time, had cast a dismal shade over the nation, on the Restoration of Monarchy fell into discredit. But the Calvinist and other Protestant sectaries, however ridiculous

culous and disgusting in their manners at that period; have the merit of kindling the first sparks of liberty against the exorbitant prerogatives of Monarchy. A considerable part of the seventeenth century, from Charles the First to the Revolution, is stained with civil wars between prerogative and privilege, whose ravages were spread throughout Britain and Ireland.

The era of the external and remote additions to the British empire are posterior to the discovery of the loadstone and mariner's compass, of America, and of the passage to Asia by the Cape of Good Hope, the two last of which are not far short of three hundred years. These discoveries ushered Britain and France into a variety of remote and expensive possessions in both these hemispheres; and form a new epoch in navigation and naval history. So early as James the First's reign, colonies from Britain began to be settled in the continent of America, and in the island of Barbadoes: and during the civil wars of Charles the First, New England and Maryland received British colonists from the wrangling sectaries of Protestants and Catholics. During the usurpation of Cromwell, Jamaica was wrested from Spain; and

and in the beginning of the present century Gibraltar. Although an English commercial company had traded to India from the beginning of the seventeenth century, yet the principal part of the vast dominions of Britain in Hindoostan was acquired during the present century, and even in the present generation.

In the course of the last few years, an erroneous system of policy, and the natural cravings of independence, have, with the assistance of France, severed the greatest part of her transatlantic empire from Britain. In consequence of this disaster, I leave it to others to decide, whether, in stating the balance of emigration, of waste of men and treasure by reiterated wars, of the galling load of taxes, of the neglect of domestic improvement for foreign colonization and commerce, Great Britain is, upon the whole, a gainer or loser by her rapaciousness of dominion in the Western hemisphere; especially of dominion on the continent of North America. I feel equal diffidence and aversion to hazard any predictions on the fate and duration of her Asiatic empire in Hindoostan. I do not recollect that Athens was long enriched by her distant colonies; and many reasons induce me
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to think, that they should be considered not as principal, but as subordinate pillars in the architecture of the British empire. Spain, with the most precious possessions of the new world, has from that epoch been verging towards decay. The Romans in the decline of their domination, instructed their barbarian auxiliaries and vassals to contend too successfully with their military preceptors : and it is an axiom, that the increasing circle of conquest embroils such nations in a larger sphere of hostilities. Legislators should extend their views to these natural consequences, to distant ages of futurity, and infinitely beyond the contracted span of the human generation.

France, during the period now under review, kept pace with, or rather out-stripped England in acquisitions of internal strength and solidity. By consent, force, or fraud, she added a number of large provinces, exclusive of those wrested from the English, to all sides of her vast empire. At the same time, by the humiliation of her mutinous and overgrown vassals, her monarchy became infinitely more compact, formidable, and vigorous. Spain, by its sudden and immense aggrandizement in Europe and in America,

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between two and three centuries ago, although a more distant power, became the chief object of jealousy to the English. This colossus of empire had so far intoxicated their haughty monarch, as to prompt him to an invasion of England; and, with the delusive hopes of its easy conquest, Spain became a sacrifice to her own ambition. These apprehensions of Spanish greatness had stifled and suspended, during one century, the ancient animosities between England and France, until the towering grandeur and ambition of Lewis the Fourteenth again revived those deep-rooted jealousies, and filled not only England, but Europe with alarm. In the beginning of his reign, France had attained to its highest pinnacle of exaltation since the era of Charlemagne. This imperious career was, however, checked at sea by the British navy; and on land by Marlborough and Eugene.

I am willing to indulge the pleasing hope, that many ages will yet elapse before it can with truth be said that Great Britain has passed her meridian: or that she will ever be degraded to the ignominy of submitting to terms dictated by France. But should such an awful event ever occur, I trust that the ministers

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who are guilty of prostituting the public character, honour, and interest of this renowned nation, and of mismanaging its resources, will expiate their crimes on a scaffold, and that their names will be consigned to the records of infamy. I agree with an aphorism of General Lloyd, "That in wars, campaigns, and " battles, *in general*, few or no enterprizes " fail but by some errors which might have " been foreseen, and consequently avoided." Ignorance and miscarriage attempt to find some supernatural excuse in chance or providence.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

A Chronological Sketch of the Navy, Militia, Army, Fortresses, and Marine Arsenals of Great Britain.

AT the Roman invasion, the ships of the Britains were little superior to the canoes of the modern savages of America, and far inferior to those of the new discovered islands in the Pacific. Their foreign commerce from Cornwall had been carried on for centuries in Phœnician and Greek ships, and their voyages across the straits of the channels to Gaul and Ireland, did not require extraordinary dexterity in shipbuilding or navigation. After the departure of the Roman legions and navy, and the union of the heptarchy, necessity, self defence, the example and terror of the the Baltic pirates, would prompt the possessors of England to exert their strength on sea as well as on land. Even in the earliest period the Britons had demonstration of the superiority of a naval force in protecting their independence. This was the successful revolt of Carausius the Roman

admiral in the British channel, who for ten years braved all the power and resentment of that mighty state, and during that interval, severed this island from their dominion, notwithstanding their possession of Gaul, and all the other countries south of the Rhine.

Alfred, a wise and patriotic monarch, was vigilant to provide, against the Northern pirates, a respectable naval force, the natural defence of every island. He increased the shipping of the kingdom, both in number and size, and trained his people in the practice of navigation and naval evolutions. By these precautions the Danes were often intimidated, defeated, or intercepted in their predatory retreats. Athelstan pursued the example of his illustrious grandfather, and enacted the following law, for the encouragement of navigation and commerce: "That any merchant, who made three distant voyages to the Mediterranean or Baltic, with a ship and cargo of his own, should be advanced to the rank of a Thane," or Earl. Edgar, *styled the honour and delight of the British nation*, was also particularly attentive to maritime affairs. In the course of his flourishing reign, he built and maintained a respectable navy, which was
divided

divided into three squadrons, and by that disposition, effectually secured the coasts and commerce on the three sides of England, from piratical insults. It is recorded by some of our historians, that Earl Goodwin presented to Hardicanute, the last of the Danish Kings, a ship richly gilt, and manned with eighty mariners in handsome uniforms.

During many centuries after the Norman invasion, England seems to have been superior, both on sea and land, to France. In John's reign, and thirteenth century, the English engaged the French fleet on the coast of Flanders, taking and destroying four hundred of their ships, and the remainder were burnt to prevent their capture. By this decisive blow they put an end to an intended invasion. In the same century, in the reigns of Henry the Third, and of Edward the First, the French were twice defeated in the channel by the English. In the fourteenth century, the most brilliant sea victory that this island can boast of, was gained by Edward the Third on the coast of Flanders; in which, according to some writers, thirty thousand French were killed and drowned, and two hundred and thirty ships captured. Two naval vic-

tories were gained over the combined fleets of France and Genoa, in Henry the Fifth's reign, who had three large ships his own property. Many centuries, however, after the Norman invasion, most of the Kings of England hired and pressed ships, on emergencies, from the merchants, and with these they engaged the French. Some were also furnished by the Cinque Ports of Kent and Suffex, as a kind of naval militia. These amounted to fifty-five, and the complement of each was between twenty and forty sailors. Edward the Third's army was conveyed to France in 1200 ships. Henry the Seventh expended 14000l. on one ship, the largest that had been launched from the English docks. It was in the first Edward's reign, that the *Society of Merchant Adventurers* was instituted, for the double purpose of exporting woollen cloths to Antwerp, and increasing the marine. But two centuries after, so late as Henry the Eighth's reign, the foreign commerce of England was confined principally to Flanders, where their woollen goods were dyed; and which then greatly excelled our island in mechanical arts, commerce, and navigation.

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That patriotic Queen, Elizabeth, encouraged the English merchants to build ships for commerce, and to depend less for freight in foreign bottoms, and foreigners; who, for many centuries, had engrossed a considerable share of the mercantile transactions of this island. At the period of the formidable invasion, during her reign, the English were far inferior to the Spaniards, both in number and size of ships. All the sailers in England amounted then to about fourteen thousand, the royal navy to twenty-eight sail, and few of these exceeded the bulk of our largest frigates. The merchant vessels were all of small size; the largest of which, in cases of emergency, were converted into ships of war. To repel the invasion of this boasted armada, the metropolis, the sea ports, the nobility and gentry, all fitted out ships at their own expence: London alone equipped thirty. Two thirds of the commerce of England, then centered in London, and was in the hands of a few merchants. The largest ship that had ever came from the English docks was built in James the First's reign. She was 1400 tons, and carried 64 guns. The English had

then become celebrated in ship-building, and in the foundry of iron cannon.

During the usurpation of Cromwell, the English navy began to assume a formidable ascendant. The act of navigation, enacted, or rather revived and improved at that period, was a wise regulation for the increase of British commerce and sailors. This and the vast increase of the coal trade from Newcastle to London, which commenced in the thirteenth century, made important additions to the naval resources of our island. Under the banners of the common-wealth, and also, in Charles the Second's reign, a multitude of desperate battles were fought in the narrow seas, between the English, Dutch, and French. At the Revolution, and towards the end of the last century, the British navy amounted to 133 ships, of all sizes, and required forty thousand men to man them. During the present century, the British navy has been augmented, both in number and in size, to a tremendous catalogue; to between four and five hundred sail, which, in extraordinary danger, they are able to man with one hundred thousand seamen and marines. This navy, throughout the
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last ninety years, has, in most instances, carried the flag of Britain triumphant over France; and sometimes over France and Spain united. It is by this Navy alone, like the golden chain of Jove, that the remote satellites of Britain can be held suspended to its centre. Had our ministers kept this maxim constantly before their eyes, and not acted like blindfolded Gladiators, North America would probably at this hour, and in spite of France, have continued a member of the British empire.

The Militia and Army are the next objects of comparative gradation to the navy. In the rude and uncultivated state of society and nations, every man, on the alarm of danger, is a soldier; and the first honours are decreed to him who excels in military courage or conduct. "Amongst nations of hunters, the lowest and rudest state of society, such as we find it amongst the native tribes of North America, every man is a warrior as well as hunter. Amongst nations of shepherds, a more advanced state of society, such as we find it among the Tartars and Arabs, every male is in the same manner a warrior." On the arrival of the Romans, the Britons had
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not emerged from this first stage of social barbarism. But in a state of civilization and refinement, arts, sciences, and occupations are immensely multiplied; the duty of war is delegated into the hands of a few; and the number of those who can go to war in proportion to the whole number of the people, is necessarily much smaller than in a rude state of society. In ancient Egypt, the military class was distinct and hereditary; it is so at this day in Hindoostan.

The Roman legions in Britain consisted principally of foreigners, and the natives were drafted to recruit their armies in different parts of the Continent. Amongst the Anglo Saxons all the freemen and proprietors of land, the clergy excepted, were trained to the use of arms, and were always prepared for war. The good and wise Alfred, after repelling the Danes, took care that all the nation, capable of bearing arms, should be registered and formed into militia, who had a regular routine of duty, and who were an excellent security on land, against the descent of the Northern pirates. During the feudal system, land armies were suddenly raised and maintained by the military vassals; and often

as suddenly disbanded. In Henry the Second's reign all able householders, and others, of sufficient property, were obliged to put themselves in military array, and to be provided with a suit of armour, and military weapons, for the defence of the kingdom. Henry the Fifth, before he embarked in hostilities against France, empowered commissioners to take a review of all the freemen in each county capable of service, to divide them into companies, and to keep them in readiness for resisting an invasion. In Henry the Eighth's reign, the free inhabitants throughout the kingdom were obliged to provide themselves with bows and arrows, pikes and halberts, armour and harness, and were frequently mustered. In the same reign some laws were also enacted, and revived for the encouragement of *archery*. That execrable bigot Mary, determined to disable the nation from resistance, by ordering general musters of the militia, and directing her commissioners to seize their arms, and to deposit them in forts and castles. But in Elizabeth's reign there were frequent reviews of the militia. The city of London alone then mustered fifteen thousand militia and artillery, which were much patronized and respected by Henry
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the Eighth, and by his daughter Elizabeth. In James the First's reign, the militia of this island amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand. The trained bands of London were then as respectable as they are now contemptible and useless. In Charles the Second's reign, a formidable and disciplined militia were established in both islands: Scotland and Ireland had each twenty thousand. During the present century, neither Scotland nor Ireland have had any regular militia: but within the present generation, the militia of England have been new modelled and improved. A finer and more athletic body of soldiers, nor a more respectable corps of officers cannot be found throughout Europe. The principal defect now is, that instead of thirty, the whole island should, *in war*, muster sixty thousand militia.

It has been alledged by some writers, not sufficiently informed, that no vestiges of a standing army can be traced in England before the era of Henry the Seventh; but the foreign conquerors are an exception to this statement. The Romans kept a standing army of between twenty and thirty thousand men in Britain upwards of three centuries. In several instances

stances also, the Saxons and Danes were hired for the purposes of plunder or butchery ; and before the Norman invasion, some Danish troops were maintained, as a species of standing army, and as body guards to their kings. After the Norman invasion, Henry the Second, introduced a practice of making a commutation of the baron's feudal service for money, and enlisted, during a stated contract, some of those disciplined adventurers, and predatory vagabonds, with which Europe swarmed. Afterwards, in Edward the First's reign, it was customary with him, and some other sovereigns of Europe, during actual hostilities, to commute the personal feudal service for money, and with this to enlist troops.

Henry the Seventh is the first who maintained, during peace, one hundred yeomen as the royal guard of his person and palace, who were all expert *archers* ; but in whom, at present, it would be difficult to discover any other qualification, except size. Charles the First maintained a small standing army in Ireland ; and during the hurricane of civil war between him and the parliament, troops were enlisted on both sides. Under Cromwell's commonwealth, a large standing army amounting

amounting to upwards of fifty thousand men, were kept up in Britain and Ireland. On the Restoration, Charles the Second was permitted to retain only a small standing army of five thousand men in Britain, and ten thousand in Ireland; and this is usually called the epoch of the first regular standing army during peace, under the British monarchy. When the Prince of Orange, afterwards William the Third, landed in England, James the Second had thirty thousand regular troops on foot to oppose him, and the projected reformation in government. After the Revolution it is notorious, that William was ambitious to excess of military fame, and of being at the head of armies on the Continent. From that period, and throughout the present century, Britain has been involved in a labyrinth of Continental quarrels; in fruitless military parade and extravagance. The scene has been merely shifted from France to Flanders, and Germany, where three long and expensive wars have succeeded each other, by which, and the late American war, the nation was reduced to the brink of bankruptcy. The consequences must be dreadful and fatal, if our state pilots do not yet see the impolicy and folly of either rivalling or imitating

tating the Continental powers in standing armies of land forces. Let our statesmen take the illustrious Alfred for their model, and they never can err. Let them read History and they must admit that all the attempts of England against the frontier of France on the side of Flanders, from the days of Edward the Third to the present moment, have been as unsuccessful in the end as they were ruinous in the expence. Edward and Henry's successful plans and line of operation was on the side of Normandy and Brittany, and which ultimately gave the former the possession of Calais.

Lastly, I cannot suppress my doubts respecting the propriety and policy of the present British mode of enlistment for life, instead of a limited period of service; (seven years) at the expiration of which, war alone should postpone the soldier's discharge if demanded by him.

The continent of Europe is now crowded with innumerable strong and expensive Fortifications. Mankind, like animals of prey, are constantly on the watch, and guarding against the rapacity of each other. Happily for Britain, and for all other islands of sufficient

ficient magnitude and population, they do not stand in need of such an extravagant circumvallation of artificial ramparts and ditches. There are very few places in Britain wherein it is necessary to erect expensive monuments on the modern systems of Vauban and Cohorn.

We have already observed, that on the arrival of the Romans, the Britons were collected into forests, and their congregation of huts secured with ramparts and ditches; and that London, St. Albans, and Malden were three of their principal cities. During the residence of the Romans, the natives could not fail to learn some of their system of tactics, architecture, and fortification, many ruins of which remain at this day; and an infinitely greater number were wantonly laid in ashes by the illiterate barbarians from Germany and the Baltic. After the Norman conquest, William and his barons were anxious to secure their spoils by a multitude of forts and castles. In Henry the Second's reign, the stately Gothic castles of the king and barons had multiplied to upwards of eleven hundred; many of which were filled with troops of licensed robbers, and a banditti of dissolute

dissolute vassals. The Tower of London, built or perhaps rebuilt by William Rufus, and Dover Castle, then enlarged, was long considered as two of the most important fortresses in England. Within the last three centuries, Portsmouth and Plymouth have, in successive reigns, received important additions to their docks and fortifications. Cromwell erected a chain of Forts in Scotland to curb the inhabitants, which were afterwards demolished; and some towards the Northern extremity have since been added. Indeed most of the fortresses in Scotland and Ireland are not calculated to resist a foreign enemy or invasion; and at present it would be folly and insanity to cover a whole kingdom with fortifications, which can be protected with far more effect, and infinitely less expence, by ships.

The Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland will not discharge their duty to the publick, if they longer postpone a critical survey and report of the great and small Forts in both islands. Let those that are judged indispensibly necessary to repel invasion or depredation be repaired or rebuilt; and let the pensions and sinecures attached to those of a contrary de-

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scription be abolished, or converted to some better use. On the fortifications and harbours, between Portsmouth and Harwich, I shall soon have an opportunity to animadvert; and also on the barracks now erecting throughout this island. At present, I shall simply transcribe a well known state aphorism; "That the most effectual way to preserve peace is by a constant preparation for war."

CHAP. IV.

Of the present relative, and absolute Force of Great Britain and France, respecting Invasion and Defence. Various Improvements suggested.

IT is only within these few centuries that the modern nations of Europe have taken their political rank and station, and have emerged from rusticity and barbarism. But the comparative scale and barometer are varying every generation. Nations and empires, like the human race, are a moving picture, and in perpetual fluctuation. The modern free cities on the Baltic, German Ocean, and Rhine, as well as Venice, Genoa, Portugal and Spain all preceded Britain and France in maritime renown. Somewhat more than one hundred years ago, in the minority of Lewis the 14th, the naval force of France was far inferior to that of England. But during a few years only of that reign, a patriotic minister raised France to be one of the first maritime powers in Europe, at least in force, though perhaps not in resources; and on land

it was superior in numbers to every other. The English and Dutch in their different alliances at that period with the French, had taught them naval evolutions and tacticks; and the profligacy of that agreeable, but inglorious monarch Charles the Second, gave them many advantages of maritime aggrandizement.

Since the beginning of the present century, not only the external, but also the internal strength of Britain had, until lately, prodigiously increased. The jarring interests, prejudices, and jealousies of both islands, together with their civil and religious dissensions have been gradually subsiding, an event in which all should equally rejoice. For it is not improbable, had not England, Scotland, and Ireland been united under one crown, and incorporated into one compact government, one people, and one interest, that, sooner or later, they might have shared the fate of the Greek republicks. Some enterprising state of the Continent, like the crafty Macedonian, would not have failed to take advantage of their civil dissensions and weakness, and in the end, would have crushed them into tributary provinces. Such fortunate union of
government

government and interest, authorizes me, in contradiction to the lofty insinuation of French rhetoricians, "that Britain and Ireland retain
 " their liberty, property, and political rank,
 " at the discretion and forbearance of France," to say, that the British empire is not inferior to France in absolute, and is superior in relative strength. At the same time we admit, that by the late violent dismemberment of North America, and more especially by the consequent load of national debt, Great Britain has been hurled from a summit of power, magnificence, and strength.

If France, merely from the impolicy, negligence, and ignorance of our Legislators, has double the population of Great Britain and Ireland, the latter have more than treble the extent of sea coast and harbours, a circumstance so transcendently essential to maritime superiority. Great Britain and Ireland, in point of situation, have some prominent advantages, as durable as the globe, and of which no human power or malevolence can deprive them. An island in war has the advantage over a continent. The first has but a small extent, and a few specific points to defend, and is accessible but by one draw-
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bridge, a navy; whereas France has several avenues by which an enemy could enter, and an extensive line of fortresses to garrison: more than one half its circumference is a land frontier. As to this menaced invasion, which is to put an end to our existence, it would puzzle the projector to satisfy his sober readers, how that is to take place, before the British fleet is defeated. How are those French grenadiers to be exported hither; by wings, balloons, or cork jackets? Is France superior in ships, or in sailors? The heroic writer should know, that it is an axiom of Great Britain, and deeply engraved on the heart of every inhabitant, never to desert the dominion of the channel, nor to drop the trident, until she has encountered a series of naval shocks and disasters, and is driven from the last plank. The history of Athens under Themistocles, furnishes her with a conspicuous precedent of the inefficacy of the most formidable invasion on record, when disabled by defeat at sea: and the British history furnishes many more of a similar tendency. Every man and boy capable of handling an oar and a rope would be forced to lend his assistance. The extra sailors employed in commerce, fisheries, coal trade, packets, ferries, and the East India Company's ships and officers

cers would make a formidable augmentation to the marine.

Great Britain and Ireland not only outstrip France, on the true element of dominion, in maritime strength and numbers, but they can even bring as many fighting men into the field as France can spare to invade them. Amongst the civilized nations of modern Europe, it is commonly computed that no more than one hundredth part of the inhabitants (including all ages and sexes) can be employed as soldiers by profession, without ruin to the community which pays the expence of their service. France cannot possibly raise during war above 300,000 land forces; at least she cannot, for any considerable time, maintain more without crippling her marine. One third of these, however, are indispensable, merely for stationary guards of her frontiers, and foreign possessions. Her offensive land army, therefore, cannot, at the extremity, exceed 100,000. Let us see what our two islands have to oppose this invading force.

If the Northern part of our island was to raise a militia in proportion to that maintained by the South part, which is both rea-

sonable and equitable, then the united militia of Great Britain might, with very little additional difficulty, be augmented to 60, or, during an actual invasion, and inferiority at sea, to 100,000 athletic men. It was by a feudal militia that England gained most of her victories and conquests in France. The legionary soldiers of Rome, during many centuries, consisted of militia; and at this day the Swiss and Prussian armies are a mixture of militia. The metropolis, and the riches on the Thames, would be far more effectually secured against foreign or domestic depredation, by substituting ten thousand periodical militia, in lieu of the present rabble of trained bands and night watch. Great Britain can also, in a short time, make a sufficient augmentation to her regular forces in both islands, to her artillery, infantry, and cavalry. Ireland with ease could, and should be encouraged, in peace as well as in war, to raise a militia, in the proportion of one third to that of Great Britain. Her patriotic army of disciplined volunteers would then be superfluous, except in very extraordinary emergencies*. The two islands

* The Editor has the satisfaction to add, that since the publication of the preceding Edition of this work, a Militia

islands are so happily situated, that they could not be prevented, by any foreign foe, from mutually co-operating with, and assisting each other, according to the exigency, and the movements of the invader. By Wales, and by Scotland, there are a variety of short, and easy channels of communication. Even Plymouth is but thirty leagues from Cork: Brest is one hundred.

Marshal Saxe, G——l L——d, and the best modern writers agree that 50,000 men are sufficient to decide the fate of any battle on land. Indeed there are few places in England where so many troops on each side could be brought into action: ranged in line, with proper intervals, they would extend above six miles. Besides, an army acting on the defensive, and in their own country, particularly if that country is full of defiles and passes, is equal to double or treble the number of assailants. The former having the choice of ground, could to its natural strength add artificial; in other parts they are defended by regular fortifications, and have the collateral assistance of

litia of 16,000 men has been established in Ireland, and an establishment of the same kind is in agitation for Scotland.

an armed nation. If the French, as their volunteer herald, Mr. Dupont, seems to threaten, should come over with all the pomp and number of Xerxes, and with all the fanaticism of Crusaders, in all probability they must speedily return, if they can, or perish by famine, disease and the sword. In truth, conquest is neither a necessary consequence of superior number, nor of revenue. If such was the inevitable result, Greece should have been but a morsel to Xerxes, and China should be able to swallow up Europe.

Nor is this one half of the effective force with which Great Britain and Ireland could burst indignant upon their invaders. A large auxiliary reserve of militia or volunteers might be conveniently disciplined throughout all the cities and towns of Britain and Ireland, to supply the emergencies of the field. It is also acknowledged that no nation in Europe has the materials of an equestrian force, equally numerous and formidable. The natives are half trained to horsemanship; and all the essentials of the equestrian exercise can be acquired in three months, without much trouble or expence. Indeed it would be rather an agreeable and manly amusement, and a meritorious

ritorious revival of the ancient tournaments. Volunteer associations of the above description could not fail to call forth a tremendous strength against invaders. Should they land near Cornwall, that county boasts of a hardy and rugged race of 80,000 tin miners. Are our enemies aware what strenuous efforts could be made by rich companies, corporations, cities, and individuals, to assist their country both by sea and land; that these alone are capable of equipping and maintaining a powerful navy and militia? A free and brave nation, like an individual roused into indignation, is capable of the most desperate acts, especially when contending "*pro aris & focis*," and would either prove victorious, or bury themselves in the ruins. Those noblemen and gentlemen of property, who conducted themselves with kindness and friendship towards their tenants and domesticks, might then depend on their gratitude and zeal.

As it would be incumbent on Great Britain, in such a crisis of her empire, to exert every sinew, and nerve of strength, it may not be improper to point out another easy method of rendering her much more formidable on land. For a defensive war of posts, he who
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can expeditiously load, fire, and hit his mark, is an excellent soldier. What a formidable corps might be collected from the gamekeepers and other deadly marksmen throughout this island, to act as chasseurs on horseback and on foot? The rifle gun and blunderbuss, the air gun, the long and cross bow, or deadly arbalester, and the long pike, seem extremely well calculated for such irregular combat, and are suited both to infantry and cavalry. At the battle of Naseby, between King Charles and the parliament army under Essex, the latter presented an invincible rampart of pikes against the furious shock of Prince Rupert's cavalry. A spear or lance was one of the principal weapons of the feudal cavalry and of the Crusaders. The Arabians, and the Uhlans have all long pikes. The present cavalry of Egypt, called Mamalukes, have each flung round them a blunderbuss, or short gun, which discharges twelve bullets, two short pistols in their waist belt, and a crooked sword; and are constantly exercised in firing at marks, and in the practice of the sabre.

G——l L——d, in his military history, calculates that, on an average, one only of four hundred shots takes effect in land battles; and

and perhaps the odds is greater in sea fights. Saxe and Lloyd both censure the impotent noise of cannon and musquetry, and especially of platoon firing: they prefer the firing by files or by ranks, beginning with the rear. It is a fact, that during all the last German war, there were not two thousand British troops in the list of killed. History instructs us that in former ages the *English Archers*, by the wise policy of our forefathers, were trained with peculiar diligence to become expert marksmen, and were of infinite service in the wars and victories in France: their arrows penetrated the strongest armour. The celebrated Lawyer, Sir John Fortescue, emphatically says, "That the might of the realm of England standeth upon Archers." Was not the stern discipline of the Roman legion, often compelled to yield to the superior dexterity and agility of the Parthian archers? The bullet discharged from the North American Indian seldom fails to carry death, and terror amongst their foes. Lord Anson found marksmen equally serviceable in sea actions. The immortal Homer, whom all military men should learn by heart, and whose Iliad the Macedonian hero always laid under his pillow, points out the vast importance of dex-

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trous marksmen. These military essentials are now shamefully neglected by us, and are sacrificed to empty parade. There should be associations and clubs throughout the Island, for the practice of the rifle and air gun, the long and cross bow, and perhaps to revive the use of some of the ancient artillery.

But it is not alone the degeneracy of our modern military institutions, which renders us less formidable on land to an invader; our imperious system of Game laws is calculated to suppress the use and exercise of fire arms amongst our yeomanry, to expose and enervate a brave people in the day of national danger, and to pave the way for the introduction and success of a more sagacious antagonist. It is one of the first badges of a conquered and enslaved nation to be deprived of the use of arms. We have seen the fatal consequences of that regimen in the history of our own Island, when abandoned by the Roman Legions. Would those who are obliged to buy annual licences to shoot partridges, be the defenders of Britain against a foreign enemy? Is it politic to sacrifice the dearest interest and security of the nation to such a paltry revenue, and to all the other wretched chicanery of the
game

game statutes? On the contrary, would it not be prudent to encourage dexterity in the rifle gun, in the modern air gun used by the Imperial chasseurs, in the long and cross bow, equally with horse racing, by lucrative and honorary rewards? In certain seasons of the year, those employed in agriculture can perform periodical military duties, pastimes and evolutions, with little detriment to themselves and to the public; manufacturers and artificers, also require occasional recreation. A Proclamation of Edward the Third contains the following curious passage. "In former times the people of our kingdom, at their hours of play, commonly exercised themselves in *Archery*, from which we derived both honour and advantage; but now that art is neglected for more useless and dishonest games."—"No improvement in arts, nor increase of wealth can compensate for the loss of national spirit, and the power of self defence." I should here add that the jealous rigour of the Laws enacted, since the Reformation, against the proselytes of Popery, and, since the Revolution, against the proselytes of the Pretender, have both contributed to circumscribe the use of fire arms throughout Britain and Ireland.

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" The ancient institutions of Greece and Rome, seem to have been much more effectual and simple, for maintaining the martial spirit of the great body of the people, than the establishment of what are called the militias of modern times. When they were once established they executed themselves, and it required little or no attention from government to maintain them in the most perfect vigour. Whereas to maintain, even in tolerable execution, the complex regulations of any modern militia, requires the continual and painful attention of government; without which they are constantly falling into total neglect, and disuse. The influence, besides, of the ancient institutions, was much more universal. By means of them, the whole body of the people was completely instructed in the use of arms. Whereas it is but a very small part of them who can ever be so instructed by the regulations of any modern militia, except perhaps those of Switzerland. In the republics of ancient Greece and Rome to learn his military exercises, was a necessary part of education imposed by the state upon every free citizen. Each, so long as he remained at home, seems to have practised his
exercise

exercise separately, or with such of his equals as he liked best;—and not to have been attached to any particular body or troop, until he was actually called upon to take the field.” (Smith’s Wealth of Nations.)

Mr. Hume, the British historian, makes the following remark:—“It is observable, that though the military profession requires great genius, and long experience in *the principal commanders*, all its subordinate duties may be discharged by ordinary talents; and from superficial practice, citizens and country gentlemen soon become excellent officers. The generals of greatest fame and capacity happened all of them to spring up on the side of parliament, during the civil wars of Charles the First. The courtiers and great nobility, in the royal party, checked the growth of any extraordinary genius amongst the subordinate officers; and every man there, as in a regular established government, was confined to the station in which his birth had placed him.”

All the essentials of military institutions for real action, and the great moment of engagement, are very few. Two thirds of the pa-

rade evolutions are then superfluous. Six or eight manœuvres, says G——l L——d, are sufficient for all cases. To preserve order and regularity in the ranks and line, whether it moves slow, quick, or oblique, and especially when advancing with rapidity; to front forwards, and to both sides; to form the line expeditiously from the columns, and, *vice versa*; to load and fire with expedition and effect; to be obedient, silent, brave; and to have regularity and velocity in every action and motion: these are the fundamental qualifications of the militia, and of every other soldier, when brought face to face with the enemy.

I cannot subscribe to an assertion of Mr. Hume's "that so late as James the First's reign, two thousand cavalry could not be properly mounted throughout England, such was the scarcity of good horses." We know that much earlier, in Edward the Third, and in Henry the Fifth's wars, that each had a considerable body of cavalry, from two to four thousand, in their army when they invaded France; and that Queen Elizabeth had two thousand cavalry mixed with infantry to oppose the Spanish invaders. It is equally
notorious

notorious that a horse was part of the paraphrenalia of the reigning passion, chivalry and knighthood ; and that it composed the principal force of the crusaders. The Swiss and Spaniards, some centuries ago, excelled in disciplined infantry ; and since that, the proportion of cavalry, more especially of the unwieldy squadrons, has been abridged. It is an observation of G——l L——d, “ that new raised cavalry generally behave better in action, than new raised infantry ; the former being carried on at full gallop, without having time to reflect on their danger. In the modern history of our own, and of other continental armies, we have many proofs of this proposition. We know that velocity will compensate for weight ; and that light cavalry can baffle heavy, even in line. But if ever an actual invasion should render it necessary, there is now in this island an ample selection of weight and velocity united, sufficient to mount two hundred thousand men.

Homer's heroes most frequently descended from their chariots to close encounter on foot. Centaurs or men on horseback do not seem to have been in use at this siege. He, in many places, extols to the skies the swiftness and

beauty of the immortal courfers. The Greeks and Macedonians excelled in infantry; Philip, and Alexander performed miracles with the Phalanx. Hannibal's army consisted principally of cavalry, and under the conduct of that celebrated General, shook Rome to its foundation. The Roman legion contained a moderate proportion of cavalry mixed with infantry and artillery, and during many centuries overcame all its enemies and rivals. The Germans, who waged war against them, were not destitute of cavalry, but their principal strength consisted of infantry. On the contrary most of the Asiatic nations have been renowned, time immemorial, for the number and force of cavalry in their armies. The Persians excelled in horsemanship and archery, and were always formidable to the Romans, even in the moments of rapid and disorderly flight. They were trained to dart the Javelin and shoot their arrows at full speed, and in every direction. It was a custom with the Sarmatians for their expert warriors to lead one or two spare horses, which enabled them to advance and to retreat with rapid diligence. The Huns, Tartars, and Arabians all brought immense armies of cavalry into the field. At the memorable battle of Angora, between Tamerlane

merlane and Bajazet, the two armies mustered upwards of five hundred thousand cavalry. The native sluggish breed of Europe has been greatly improved by that of Asia, and especially of Arabia.

It is the just and important observation of Vegetius, that both the Roman infantry and cavalry was invariably covered with defensive armour, such as helmets, breastplates, greaves, &c. from the foundation of the city to the reign of the Emperor Gratian: that in the decline of the empire and military tactics, their enemies profited by their fatal omission and negligence in protecting the vital parts by the usual military accoutrements. For this purpose G——l L——d strenuously recommends cuirasses and caps of the strongest leather. I am sorry that in this and many other instances, his advice is not more attended to by British statesmen.

On the Navy I propose to offer a few hints, calculated to two objects: the increase of the nursery of sailors, and of the actual marine force of the nation. As to the first, I believe that the most certain and durable recruit of sailors must be sought for from our domestic

and foreign fisheries, and from the coal, and coasting trade; and that it would be politic and practicable for the legislature to give more encouragement to the consumption of fish and oil. Again, from the parochial charity schools of England, and from the necessitous poor of the metropolis, many thousand sturdy boys, might be annually selected, and sent, at the expence of their parishes, or other public institutions, on board of ships, to be stationed, for that purpose, in a few convenient sea-ports. By one or two years training, they would furnish a constant recruit both to the royal and mercantile service; and would, in a considerable degree, alleviate the rigours of the impress duty, and the teasing interruptions of commerce. These are truly the children and property of the state; and in no other mode can so effectually recompense their benefactors. I could even wish them to be nursed on the sea, and to regard it as their native element.

The peace establishment of the infantry of Britain is not too numerous, considering the distant settlements and garrisons which they are also obliged to guard: I speak of numbers, not of regiments. But this I maintain, and I could quote not only the written authority of

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G——l L——d, but also of the late celebrated Marshal Keith, to the same effect, that it would be infinitely more advantageous for the nation, if at least one half of the standing army of the empire was converted into Marines. All our military operations on land should have a connection with the fleet, consequently, should be principally restricted to islands, and the sea coasts. It is to be hoped, that the British nation will never hereafter suffer themselves to be misled and inveigled into Continental quarrels, except where they can act on their proper element, the ocean. But should this system of folly, ignorance, and corruption, be persevered in, let them, of two evils, chuse the least: they can hire land armies of disciplined soldiers, at one third the expence of their own, from several German potentates, and from the Swifs, and can subsidize them still cheaper. As to cavalry, half of the thirty regiments, and especially the heavy ones, might be disbanded, without any public loss or regret. The men, horses, and accoutrements are an enormous expence. They never can be wanted to guard our distant possessions, nor to attack those of the enemy. Before any invasion could take place, sufficient time would intervene for raising and

training a competent force of cavalry. In preventing smuggling, the Navy and Marines will be more effectual; and for quelling accidental riots or sedition, a better national police, with the militia, will insure the execution of all wholesome laws. The enormous extra train of horses, carriages, baggage, attendants, staff, &c. and the necessity of frequently recruiting the ranks in a land army during war, is sufficient to impoverish the richest state—and of all the European armies that of England is by far the most expensive.

Besides converting half the British standing army of infantry and cavalry into Marines and naval Artillery, I submit to more experienced judges, whether it would not be more beneficial to the public, and to the uniformity and harmony of the naval service, if the officers of marines were to be drafted from the corps of midshipmen and lieutenants. At present, during peace, this junior class of soldiers are turned adrift on the world without pay: too many of them must then become burthensome to their families, or must seek for employment in foreign countries, amongst our open or secret enemies, or starve in gaols. Or suppose them, at length, promoted to Lieutenants in the navy, how few,
without

without interest, can rise above that rank? By this intimate incorporation of the naval and marine service, there would, in extreme danger, be a double strength of officers, sufficiently expert in both naval and land evolutions. It can never be too often inculcated, *that the standing army of Britain and Ireland should be principally, if not wholly, amphibious.* In many arts and sciences almost one third of life is obliged to be spent in acquiring the rudiments: and will any one have the folly to assert, that interest or money should be the sole recommendation to military promotion? How many expeditions have failed, from the reciprocal ignorance and bickerings of the commanders of the sea and land forces, and from their superficial knowledge of the duty of each other.

By the transmutation of half the standing army into marines and naval artillery, a force of thirty thousand men, could be added to the navy, without a shilling extra expence to the nation. Fleets then could be fitted out at a short notice, instead of delaying to ransack the island for raw recruits, and the scourings of gaols, and squandering the CRITICAL moments for action, in dilatory and inefficacious preparation. A standing
army

army would then be an excellent nursery for the navy; and wars might be brought to a speedy termination, without harrassing commerce so oppressively, and without draining to the dregs the revenues and resources of the nation. The scandalous traffick in commissions would thereby be prodigiously checked, and the influence of the executive government would suffer no diminution. It is in truth a cruel hardship and injustice upon the officers in general of the naval profession, that such multitudes of them are dismissed to pine on a niggardly half pay, until their country shall be again in danger. The preceding regulations would also render our employment of many thousand foreign sailors, during war, unnecessary*.

From the comparison of the sea and land forces of the invaders and defenders, and of their reciprocal difficulties and advantages, we come to say a few words only on another important subject of national strength, and which is emphatically termed, the sinews of war, on Revenue. The relative and ab-

* See Sir William Temple's works on the mode of increasing the Navy of England: and Lord Hawksbury on the true Constitutional defence, a Militia. See also Petty, Davenant, Deslandes.

solute power derived from revenue, will be very different in different countries, and in the same country in different centuries. It is by no means a subject of which we can boast that Great Britain and Ireland, with not half the population, now raise an annual revenue not inferior to France; including in the general estimate, as is done in France, the parochial, and other extraneous subsidies and contributions. The last Revolution, however meritorious and indispensable for the security of civil and religious liberty, engrafted and entailed a new disease into our Constitution; the system of national debt, of borrowing, mortgaging, and devouring the revenues of posterity. The cup of good is seldom dealt to man unmixed. This consumption and canker has continued, throughout the present century, to prey upon the vitals of the nation. It proceeds gradually in sapping the foundation of liberty, property, and social enjoyments. Taxation is now to Britain one of the severest calamities and scourges of war. Who can, with truth, deny that it is not in several instances stretched to oppression? "Sunt certi denique fines, quos ultro citraque nequit consistere rectum," is justly applicable to the modern financeering schemes of Britain,

Britain, Holland, and France. They have long been running races of prodigality and extortion, and have depended as much upon the weight of gold and credit, as upon iron and lead in ruining one another. By such profusion, two of those powers have become nearly exhausted. One of them lingers in an incurable decline. The other has lately made a daring effort to disburthen herself and posterity of this load. Let us also hope that Britain will be able to extricate herself in sufficient time, so as to meet her rival on terms of equality. Promises and protestations of disinterestedness, would be but a slender security against future molestation from that quarter.

Since the first edition of this work and of these observations, we have become engaged in another war with France; and most unfortunately and indiscreetly are plunged over head and ears in the old vortex of Continental quackery. Without some speedy reform in our political and military system, it requires not the gift of prophecy to foretel the fatal consequences. Should this war of extravagance and misconduct continue but another year, I really cannot discern any permanent sources of taxation, in the usual mode, which will
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not excite universal murmurs and discontent. Palliatives will not long avail in so desperate a disease. Church tythes seem to me the only radical resource: these to be gradually abolished at the death of each incumbent, and an additional land tax levied for the public use. Probably in Britain and Ireland this tax would produce an extra annual revenue of three millions sterling. On a similar equitable principle, the superfluities of some Bishopricks and Prebendaries should be transferred to the present scanty pittance of the labouring clergy, the Curates. With this additional revenue, with that of the French sugar islands, together with proper economy and reform, *a naval war*, the only war in which this Island should ever personally engage, may be maintained "ad infinitum" against the conventional and democratic malice of that outrageous nation. We might then even permit the militia, during one third of the year, to retire from the channel frontier and to reside with their families.

What parricidal propensity or fatuity can have so long influenced our ministers and legislators, as not to promote the production of a sufficient stock of Hemp and Tallow at home, instead of sending annually, one million
and

and a half sterling, in hard cash, without any adequate recompence, for these two articles to Petersburg*? If they mean to make a proper use of the late captured French islands, exclusive of their prodigious additions to the revenue and marine of Britain, another million sterling of specie, annually buried in China, may be retained at home; coffee being a more cheap, agreeable and wholesome substitute for those foreign leaves called tea. We might then barter on terms of equality with those selfish Asiatics. The revenue of the East India Company is now superior to that of the vast Russian empire. From this another million might be transmitted annually to the British treasury, by reduction of the establishments and peculations, and by the introduction of a more impartial system of justice and lenity amongst the mild natives of Hindoostan.

Turn our eyes next to Gibraltar, Spain, and the Mediterranean; and I think we may find other productive sources of revenue, opulence and naval strength. First, I wish our politicians

* See a comparative estimate of the advantages Great Britain would derive from a commercial alliance with the Ottoman, in preference to the Russian empire. Sold by Debret, Piccadilly.

would

would decide, by fair argument and proof, whether it would not be prudent to surrender the expensive rock of Gibraltar to Spain, for a reasonable equivalent in money or barter. Until this transfer takes place the Spanish cabinet never will be reconciled to Britain, nor admit either her or Ireland into a share of her transatlantic commerce, which would prove to the merchants and manufacturers of both a mine of wealth. Besides, the sum spent in retaining this southern pass of Spain would man and maintain a respectable squadron in the Mediterranean, without which we can neither hope to defend our recent acquisition of Corsica, nor to rival France in the lucrative Levant trade, and estimation with the Turk. Would not such a squadron command more respect even from the piratical states of Barbary, Algiers, &c. than a stationary barren rock? In the present improved state of navigation, Britain, Lisbon and Corsica are not too distant stages for commercial voyages to that quarter. We have much longer stages across the Atlantic, and to Indostan, without a baiting place of our own to refresh at. Perhaps by some compound barter between Spain and Portugal the Island of Madeira might be obtained in lieu of Gibraltar. Our East and West India
fleet

fleet would find every convenience in this Island, and our troops a preparatory stage for seasoning. I wish also our legislators would direct more of their exertions to the improvement and extension of domestic agriculture, fisheries and the useful arts, and that they would abandon to posterity the premature projects of remote colonization in every corner of the globe.

The aggregate additions of gain and savings which I have here barely glanced at, unless I mistake, might be estimated at seven or eight millions sterling annually. With these fresh resources, I should not despair of both repelling and chastising the most gigantic efforts of French hostility and malice, nor of establishing such a substantial Sinking Fund as would lead us to expect, in the short period of one generation, if not an abolition, at least a considerable diminution of the public debts and burthens. All the plausible projects hitherto set on foot for this last purpose, are, in the present state of British finance and mortgage, temporizing palliatives; they are wretched manœuvres of fatal procrastination. Since the first edition of this supplement, the ruling factions of France, after subverting all legal government
and

and order, have, by successive proscriptions, murders, and robberies, converted the principal part of the property of that great nation into a military and naval fund; consequently the hackneyed recipes and "repetaturs" of our political doctors, must, to be effectual, undergo some alteration. The system of St. Grado will in time exhaust the most robust political constitution and strength. It is too notorious that modern wars whether offensive or defensive, require a large extra revenue, as well as sailors and soldiers to prosecute them with success. I am truly solicitous that the state physicians of Britain should not accelerate its dissolution or decay by injudicious or corrupt practice; or to use a legal phrase, that they should not be content in prolonging its existence by temporary respites. With such profuse and everlasting drains from the purse and industry of individuals, it is certainly incumbent upon them to supply the dam, and to prevent all unnecessary and profligate waste*.

* One per cent. deducted from the annual interest of the Stockholders would raise between two and three millions sterling.

The last subject respecting revenue which I shall notice, is that appropriated to the Civil list, and to the other branches of the royal family, the probable increase of which I pretend not to calculate. It is not clear to me but that the true dignity and comfort of those personages and the interest of the nation would be better consulted by permitting them, under certain restrictions of prudence and decorum, to intermarry and assimilate with natives; and to acquire hereditary property and independence, instead of continuing a sort of state pensioners upon the public. Is it for the solid advantage of that family or of the nation, that they alone should be condemned to retain any of the absurd and unnatural vestiges of the monastic institution, or that they should be severed from the society in which they live, as a solitary cast or tribe? And if in the race of ambition, their connection would be courted and estimated as a prize of fortune, why are our nobility and gentry so mean and stupid as to surrender the whole monopoly to foreigners?

To my comprehension there is not a clearer demonstration in Euclid than this; that to maintain with vigour, resolution, and perseverance,

severance, the present decisive war with France, and to terminate it with final honour and success, very few more taxes, in the old system, should be laid upon the public. The impartial reader will decide whether or not I have pointed out the means of accomplishing this important object. I have endeavoured to make it manifest, that Great Britain is far from being exhausted of energy and resources to combat France, provided they are properly exerted, discreetly managed, and judiciously directed. The economical retrenchments in the expenditure of Britain, not long since recommended by a traitorous projector and exile, whose writings have excited so much clamour and declamation, no honest and judicious man can applaud: because they are built on the destruction of our navy, our security, and our constitution.

The Editor cannot forbear taking the present opportunity to remark, that upwards of a year ago, and immediately after the unfortunate siege of Dunkirk, of which he was a spectator, he sent more than one memorial to the British ministers intreating them, for reasons therein stated, to withdraw the whole of the British troops from Flanders, to send a much stronger

force against the French sugar islands, and to dispatch the remainder together with the Prince of Conde's army, and all the other French emigrants able to bear arms, to the assistance of the Royalists in Brittany, to endeavour to secure the navy in Brest for their use ; and to harrafs the enemy from the sea. The projected expedition to France with a handful of men under a gallant Earl he reprobated as a desperate enterprize. He hinted his distrust about the propriety of an *English Generalissimo* in rendering the cause of royalty patriotic or triumphant in France, and the tragical abandonment of Toulon soon after verified this part of his prediction.

As to our Northern and Continental allies, in general, in the present war, my prognosticks, in these memorials, respecting their conduct have all been confirmed. The uniform history of the last hundred years should have taught our ministers never to trust to the Dutch as active or zealous coadjutors. Prussia's crooked policy, profligacy, and venality was notorious even at the outset of the present hostilities. As to Russia, every unfledged apprentice in politicks should have known that cabinet is a secret and systematic enemy both

to Britain and France, and indeed to the majority of the human species. Their object is to distract and weaken both nations. The Hanoverians and Hessians will fight with fidelity and bravery so long as Britain can furnish them money. These memorials represented and urged to Ministers the policy of subsidizing the Emperor, and of stipulating with him instantly to set about the necessary repairs in the fortifications of Nieuport and Ostend, in order to exclude the French from the maritime coast and ports opposite the Thames.

Note. I received the present proof sheet for correction, from the Printer, when a pamphlet *On the Naval Strength of Britain*, written by Sir J. Sinclair, Bart. fell into my hands, for the first time: amongst a variety of judicious observations, this respectable author and legislator recommends a distinct *Order of Merit* to be instituted for the Officers of the British Navy who shall distinguish themselves, and render important services to their country. I most heartily second this hint to his Majesty's ministers, for many reasons sufficiently obvious. Sir John recommends a white ribbon; but perhaps a ribbon composed of white, blue, and red, the three cardinal colours of the British flags, would be preferable. As he has not suggested any name for this new Marine Order, I take the liberty of submitting that of *Neptune*, or of *Alfred*.—I likewise recommend more care and selection in giving names to our ships of war.

CHAP. V.

Of the parts of Great Britain and Ireland most exposed to Invasion. A Military Sketch of the Suffex and Kent Coasts.

IT is of importance to be able to predict, and with tolerable certainty, by what nation, and in what part of our coast we are most exposed to invasion; and at the same time to determine the most judicious disposition of the defending troops. If we look round the different nations of Europe, or of the globe, for a probable invader of Britain or Ireland, we shall find very few capable, or whose interest it would be to make that experiment. The Mediterranean powers (France excepted) are too remote or weak. From the nations on the Baltic, which is frozen up half the year, there seems little danger, and the eastern coast of Britain, which is many hundred miles distant from them, would there be principally exposed. Ireland on one side is screened by Britain, and its invaders from the north of Europe, must either sail round Scotland, or run the gauntlet along two
faces

faces of Britain. But if, from the lethargy or imprudence of other states, Russia should reach the goal of her ambition and politics, the expulsion of the Turk from Europe, an event not improbable, nor the attempt distant, all the enlightened and leading powers of our hemisphere must then shrink, both by land and sea, into inferior satellites. Against this rapid and ruinous deluge of French anarchy and Russian despotism, the civilized nations of Europe cannot be too vigilant, guarded and united. In the latter case Egypt would follow the fate of Constantinople, and the Eastern possessions and commerce of Britain and Holland would be held by a very precarious tenure.

During several centuries, England continued to invade France, principally by the narrow passes of the channel; from whence we might, "a priori," suppose, that France would pursue a similar system. But the immense improvements and revolutions, during the three last centuries, in naval architecture and tactics, in fortification and engineering, require harbours more deep and convenient to insure an invader's footing and progress. Cæsar sailed from Boulogne or Calais to-

wards Deal and Sandwich, and on his first attempt to land was encountered by the natives. The Saxons sailing from the ports of Germany and the Baltic, first established themselves a few miles farther north on the Kentish coast. The first Norman landed his army on the Suffex coast, and afterwards marched into Kent. Henry the Second, in his frequent expeditions to and from Normandy, generally embarked and landed at Southampton or Portsmouth. Edward the First embarked with his army at Winchelsea, and steered to Flanders. Edward the Third embarked from the coast of Suffolk and landed in Flanders, and afterwards from Portsmouth and landed at La Hogue in Normandy. His son, Edward the Black Prince, conducted another expedition from Plymouth to Bourdeaux. Henry the Fifth embarked at Southampton, and landed likewise at the mouth of the Seine.

It is obvious, from the relative geography alone of great Great Britain and France, that the maritime and channel counties of Cornwall, Devonshire, Somersetshire, Dorsetshire, Hampshire, Suffex, Kent, Essex, and Suffolk, and the counties in the rear and contact with these,

these, all of them comprehended in an arch from Plymouth to Harwich, and from the Thames to the Severn, as they have hitherto been, so they would in future be the principal theatres of invasion; and unless from our supineness or treachery, the enemy can penetrate by the Medway or the Thames, the *nearest* approaches from most of the convenient landing places on this coast, to the Metropolis, are little short of sixty miles. The Essex and Suffolk coast are, at present, however in least danger from that quarter; and further north on the German Ocean, it is not probable that the French will ever venture, at least for the purpose of effective invasion, but only as a diversion from the grand object, and to plunder, or extort contributions. Throughout this extent of frontier, which is nearly equal to the north frontier of France, the defender has but a few fixed points, or posts of peculiar consequence on land to contend with the enemy; these are Plymouth, and Halldown, Portsmouth, and Portsdown, some parts of the Isle of Wight, and the passage of the Needles, Dover, Deal, the Forts, Docks, and ships on the Medway, and the Thames, the Metropolis, and Landguard Fort. Would they attempt to penetrate through the intervals,

vals, towards the Metropolis, and leave those garrisons on their flanks and rear? A superiority at sea, and gross misconduct on our part, could alone give encouragement to such a daring project. The enemy should not be emboldened, by their weakness, to take any of these by a "coup de main;" nor until after obstinate sieges. At the same time suspicions might be entertained, that the two great commercial cities on the Western coast of England, Bristol, and Liverpool, would be included in the collateral objects of depredation, or conflagration.

If ever a Northern maritime nation should invade England, of which there is no instance during the last seven centuries, such invasion would probably be to the North of Dover, and perhaps in a line between Harwich and the Downs. Indeed it is not improbable, notwithstanding the perils of the navigation and coast, that they might attempt to molest Hull, and the Humber, and also to cut off the principal magazine of fuel from London, and an important nursery of the British marine. France might also think this an important object. Part of these inconveniences might be prevented by an additional stock of fuel in reserve.

reserve. Besides, an enemy would have some danger to apprehend from 100,000 sturdy colliers, who might be assembled in the neighbourhood of Newcastle, Shields, and Whitehaven. Edinburgh and Aberdeen are exposed near the shores of the German ocean to insult, and contributions. Glasgow and the Western coast of Scotland are more remote and secure. But if two Forts were erected on the two towering eminences at the Eastern extremity of Edinburgh towards the sea, and the circumference of that city connected and secured by a ditch, rampart, redoubts, &c. with the Castle hill and fort on the West side, I apprehend a very obstinate resistance might be then made by its numerous inhabitants alone, against a besieging army; and more especially so by having recourse to the collateral assistance of the waters of two adjoining lakes, and to the sea. Most of the principal manufacturing cities and towns of England, are without the reach of surprize or pillage, by being placed at some distance from the sea coast, with which, however, they have an easy communication by rivers or canals.

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As no foreign invasion for the subjugation of England had been attempted, during five centuries, until the reign of Elizabeth, it may be both curious and useful to examine the disposition on each side, and the preparations of defence against such malevolence. The Spanish plan was, that the Armada should sail unmolested close along the French shore, as far as Dunkirk, and having chased away all the English cruisers, should there join the Duke of Parma. 34,000 troops were assembled under him in Flanders, and kept in readiness to be embarked in flat bottomed boats. These added to 20,000 from Spain, made the land army alone of invaders 50,000; with which united, they had orders to sail up the Thames, and to attempt at one decisive blow the conquest of England. Plymouth and Portsmouth had not then risen to be marine arsenals of such immense importance as they are at present, and were not included in the scheme of attack.

The principal fleet of England was stationed at Plymouth, and a small fleet off Dunkirk to awe, and intercept the auxiliary debarkation of troops from Flanders. The land forces

forces were disposed as follows: 20,000 militia were distributed along the channel coast where any landing was practicable, and directions given them, if they could not hinder the invaders from gaining the shore, to retire backwards, to waste and drive the country around, and to wait for reinforcements from the neighbouring counties, before they opposed the enemy a second time: 22,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry were stationed at Tilbury and Gravesend, to cover the Thames and the metropolis: besides these 34,000 foot, and 1000 horse were appointed as a reserve, and to march under the Queen wherever the enemy should appear in force.

In sailing up the channel, this invincible Armada was infested with incessant skirmishes of the light English fleet which hovered in their rear, and which, though much inferior in size and number, after several sharp engagements compelled them to fly round the North of Scotland, half of them being previously captured or destroyed. How dear ought its marine ever to be held by Britons, which has so often repelled invaders from the shores? These are our sea Gods to whom we must look for protection in similar perils.

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In the subsequent project of the Duke of Norfolk, in order to liberate Mary Queen of Scots, then confined in England, it was intended by Spain, to land from the side of Flanders, 10,000 men at Harwich, and from thence to march to the metropolis. At the Revolution, William, Prince of Orange, landed his friendly army at Torbay. Within the present century, France several times meditated and attempted, from Dunkirk and from Brest, an invasion of Great Britain and Ireland; especially when she had hopes of profiting by the civil dissensions of the nation, and of imposing an exiled tyrant. Three attempts of this sort were frustrated by the British navy, in the successive reigns of William, Anne, and George the First. Her reiterated projects, in 44 and 54, wherein G——l L——d bore a part, have been already noticed. In the late war it appears that the object of the combined fleets of France and Spain in 1779, was Plymouth; and a recent publication by one of the spies or incendiaries of France, exposes still more glaringly their insidious schemes against that naval arsenal. Had they succeeded against this Fortrefs, and the British fleet, it is not improbable that their
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land army, then in readiness on the channel coast, might have afterwards attempted Dover, Chatham, and the metropolis.

During the two last wars, Coxheath, near Maidstone in Kent, and Warley, contiguous to Brentwood in Essex, were the principal camps for the defence of England. Their situation is more healthy than that of Tilbury Fort, from which they are distant but a few hours march. A few regiments of cavalry were also assembled on Salisbury Plain: but Plymouth and Portsmouth had neither fortification nor garrison adequate to their defence, and were excluded almost without the pale of succour. G——l L——d's distribution of the defending troops has been laid before the reader, and there is no necessity to repeat it.

The General having accurately surveyed the Channel coast from Plymouth to Portsmouth, and directed the proper modes of defence, I shall, from my own observations, add a few hints respecting the invasion and defence of the frontier included between Portsmouth and Sheerness, beginning at the projecting point opposite St. Helens, called Selfea Bill.

Suffex,

Suffex, Kent, and Surrey are the bulwarks of this frontier of Britain. Cherbourg and Dunkirk are the two extremes of the opposite frontier of France.

Without a superior navy, as G——l L——d has already observed, I cannot discern how France can attempt, with reasonable hopes of success, any serious invasion in the heart of Britain. But should she ever, by the misconduct of British ministers be suffered to attain such naval superiority, she might select any part of this frontier for attack; or it is not improbable but she might practise her present too successful system of land tactics, and assail the whole sea line of the Channel, at the same instant, with feints and real attacks. On this portion of the frontier she would have a short line of operation, and many good roads penetrating to the metropolis.

The several and principal noxious objects that an enemy such as France might be supposed to entertain in invading this frontier are, I believe the following: to burn and sack the towns, houses and craft on the coast; to exact contributions, especially of cattle,
corn,

corn, forage, money ; to cut the embankments of Pevensey and Romney, and drown these extensive and fertile vales with the sea ; to subsist their army at the enemy's expence, and to occupy a tract of country sufficient for that purpose ; to gain a convenient port and depot near the shore, and their own coast, from thence to ravage the neighbouring country, and perhaps penetrate to Chatham and the metropolis ; to harraßs and intercept the regular supply of the metropolis from this quarter, especially of the necessaries of life ; to interrupt agriculture, commerce, fisheries, industry in general, and to foment insurrection, and anarchy.

From Dover and Calais the shores of Europe and Britain mutually and gradually recede from each other, both to the north and the south, and the partition by sea becomes wider. From Cherbourg to the Isle of Wight is 63, from Boulogne to Rye 40, from Calais to Dover 25, from Dunkirk to Margate 50 miles. This may be called the straits of the Channel. The ramparts of Britain bordering on these straits we are now to comment upon.

The sea frontier of Suffex and Kent may be divided into two parts, that from Portsmouth to Dover, and from Dover to Sheerness; the first is 120, the latter 36, and the whole is 156 miles in length. The distance from this shore of Britain, or arc of the circle, to the metropolis is throughout from 70 to 56 miles; and to Chatham in several places, from 30 to 25 miles only. Along or near the shore there are about 27 towns and villages; very few of them however (at present) distinguished by their size, population, opulence, or symmetry; although several contribute members to the legislature. Some are supported chiefly by bathing visitors during the summer. Grazing, agriculture, and fisheries are the principal occupations and riches of the inhabitants of this frontier, and are ever tempting baits to an invader. (See the tables and maps.)

Between Portsmouth and Sheerness we perceive five conspicuous projecting headlands, some of them remarkable for their rustic grandeur, and between them nine bays or indentations of the sea into the land, exclusive of several smaller intermediate projections and bays. *The flat shore of this frontier is nearly*

nearly equal to that of the towering cliffs; the latter of which are in most places inaccessible to an enemy from the sea, except by a few chinks and passes natural and artificial. Some miles behind the shore a chain of hills, ascending nearly to the dignity of mountains, run from Portsmouth in the rear of Shoreham and Brighton, and as far as Beachy Head. Behind Pevensey and Romney Vales the ground rises, but not in bold hills until near Hythe. In the rear of Hythe and Folkestone there is a romantic girdle of circumvallation, formed into natural bastions and curtains.

Besides the general face of the shore and country behind, the coast towns, passes, &c. a consideration of the longitudinal and transverse roads, and lines of operation on which armies must act, is equally indispensable in forming judicious arrangements of defence. From the south point of Sussex there is a circular or coast road to Margate, and connecting with each town. In winter this road, particularly along the flats, is very bad, but upwards of a dozen direct and convenient military roads lead from the towns on the coast to the metropolis, coalescing as they approach the center to half that number. Some, as for instance those from Dover, Deal, Sandwich,

Ramsgate, Margate, form a junction in Canterbury, which is but sixteen miles distant from each place, and the sea. The transverse roads and lines, through which the preceding or longitudinal necessarily pass to the metropolis, are not above one third that number. It would be an additional security against the progress of invaders, if all the roads immediately leading from the shore were carried through defiles.

From these general preliminaries, I proceed to a more specific survey of the sea frontier, outworks, and covert way, if I may use the metaphor, of the channel straits. *And as I consider Dover and Deal, the two principal and joint keys of this portion of frontier and of the channel straits, I begin with them. They may be termed the Thermopylae and Dardanells of Britain. Between Deal and Harwich is also the maritime basis of a triangle, of which the North is the acute point.*

It is evident of what consequence William the Norman thought the possession of Dover. Its distance from Battle is little less than from Battle to London; (56 miles) yet notwithstanding the total overthrow of Harold and his army, the conqueror chose rather to make
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this circuit, which added 70 miles to his march to the metropolis, in order to secure a safe harbour, and fortress, contiguous to France, before he ventured into the country.

Dover town cannot be taken, by force, by any direct attack from the sea, having five or six miles of stupendous precipices on each side to secure it: that narrow chasm on which the town and harbour lay, is protected by several batteries, and several more might be erected on each shoulder of the two hills overlooking the town and the entrance from the sea. It must therefore be assailed by the east or west flanks of Deal and Folkstone, or by the north and rear from Canterbury. Three principal roads lead into Dover from Deal, Folkstone, and Canterbury. The town lays in a hollow between two mountains: towards the shore the tops of these mountains are probably a mile distant from each other, and at the opposite extremity half that distance. These two gigantic hills, like Mount Edgecumbe at Plymouth, may be truly called the keys of Dover. Whoever is in possession of either of them may lay the town below in ashes, prevent all intercourse by the harbour, and command the batteries erected on the verge of

the sea, beneath that hill which they are in possession of. Let us first investigate the defences of the north-east hill, on which the ancient Castle is built.

The Lord Warden and Guardian of the Cinque Ports may refute me, if he can, but I have no hesitation in declaring that I think Dover, in its present state, is not tenable for any time, provided an enemy in force, and protected by a superior navy, could effect a landing and possess themselves of the summit of the hill on the Deal road, overlooking the Castle, and within musket shot of its north-east face. Between Deal and this hill, which are but eight miles distant, there is no natural obstacle on land to overcome; and "vice versa." Before the invention of gunpowder and cannon, stone walls might be sufficiently strong: but since these tremendous inventions it has been found necessary, both for security of the defenders, and the Fort, to add ramparts of earth from fifty to one hundred feet thick behind the walls, to enlarge the towers into bastions, and to add outworks. Dover Castle labours, notoriously, under all these imperfections. It is by no means indebted for its supposed security, to
either

either its artificial strength or form, but to its natural situation and elevation. The form is a parallelogram, or nearly so, the two sides east and west being double the length of the other two sides to the sea and the north. The whole circumference I conceive to be about three quarters of a mile. With very little exertion of art, two sides, a short and a long, might be rendered impregnable: very few men would be required for their defence, which could therefore be spared to the two weak sides, and the necessary outworks which I am about to recommend. The short side to the sea is secured by a perpendicular precipice far higher than any effort of human architecture. The other long side towards Dover town is secured by a steep declivity and chasm. One half also of the east flank of Dover Castle skirting the sea is protected by a broad and deep valley. It follows that the weak faces of the Castle are north and north-east, fronting the Deal road.

To render Dover Castle tenable, I apprehend there should be erected a *strong Fort*, on the line of high road to Deal, within musket shot of the north-east face or angle of the Castle; also a *Ravelin* on the north side nearly

opposite to the gate, and extending beyond the barn; one half of it flanking the north, the other face the hollow way and east side of the Castle. The road to Deal to be carried round it, and afterwards more to the right along the margin of the Fort and slope of the hill, so as to be better enfiladed by the Castle guns. Another ravelin might, with little difficulty or expence, be formed from that mound of earth before the extremity of the Castle ditch contiguous to the sea. These two ravelins in conjunction, and connected by a second ditch, would interrupt approaches to this vulnerable face. Perhaps, it would also be prudent to sink a well in the hollow interval between them, for the more certain and plentiful supply of the garrison, which has now but one well: and to these may be added cisterns for catching rain. The whole ditch round the Castle should be cleared out and palisaded, the glacis scarped, the high towers lowered to the level of the ramparts; because their repair is a fruitless expence, and they would be injurious in a siege to the defenders, both by the splinters, and by their ruins filling up the ditch, and forming a bridge for the assailants to pass over. The old moat or exalted mound of earth within the Castle, might
be

be converted into a Citadel. The barracks would be more sheltered in a siege along the side of the Castle towards the town; there should be casemates, and bomb-proof magazines, scooped into the rock; the walls should be lined with ramparts of earth intersected with traverses, and the surface of the naked ground within the Castle levelled.

The reader will now please to accompany me to the opposite western hill. Should an enemy be permitted to gain the summit of the pass or gaut above Folkstone on the road leading to Dover, the table land from thence presents no material impediment until about halfway, when this oblong western hill separates the road into two, which run at the bottom of it to each extremity of Dover, that to the right being within musket shot of the cliffs, and sea. This naked mountain is extremely steep on three sides: towards Dover there is a perpendicular precipice of chalk stone, and the other two long sides going from this at right angles, might be scarped so as to render them much more difficult of ascent. The most remote or west side is naturally the weak and vulnerable part, because it extends a mile beyond the farthest guard houses, and cannot

cannot all therefore be brought within the lines of defence. But this west face, though naturally weakest, is fortunately the narrowest of all the sides, requiring, probably not above four hundred yards of rampart, and consequently would seem to be well secured by two bastions, a ditch, rampart, ravelin, and covert way. The north and south faces having natural defences, may, by every maxim of fortification, be prolonged to double or treble the length of the former. The whole would form an oblong Fort or parallelogram, corresponding with the shape of the hill, the area of which would be double to that of the opposite ancient Castle: it would command, not only the two roads running beneath it from Folkstone to Dover, but also the entrance from the Canterbury road. A wet ditch across the narrow valley would be an additional security to this northern entrance into Dover; from which to Barham Down there is a chain of defiles. The surface of this hill within the ramparts should be levelled. The steep brow towards Dover should be sloped off into a gentle descent, like the opposite hill, which would enlarge the too narrow dimensions of the town in that part: and the fragments of this chalk stone could

be used to form a high and broad rampart at the North extremity of the town, connecting both hills, and a road carried along its summit. Immediately within this rampart, I think, would be a proper central situation for barracks and casemates: through the gate in the center the high road and river to be carried, the latter of which should there enter the acute point or cone of the new harbour, as I shall hereafter explain, and recommend.

Upon the whole, I conceive that to make the two hills or flanks of Dover capable of effectual resistance against a formidable invader, and to improve its harbour, would require the united labour of twenty thousand men during five or ten years: and that when these works are compleated, from six to ten thousand men would be sufficient to defend them against an enemy of one hundred thousand.

Deal, and the Downs on which the former lays, being by situation, depth of water, anchorage, shelter, &c. a naval rendezvous, stage, and resting place of such inestimable importance to this island, it will not be thought superfluous that I devote a few lines

to

to this neglected asylum of our marine of every description and burthen. The shore and coast between Dover and Deal becomes flat near the latter, and continues so many miles round the bay of Sandwich to near Ramsgate, when the chalky cliffs recommence along the front of Thanet as far as Margate. Along the shore of Deal there are three ancient stone works, called Castles, Walmer, Deal, and Sandown; the first and the last being upwards of two miles distant from each other. I am not satisfied that these paltry castles could make much resistance against even a vigorous attack from the sea; but as an acute enemy would, no doubt, endeavour to land at some distance on the naked shore, and come on their rear, they must then, like all batteries not included in forts and flanked on every side, submit. I therefore take the liberty of suggesting whether two square Forts, arched or casemated in front, somewhat similar to that lately erected opposite Spithead, (called Fort Monckton) and a floating battery stationed in the centre would not be of more utility in affording security to the ships anchored in the Downs, and in repelling an invader who ventured in front or flank? He may and should be excluded

cluded from penetrating on the right of Deal, and forced to encounter a more dangerous navigation lower down. Deal Town should also be made more regular, enlarged towards the rear, and all sorts of naval manufactories established there: its police also requires amendment.

From Deal, Dover, and Folkstone let us return back along the shore towards Portsmouth. From Folkstone the cliffs continue bold to Sandgate: a flat shore succeeds to Hythe, Romney, Dungeness, Rye, Winchelsea, and an extensive luxuriant vale covered with sheep. Between Winchelsea and Hastings steep cliffs front the sea, to which succeeds another fertile level of pasture land as far as East Bourne, called Pevensey Marsh, appropriated to the fattening of bullocks. These two vales, Romney and Pevensey, resemble Flanders and Holland, and revive pleasing ideas of the pastoral ages. To them London is indebted for a considerable share of her weekly supply of two important necessities of life, sheep and bullocks. From East Bourne and Cockmere which lay on each shoulder of Beachyhead, tremendous cliffs extend to Seaford: between this and Newhaven,

haven there is a small bay and flat shore: from the latter perpendicular cliffs continue to the West of Brighton, when the shore becomes flat and tame to Shoreham, the Arun, and South point of Suffex.

Having now glanced at the *natural*, I shall, with equal brevity, notice the *artificial* defences along this frontier, interspersing and suggesting some improvements. About a dozen of batteries, and upwards of one hundred cannon are erected on the line between Folkestone and Portsmouth. Sandgate old Castle is a diminutive pile of stone walls and towers on the verge of the sea. As there is a considerable elevation of ground within musket shot behind this fort, I do not see the necessity of either repairing or rebuilding it: and a floating battery there would probably be more useful. Between this and Hythe the ground rises behind the shore and the road into a sort of natural bastion, on which cannon are judiciously enough placed: on the shore, to the west of Hythe, two new square redoubts are erected near a mile distance from each other, with cannon flanking the intervals, and others pointed to the sea. The fort of Dungeness has all the imperfections
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of that at Sandgate. Rye and Winchelsea stand about a mile from the shore on natural mounds rising out of an extensive plain. The former has some imperfect batteries, and cannon pointed to the harbour. The position of both towns is strong, and the approaches difficult, rivers, canals, and marshes surrounding three sides of them. It appears, by the Saxon Chronicle, that a large army of Danes, under Hastings, landed near this place, and another column, at the same time, landed on the opposite side of Kent at Milton in the Swale, a branch of the Medway: that Alfred posted his army in the centre of Kent between that of the invaders, to check their depredation and prevent their junction. At Hastings a small battery is erected on the shore: beyond this there is a natural rampart of five or six miles in extent in the rear of the road, which there runs along the shore. Pevensey Vale is intersected by numerous drains and canals, but has no cannon. If the walls of that majestic Roman ruin, Pevensey Castle, were lowered one half, and a ditch dug round the outside, a strong inner rampart might be formed of these materials, which with the addition of four bastions would, in that flat situation, and so near the sea,

sea, admit of considerable defence, and connect the chain of posts on this frontier. For better security against an enemy and the sea, there should be along the shore of both Romney and Pevensey Vales a strong double embankment, at some distance from each other, the road carried along the second, which might be constructed with projecting redans, like lines of countervallation. Nature has fortified the interval between Beachyhead and Scaford. Between Scaford and Newhaven a battery is erected on a natural promontory near the shore, and another on the shoulder of the cliff at Newhaven, where the river Ouze enters, and pursues its course through Lewes. This populous town lays central on the frontier between Portsmouth and Dover, environed on three sides by very high ground, a few miles distant from Newhaven and the sea, to which it is connected by a navigable river. I recommend a barrack, a post, and port here. At Rotten Dean there is a narrow landing place, but no cannon. Brighton has two small batteries on each side upon the brow of the cliffs. But, for reasons before stated, and obvious, neither Brighton nor Hastings could be defended, by these batteries, against assailants once landed in force.

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The summits of the two hills on each side of them are the only posts for resisting and repelling an attack on land. The Devil's Dyke behind Shoreham, with a few redoubts, could be made a difficult pass. There are several other strong positions along this second line.

It is generally admitted that maritime towns should be built near the entrance of navigable rivers, of easy access for ships, free from rocks and shoals, secure or capable of being made so against an enemy, and storms. Rye, Newhaven, Shoreham, and Hampton are the only four harbours of this description between Dover and Portsmouth. Most of the other towns and villages lay on the open shore, without back water, and consequently cannot be improved but by projecting piers or moles, as at Gibraltar and Cherburgh, or by inland docks. But the former admit of essential improvement both to their harbours and inland navigation. The Ouze might be joined to the Medway, the Arun to the Thames. Rye, Winchelsea, Pevensey, and Cockmere might all be made very convenient and capacious both for commerce and fisheries, and a new town rebuilt

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at Pevensey. As to the absurd idea that by there being few convenient ports on this coast an enemy will have fewer openings to invade us, it is mean, wretched, and ruinous policy: as well might it be urged that by turning the whole frontier into a desert, they would be deterred from doing us mischief*.

As to fortifications I admit that previous to erecting them there should be clear demonstration of their utility, importance, expence, the number of troops requisite for their defence, and the capability of the nation, both as to men and money. I also admit that in all fortifications and lines, if they are not equally strong by nature or art, in every part, they are imperfect: and in such an extent of frontier this is impracticable. But this argument of imperfection would bear equally against all the actions and offices of human life. What fortresses, towns, bridges, roads, did the Romans construct in this Island? In the short space of two years two Roman legions compleated the stately and solid rampart of seventy miles across the north part

* See Campbell's Political Survey of Britain and its Harbours.

of England. Trajan's roads and bridges were infinitely more useful to the Roman empire than the most splendid victories. After the era of Dioclesian the chain of fortifications along the Roman frontiers were some thousand miles in extent. What rendered Constantinople so many generations impregnable against the northern barbarians? The north frontier of France has between twenty and thirty regular fortifications on it; and all Europe are long witness to their importance in repelling invaders. Are the *public works* erected in this Island such as the nation has a right to expect in return for their enormous burthen of taxes?

Velocity of correspondence between the seat of government and the channel coast would always in war be of the first importance, and still more so when an invasion is meditated, or attempted. Mr. Gibbons in his Roman history, and Kempfher in that of Japan mention the celerity with which these nations communicated to a great distance the alarm of an enemy on their coasts. Telescopes though recommended many centuries ago by an Englishman, have been but lately introduced for the conveyance of military corres-

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pondence.

pondence. A telegraphe erected on the top of the Treasury, might convey in two branches and in a few stages, instructions and orders to Chatham and the Downs, and to Portsmouth; and from these last along the Channel frontier, and also across the mouth of the Thames to Harwich. In this way intelligence and dispatches could be carried forwards and backwards with extreme rapidity. Perhaps our merchants and insurers would benefit by adopting some system of this sort.

Should an invasion, in force, of Great Britain be ever seriously apprehended, probably, it would be prudent to erect temporary *redoubts*, or square forts, with flank bastions, opposite several other naked landing places, especially along the channel and East coast, and near commercial towns situated on navigable rivers, and arms or bays of the sea, and in particular passes by which an enemy from the shore could suddenly enter the country, or seize upon a strong post; to which troops forced back from the shore could retreat, and await succours; and to prevent the invader from advancing in several columns. These redoubts would serve to protect

tect the defenders, the ships, and houses,
 from fire and shells, from sudden predatory
 incurfions and coup de mains. The parapets
 to be made of earth, and faced with green
 fod, old bricks, or timber; without this the
 ditch, a covered way and glacis, palifadoes,
 loop holes, stakes, crows feet, men traps,
 spring guns and carronades, &c. and when
 narrow harbours and rivers are to be defend-
 ed, chains, boombs, gun boats, flat barges,
 floating batteries. Within the redoubt and
 its outworks, cannons, howitzers, mortars,
 carronades, air guns, long and cross bows,
 furnaces, shells, grenades, shot, grape, fire
 engine. Temporary casemates or cover for
 the troops and stores may be formed of strong
 timber planks leaned sloping against each
 other, like sheds, covered with fascines, and
 a thick layer of moist clay and cow dung,
 and over all a wet sail or winnow cloth: and
 the troops may fire between baskets or sacks
 of earth or sand laid on the parapets. Mul-
 ler and Belidor may be usefully consulted on
 structures of this sort; which should be
 erected under the inspection of skilful engi-
 neers and naval officers, and at the expence
 of each county, city, and town where they

are wanted. A well of good water, within, or under the fire of the redoubt will also be a valuable addition.

In sudden extremities, where there is not sufficient time to erect substantial redoubts, or breast-works, and where there is no natural or artificial cover between the defenders and the invaders, such as ditches, hedges, fences, trees, holloways, banks, precipices, walls, houses, morasses, rivers, brooks, and so forth; perhaps, this end might, in some degree, be effected, by a number of stuffed mattresses of wool and horse hair, six inches in thickness; and fastened by a few posts, ropes, and chains. They would serve, like the hammocks and bedding of sailors, a double use; to repel grape or musket shot, or to deaden its force, and at other times as beds. Such mattresses being light, could be always carried about in the different waggons, covered with canvas or oil cloth, and without embarrassment or expence. Necessity and invention might suggest a variety of other temporary materials for parapets, as gabions, baskets, barrels, hogheads and sacks filled with earth, sand, fascines, or faggots: posts
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and planks with boards nailed against them, or iron bars: willows and oziers platted into a thick fence: posts with chains, cables or ropes: palifadoes of wood or iron: feather-beds, woolpacks, straw, rush or junk mats, raw hides, sheep skins, winnow cloths, carpets, sacks, sails, chair and sofa seats: reeds, bull-rushes, broom, straw and hay tied firm in bundles. Waggon might also be better constructed to serve, occasionally, as parapets.

In artillery, the defenders may always be superior to the invaders; and it is generally admitted, that raw infantry should, on that account, be provided with more artillery and cavalry. Each maritime county could, in times of impending danger, provide themselves with a small train of iron ordnance, of light construction, from the Carron foundery, at a moderate expence, and for real use, not inferior to brass. They could also have in store gunpowder and ammunition, of every species, ready prepared in cartridges, proportioned to different distances, and marked; and it will be an error on the safe side, to diminish considerably the powder in the

ordnance charges. The inhabitants can also render important assistance to the regular and armed forces, by providing an assortment of other instruments and machines, of which a brief enumeration may not be superfluous; the principal of these are saws, hatchets, adzes, bills, augurs, bits, gimblits, chissels, planes, pickaxes, cranes, forks, spades, shovels, mallets, hammers, nails, pins, bolts, screws, hooks, chains, horse shoes; wheel and hand barrows, baskets, gabions, fascines, chevaux de frize, palisadoes, stakes, pickets, hand-spikes, ladders, gins, cranes, buckets, fire engines, grindstones, sacks, mattraffes, mats, blankets, tents, cords, lanterns, flambeaux, harness, carts, tumbrils, waggons, panniers; travelling forges, kitchens and ovens, canteens, and leather bottles. To this ordnance list may be added certain artificers, as farriers, gunsmiths, wheel wrights, carpenters, masons, harness makers, waggoners, labourers. And, by providing coaches, chaises and horses, infantry can be conveyed, with more celerity, along the frontier.—A few good telescopes and maps of the country and roads will also be useful. A constant supply of generous nourishment to the troops will likewise

likewise be of infinite benefit, and more especially so against the present system of French tactics. Homer, in his Iliad, has beautifully illustrated this subject.

Note. Whether Guernsey and Jersey might not be preliminary steps of invasion by France is problematical; but at all events they should be well provided and prepared in every respect,

CHAP. VI.

Additional remarks on the importance of Dover and Milford Haven: on the Tower of London. Animadversions on the Barracks now erecting throughout Great Britain.

I Proceed to a further illustration of what G——l L——d has not thought proper to discuss in his Rhapsody, but on which, I have an opportunity to know, he could have communicated much useful and original information. I allude to *Dover*, and the whole range of coast from thence to the Thames.

In all that extensive sea arch, of fifty leagues, between Portsmouth and the conflux of the Medway, and the Thames, there is not a harbour, port, or asylum, convenient for admitting, sheltering, and repairing large ships, when endangered or damaged by storms or an enemy. One half of the British commerce must incessantly pass and repass this tract of coast and channel, exposed in war to the cruizers and privateers of France, especially between Dunkirk and Cherbourg. Na-
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ture has made the straits of Dover the principal maritime pass and defile of Britain, through which the respective commerce of the Northern and Southern nations of Europe is conveyed, and through which France must transport her naval stores from the Baltic. Art, therefore, should be employed in the assistance of nature, so as to construct a harbour, capable of receiving ships of war and commerce when in danger or distress. They cannot often, without great risk, lay in the Downs during the equinoctial gales, and winter season, and therefore without a convenient, and safe port in the vicinity, there is neither security against storms, and still less against a superior enemy, nor a convenient station for interrupting their commerce and convoys. Dover is an intermediate stage between Portsmouth and the Nore; it seems a most important barrier to the Medway and the Thames; and a hostile debarkation on the part of France, north of Dover, might in a variety of ways be annoyed from that projecting post. One half of the frontier roads of Kent leading to Chatham and London, unite but fifteen miles in its rear, at Canterbury. These narrow straits, a dangerous coast, and a secure harbour would even compensate

compensate for a considerable inferiority of maritime force, both in naval action, and as laying so advantageously for the interception of naval stores. Multitudes of ships and materials of commerce would then be preserved, which are annually wrecked in that tract of channel, exclusive of the losses by insurances and captures in war. What dreadful havock has France made in the narrow seas amongst our merchantmen? Nor can we retaliate, with equal facility, as the rich commercial ports of France lay at a greater distance from our coast and reach.

Within the last hundred and thirty years, Dunkirk, and lately Cherbourg, have been constructed, at an enormous expence, notoriously, as a Scylla, and Charybdis, to devour the British commerce. We should be unjust to ourselves, were we to neglect the means of counteracting these ambuscades, and stratagems of a restless and an inconstant enemy. It is to me astonishing that no English minister has yet seen the immense importance of these narrow straits; that they might compel all the maritime powers to court the friendship of Britain, and to dread hostilities with her.

But

But if the arguments I have here used, in favour of Dover, should fail to impress conviction, I have many more in reserve, and weighty authority to support me. It is a secret lodged in the French cabinet, and known but to very few persons in England, that some years after the late rebellion in Scotland, G——l L——d was employed by the French ministry, together with five other engineers and pilots, to survey the harbour of Dunkirk, and to determine whether it could not, by art, be made a complete marine arsenal and deep harbour. At that time the French king and ministry had it in contemplation to attempt the next invasion of England, in concert with the exiled family of Stuart, from Dunkirk, and to strike, if possible, by the narrow seas, directly at the British metropolis; or, at all events, to be enabled, from thence, to commit greater depredations on the British commerce, in its flux and reflux by the Thames. I have perused a copy of these engineers' report and memorial to the French cabinet, which is now in the possession of G——l L——d's friend. The plan, the number of convicts, soldiers, and sailors, necessary to complete the

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the works, the expence and time, are all stated.

Dunkirk, together with part of French Flanders, when taken from the Spanish and Austrian monarchy by the joint arms of the English and French in 1658, was surrendered into the hands of Cromwell. Four years after it was sold to the French by Charles the Second, as a temporary supply for his profligate expences. In the possession of that rival it was calculated, during war, to be an extreme annoyance to the English commerce. But it was Lewis the Fourteenth who, by the unremitting labour of ten thousand men during thirty years, made it a renowned sea port and fortification. Afterwards, at the end of two ruinous wars to France, in the reigns of Lewis the Fourteenth and Fifteenth, it was stipulated, as an indispensable article of peace, that the fortifications and harbour of Dunkirk should be demolished and filled up, within four months at the expence of France, and never to be repaired. Scandalous concession! Why was it not restored back to Austria, and guaranteed to that crown? It should have been a fundamental axiom of Great Britain, never to permit France
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to extend her Northern maritime frontier beyond the harbour of Calais. Lisle seems also indispensable for the security of the Imperial possessions in the Netherlands; and until that transfer takes place, Britain and Holland will have expended enormous sums in that quarter to very little national benefit.*

When G——l L——d had surveyed the channel coast of England a second time as a friend of France, he could not suppress sarcastic remarks upon the stupidity, or —— of the British ministers and engineers who never had endeavoured to render all these inimical projects, from the side of Dunkirk, abortive, by means of Dover. This he termed, emphatically, the counter plan of England. The old town of Dover lays in a valley, on part of the foundation of which, and of the present narrow harbour G——l L——d, and his military friend at that time, recommended one far more capacious in depth, breadth, and length, to be scooped out, and a new regular town to be built on the base and declivity, on each side of this harbour. There would be sufficient depth of water, and a current

* See a late History of Dunkirk with plates by Diot: published by W. Faden.

behind

behind to clear out the sand; and the fortifications on every side, might be rendered as impregnable as those of Gibraltar. It was also recommended to make it a free port, so as to rival Dunkirk in commerce and population. I conceive that our convicts would be much more profitably employed in such labour, in clearing harbours, in adding to the defences of our dock yards, in forming embankments on the sea coast, erecting moles, piers, &c. than in distant and extravagant voyages to Botany Bay.

Every unprejudiced judge will, I believe, admit, that in the present century immense sums, upwards of one million Sterling, have been squandered, to very little purpose, on the harbour of Ramsgate, and on the fortifications of Chatham. In the opinion of skilful engineers, the last is a flagrant imposition and public robbery. Sheerness and Upnor, the barriers of the Medway, were forced by the Dutch in Charles the Second's reign; but they were repulsed on the Thames at Tilbury Fort. If however, France should revive her project of invasion against the head and heart of our island, *all* these different forts and landing places, as far as Harwich, would,

would, require previous additional security, especially *Dover*, and *Deal*, *Sheerness*, and *Tilbury*. Or, what I think, more adviseable is, to demolish both these last defective barriers of the two most important rivers in Britain, and to erect regular and substantial fortresses in their place. Some harbours on the East coast are too naked of defence. *Newcastle* requires particular attention.

It should always be remembered, that as yet, in modern fortification, even in works thought perfect, the science of attack is more improved and certain, than that of defence. It seems however probable, that when the theory and practice of inundation, of mines, and counter-mines, of ricochet firing, when various intricacies respecting the composition and construction of artillery, respecting gunpowder, charges, projectiles, pneumatics, &c. are better understood, that the besieged, under the conduct of a scientific and resolute governor, will be enabled to make a more obstinate and reputable resistance.

Turning our attention next to the Western coast of England, we perceive *Milford Haven*, a convenient, capacious, and safe harbour,

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situated

situated on the projecting coast of Wales, in a central situation between Britain and Ireland, and between Bristol and Liverpool. From its situation and port, it seems admirably calculated to protect and promote the whole commerce of the west coast of Britain, of the opposite coast of Ireland, and of the intermediate channel. It has many recommendations to render it a principal rendezvous of domestic and northern fisheries, and a nursery of sailors. It is out of the reach, or at least easy access of any Southern, and still more, of any Northern foe. Nature too has been bountiful in constructing it, with very little addition of art, an asylum and retreat with difficulty assailable. There is no harbour in the whole western coast of Britain, to be compared to Milford Haven, and none is so shamefully neglected. It is well entitled to become the metropolis of Wales, a naval nursery, and depôt; a convenient stage, of mutual intercourse between both islands. I could point out many serious inconveniences in leaving it open for the accommodation of a maritime invader.

Tower of London. Muller justly observes,
 “ that when a town is large and wealthy, and
 “ has

“ has little or no fortification, and where it
 “ would be too expensive to fortify the town
 “ itself, that there a citadel is often built,
 “ which serves as a place of security to
 “ carry in the most valuable effects of the in-
 “ habitants, when the approach of an enemy
 “ is apprehended ; and if the place is a sea-
 “ port, to protect ships laying in it.”—In
 the present enlarged state of London and the
 vast increase of ships to the east of the Tower,
 this diminutive Gothic ruin is a mere bur-
 lesque against external and internal enemies,
 provided with the proper implements of
 war. I therefore submit to public and parlia-
 mentary discussion, the propriety of erecting,
 for the above mentioned purposes, a regular
 fortress, at least six times greater in dimen-
 sions than the Tower, exclusive of outworks.
 The most eligible situation seems to me that
 extensive projecting flat, between Limehouse
 and Blackwall, which is skirted on three sides
 by the Thames. It might, in a great measure,
 be executed by convicts, superintended by the
 Artillery Corps, and who, on its being finished,
 might transfer their laboratory and arsenal
 from Woolwich to this tenable spot.

Whoever examines, with a critical eye, the environs of London, will perceive that it presents many natural obstacles to the progress of an enemy, which we shall suppose landed and victorious, and aiming, either by the side of Kent and Essex, or of both, at the possession of the Metropolis. This access might be made considerably more difficult: and were the inhabitants able to bear arms, animated with sufficient resolution and patriotism to unite in its defence, an enemy, however formidable and presumptuous, could not march into it with the same ease as into a sheep-fold, and they could have no hopes of succeeding by blockade. The whole island would fly to its succour, and to assail the enemy's lines of operation. In such an emergency, the active influence and exertion of the female sex could never have a more glorious opportunity of displaying itself, than in rousing their protectors to act the part of men and Britons. Homer's *Iliad* furnishes some inimitable speeches and arguments in disastrous circumstances of this nature. The obstinate resistance made in ancient and modern times, by several large cities, for instance, by Jerusalem, Rome, Alexandria, Constantinople, Vienna, Turin, &c. &c.

&c. are additional incentives to a nation ever celebrated for its determined valour. It is about eight centuries ago that Canute the Dane, with a formidable army, was in one year three times repulsed by the citizens of London, and compelled to raise the siege of that Metropolis.

Barracks. Since the late popular uproar and phrenzy in France, the British Ministry have thought it necessary to order barracks to be erected throughout various parts of this island, instead of quartering the troops as before on the publicans. It is not the principle, but the plan that I think most faulty; and I lament that in this project, as well as in the late precipitate fortifications of Chatham, more discussion, deliberation, and judgment were not previously exercised and courted.

My objections to the present barracks are, that *they are not on the frontier opposed to the principal enemy of Britain*; consequently are not disposed for prompt attack or defence, by sea or land, at home or abroad. Because they scatter the small British army into distant fragments, instead of collecting the troops into a few frontier posts, where they would have the

advantage of manœuvring in considerable bodies; a circumstance which G——l L——d and other intelligent military judges principally complain of, as giving the French army a superiority over ours. Because, in peace as well as in war, much depends on the judicious distribution of the troops; and in getting the start of the enemy before he is prepared. Were not the strength of the Roman legions always stationed along the frontiers and verge of their most formidable enemies, especially along the Rhine and the Danube?

With great submission to the present military directors of the British Cabinet, *London, Dover, Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Milford Haven*, seem to me the most eligible stations for barracks for the British standing army, and especially the infantry, both in peace and in war. *Lewes* and *Hall Down* seem also proper intermediate stations. They cover the dock yards and ships, the metropolis, the frontier principally exposed to invasion; they present an instantaneous reinforcement for Ireland, for the remote colonies of the empire, or to attack the enemy unprepared in his own ports. As to *Chatham* it can neither
be

be fortified nor defended, except by the approaches of the Medway, and the frontier lines of Kent and Suffex; and its barracks are extremely unhealthy by being exposed to the adjoining marshy effluvia. There is no doubt had they been erected on the summit of the hill, instead of the declivity, they would have been more beyond the reach or usual ascent of those noxious vapours: or the river might be embanked, and the marshes converted into dry land. But in their present state they can neither claim the merit of policy or humanity.

Had the British army been placed in those frontier stations of the channel coast, ready at the commencement and critical moment of the present hostilities with France, in all probability the greatest difficulties of the war would by this time have been overcome, to our honour and satisfaction, and we should have been now looking with pleasing confidence, to the speedy termination of hostilities and expences. It is time to put an end to the ruinous system of carrying on wars as we do suits in Chancery. Celerity and activity is the soul of warfare. From want of barracks in such proper stations, see how the inhabitants of the channel coast are now tor-

tured and oppressed with troops for defence and embarkation; and how many have sickened and died in consequence of being too long confined in the foul air of transports. Of Dover and Milford Haven, I have already suggested many favourable circumstances to recommend them to public and parliamentary notice. Milford Haven would be, of all others, the most convenient link and last stage between Britain and Ireland, for embarking and disembarking marching regiments in their annual rotation of quarters from each island into the other, and for transporting and receiving mutual supplies and succours, in cases of necessity. It was from this port that Henry the Second embarked with his army for the reduction of Ireland. The soldiers would have another advantage in being quartered along the sea coast, they could be better fed with fish, and more especially so if a few boats were provided for each regiment: they would, at the same time, be inured and habituated to the sea and navigation. Between these principal stations and bastions of the channel coast, the smaller barracks already erected along the curtain of that frontier might be suffered to remain.

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As to the defence, during peace, of the internal and northern parts of Britain, which are far separated from all external enemies, I conceive that should be configned to the militia in rotation, and a few of the cavalry regiments. If one fifth of the militia, or about 8000, were annually called out and disciplined, such duty would not reach each individual and regiment but once in five years. I trust it cannot with truth be maintained that it is necessary to spread a permanent standing army throughout this island, merely to promote subordination, to enforce the collection of taxes, or to bridle the inhabitants. It is a serious and alarming misfortune if our constitution and morals have fallen into such decay as to require these desperate remedies. But if such is the fact, it would surely be wisdom and policy to explore, without bias or faction, the disease and remedy. I never will admit that it can be necessary to scatter barracks throughout this island, like the ancient Barons castles, for purposes of the above description. Besides, if any serious insurrection is or should be hereafter intended, is it clear that such subdivisions of a small army into so wide a space

space would be a prudent measure? And would not ships carry them more expeditiously than they could march near the scene of action? Let our officers learn the business of war, and not the petty duties of constables and excisemen. From London, Dover, and Portsmouth the troops could conveniently assemble at Coxheath, Barham Down, or Brighton, and also at their respective barracks in rotation, where they might annually practise all the possible evolutions of war, in sufficient bodies, and under the eye of majesty. A few practical military schools of this sort are much wanted to render our officers more scientific and respectable in their professional duty; and to be on a par with the enemy. An eminent writer has well observed, that a Roman review, and a battle differed in no respect but the shedding of blood.

Were I, in like manner, to suggest barracks for Ireland, and upon the same principle of attack, defence, and co-operation with Britain, I should point out *Dublin, Waterford, Cork, Limerick, and Galway*, as the principal stations of the standing forces of that Island.

To

To render these *Barracks* still more beneficial and comfortable to those who devote themselves to the military profession, and to the nation likewise, I beg leave to suggest the following improvements. Near each of the principal Barracks in Britain and Ireland, I propose that a sufficient quantity of land be purchased for raising *Garden Vegetables*, especially Potatoes, Cabbages, Carrots, Onions, Turnips, Beans, Peas, and some other of the esculent tribe; to be cultivated by the soldiers, their wives, and children, for the uses of each regiment. The officers to have a separate garden. And it would not add to the expence were they to rear hogs, and poultry. That, in the herring and pilchard season, the boats of each battalion be sent out to catch these nutritive fish, which swarm periodically, on our coasts; to cure them with salt, and these to be served up during the winter, as one weekly meal for the whole barracks. If there should appear any overplus after the public magazines are filled, such overplus to be sold for the benefit and encouragement of the captors. Probably, in this mode, a considerable saving might be made in the annual provisions of the navy.

I propose

I propose that in each of these principal barracks, *Military Schools* be instituted, with competent professors in *all* the different branches of that art, by land, and sea, not omitting the science of ship-building and naval tactics; that they read lectures and exhibit military experiments through the winter; that they be provided with proper books, instruments, apparatus, and engines: that young officers, officers sons, cadets, together with marine and militia officers be admitted to these lectures, on paying a small subscription. That in future, every officer in the army, marines, militia, and East India service, (those excepted in remote garrisons or during actual war) previous to any step of promotion, be obliged, by law, to produce a certificate of attendance on those lectures. That a separate course of lectures be also read by army physicians and surgeons on the diseases and accidents most predominant in the military life, by land and sea, in all climates and seasons, their prevention and cure: that another course be read on the diseases of horses, farriery, and the whole veterinary art. That in each barrack an hospital, a riding house, and a church be erected.

I propose

I propose also, that *Military Musical Schools* be instituted in each of these barracks, with able professors, for teaching the sons of soldiers, sailors, and militia, the practice of all the wind and other instruments used in war, and military bands. Such an establishment is greatly wanted in both Islands, for the supply of the army, navy, militia, East Indies, and East India ships. And I think the harp and bagpipe, as being peculiar national instruments, should be added to the others now in general use. The number then of the different instruments of a compleat military band, would amount to thirteen or fourteen. It is superfluous to observe how essential good music is to regulate marching. I could prove how it might be made to contribute to the health of seamen.

As a spur to industry, emulation, and excellence, both in the military and musical schools, I propose that small premiums of books, fire arms, medals, and musical instruments be, annually, distributed in a public and honorary manner. That superior dexterity in the rifle and air gun, in the long and cross

cross bow, in the cavalry sword, and in artillery evolutions be equally encouraged.

It would be curious to ascertain, and might easily be done, the number of married soldiers, of widows, and children in the British army, navy, and militia. Would it not be politic to give this athletic class some encouragement to matrimony? The example in this instance of Alexander the Great, and of the late King of Prussia, are well deserving our imitation. And should not barracks be accommodated to the two classes of married and single? Such population might be justly estimated as a considerable reimbursement of the public expenditure, in support of the military professions, and the epithet of unproductive labourers would be less applicable to this class of society. Some might be advantageously employed on the fortifications and roads along the coast, as masons, carpenters, and labourers: a portion might be taught to manufacture the regimental arms, accoutrements, and cloathing; the children of seamen to manufacture sails and cordage; those of the artillery the apparatus peculiar to their respective branch. These barracks and schools would, in some respects, answer the purposes of the *Gymnasie* of
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of the Greeks, and the Campus Martius of the Romans. Indeed I can see no solid objections against the rudiments of military exercises being rendered an indispensable obligation or rather qualification in the education of youth throughout both islands. Without these institutions Greece and Rome would not have maintained such a conspicuous rank and pre-eminence amongst the nations of the earth.

CHAP. VII.

Conjectures whether the other Powers of Europe would suffer France, were she really able, to conquer Great Britain and Ireland.

THIS Proverb has proved true since the days of Homer; that "many accidents happen between the cup and the lip." No nation should exult in the success of its arms, until its conquests are complete and terminated; nor, on the other hand, should any nation despair of its safety until it is subdued. I have endeavoured to demonstrate that France is unable to subdue Great Britain and Ireland. But were she really adequate to these military wonders and miracles, would the other powers of Europe tamely look on, and behold, with indifference, the downfall of such an important member? Would they sit, like the audience in a theatre, or like the gods and goddesses on Mount Ida, as inactive spectators of these gallic triumphs, and British degradation? On this subject we must be cautious of drawing conclusions from remote precedents, such as Rome, Carthage, Constantinople, &c. because the circumstances and parallel are extremely different

different in many points of comparison. Europe is now subdivided into many powerful states, who will not suffer the political equilibrium to be so immensely deranged; and whose private interest and policy would, sooner or later, unite them in hostilities against such a voracious monster. Modern history furnishes instances in abundance of the truth of this proposition.

The writer, who represents Britain as such an easy prey to France, in his impetuosity, forgot to reflect, that whilst France may be occupied in such invasion, one or more auxiliary armies in the latter's favour may force an entrance into France; and it is not impossible might traverse from Dunkirk to Brest, and from the mouth of the Seine to Paris, before the invader had set his foot in the bank of England. Would Britain's Continental allies be idle spectators? Even Austria might think it a convenient opportunity to recover some of those rich provinces, of which, in her misfortunes, she was plundered by France. Britain has often rescued Austria and Holland from her arbitrary gripe. Would the Northern nations of Europe be such conspirators against their dearest interests, as to

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acquiesce

acquiesce in France taking possession of all the narrow avenues and strong holds through which their commerce must be wasted, not only to the South of Europe, but to every part of the globe? Would these nations submit to such an enormous grasp of power in the hands of Frenchmen, whose general character, at least in their politicks with other nations, is neither conspicuous for moderation, nor plain dealing? In the present state of France, these vaunts and menaces of universal dictatorship are premature and impolitic. I have calculated principally on their personal interest and security in rousing the other independent and rival nations of Europe to avert the common danger, without laying much stress on their friendship or gratitude. And in truth I am warranted by history and experience to place so little reliance on the faith or efficacy of offensive and defensive treaties with these continental shufflers, that I hope soon to see all such political trash and cant cancelled and consigned to the flames; and that Great Britain's alliances will in future be simply commercial and reciprocal convenience.

G—t L—d, in his Military History, calculates that if the Northern frontier alone
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of France, from Switzerland to Dunkirk, was to be vigorously attacked in three different points, it would require two hundred thousand men, distributed into separate armies, for its defence; exclusive of strong garrisons in all the intermediate fortresses. And the other three sides of the French frontiers, especially the ports, and naval arsenals, could not, with prudence, be left defenceless.

It appears, on many accounts, problematical, whether an invasion of Great Britain by France would not be more injurious to the invader than to the defender. Persia was disgraced, and nearly ruined by two invasions of Greece. Spain sunk much both of her treasure and renown, in the boasted Armada against England. France was no gainer by her repeated invasions of Germany, Italy, and Holland. Lewis the Fourteenth, with half a million of soldiers, and without the necessity of crossing any sea, was driven back from Holland, which could not then muster one third of the present effective strength of Britain and Ireland. France long felt the extraordinary and straining efforts of this monarch's military ambition. What naval or land trophies did the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Lewis

gain, by their repeated stratagems and attempts to invade our islands? It might, probably, be a fortunate circumstance for the British empire, were France to put these public threats into execution. By thus grappling with our united force, she might be disabled from doing us any injury during a long period, and we might pursue in peace our commerce and industry. There could not without gross ignorance, or treachery, be any just grounds to deprecate the attempt as a national calamity. But I am not so ignorant or confident as not to admit that if ever France, whose lust is war and superiority, should be suffered to make a conquest of any neighbouring maritime nation to the South or North of Spain or Portugal, or of the Netherlands and Holland, that in either case Great Britain would have solid reasons to be alarmed, not only for her remote colonies and commerce, but also for her domestic security. The notorious and sagacious Dumorier was well aware of the difficulties and dangers attending an invasion of England, without the previous possession of Flanders and Holland: these were the preparatory steps last year to the avowed attack on our island and metropolis. In such a conflict, for independence and existence,

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Great Britain, in her offensive operations and retaliation, should abandon her former system of military empiricism. *She never can avenge herself against France but upon the ocean, upon her sea-ports and marine arsenals, and by dismemberment of her transatlantic colonies.*

Note. See the alarming consequences to Britain of France possessing herself of the Netherlands and Holland, in a Pamphlet published when Dumorier was near the gates of Rotterdam, intitled "*Reasons for preventing the French, under the mask of liberty, from trampling upon Europe.*" —Second Edition, Debrett, Piccadilly.

Note. His Majesty's present ministers will do me the justice to admit that six months ago, (in July 1794) I earnestly exhorted them to take better precautions against inferiority at sea, and therefore to assemble the Irish Parliament, and to request their assistance to contribute 20,000 marines, with officers of the same country, to arrange them into legions and battalions, synonymous with the provinces and counties of Ireland; and to instruct them, with all speed, in artillery evolutions, *only*, on board ships. The reader may credit me when I assure him that I am not of a forward disposition to obtrude myself or my advice unsolicited, had I not seen torrents of danger and disaster rolling towards this country. Why, throughout this war, the optics of British ministers have been so obscure, and their understanding and actions so lethargic I leave them to explain.

CHAP. VIII.

A new Military System, or Order of Arms, Arrangement,
Firing and Drefs.

IT is universally acknowledged, by the best military judges, that the firing by platoons, files, or even ranks is liable to weighty objections; and that we have not yet discovered that sublime problem and desideratum in war, *To unite missile and hand weapons, still more effectually, than in the musket and bayonet.* "The choice of arms, and arrangement is "the foundation of tacticks." G——L——d (in vol. ii. page 20.) asserts that no species of arms can be made to serve the purpose of a musket, and a hand weapon. On a subject of such infinite moment, I venture, with extreme diffidence, to suggest some at least new hints, which the reader, if he chuses, may term innocent reveries. My observations shall be as concise as possible, and compressed under four heads, viz. arms, arrangement, firing, and drefs.

Arms.

Arms. Suppose each battalion or brigade of infantry arranged four deep; each soldier and sergeant furnished with Lloyd's pike, with the addition to its blunt end of a strong iron spike, six inches long, well secured to the wood, and by which it may be stuck upright and firm in the ground, its upper half well defended with thin iron plates, and the steel point covered with a scabbard: or, perhaps it would be an improvement, if the steel point was to be occasionally fixed on the shaft by a screw, or as the common bayonet. The next weapon is a rifle gun larger in the calibre than the present; a leather belt fixed along its under part, in order to sling it with the breech uppermost over the neck and left arm, and to rest somewhat transversely on the shoulder and back in marching; nor will the pike prevent it from being carried on the left shoulder in the usual manner. No bayonet. Two short flat pistols, suspended by leather straps or a noose, and sewed to the waistcoat near the lower and fore part of the sides. The cartouch box slung by a cross leather belt over the left shoulder and side; and another shorter cross belt over the right side, to the extremity of which, under the right arm, is

fixed a strong iron or brass clasp, with a spring, in the form of those by which keys or watch seals are hung; this clasp is for the purpose of suspending the rifle, in a perpendicular position, by a ring fixed near the under part and breech of the barrel, when the pike is grasped for close combat. The officers to be armed with pikes, pistols and sword: the light infantry and marksmen, with rifles and a sword bayonet three feet in length; artilleryists, with the same, and to have each a pike fixed at the side of their cannon. The cavalry to carry a short rifle; a long and strong cut and thrust sword; two short double barrellled pistols in the saddle holsters; a cartouch box at the right side or before. All these arms to be of the best materials and workmanship. Each soldier should also carry, in a leather pocket case, a worm, flints, lock hammer, sponges for the barrel, and the pan, woollen rags, tow, and a small tin flask of gunpowder.

Arrangement and firing. Thus arranged and armed, the infantry arrive within reasonable musket range of the enemy, the rifle then loaded and suspended at the clasp under the right arm: the files and ranks so open that

that the men do not as usual, press and jostle each other, and between each company and Battalion still wider intervals. The battalion or brigade, by command or signal, dresses the line, the pike is instantly struck into the ground, in range with, and between each file man; the whole then face to one side, always presenting the left side in front to the enemy, leaving, in consequence of this lateral motion, a wider interval between each transverse file: through this interval, the fourth or rear rank advances sideways to the front, but not beyond the line, aims, fires, retreats back to its former station and loads, and so on each rank successively; only that the front rank, if a favourable opportunity presents, or urgent necessity requires, need not wait for the regular routine of firing. In ground best calculated for musketry, where the enemy is observed wavering or disordered, and it is thought adviseable to advance with missile weapons, the two front ranks may step forward, thirty or forty yards, leaving their pikes, and the two rear ranks standing, to which they can, without risk, retreat; the light infantry and cavalry succeeding them to compleat the victory. In this way the single line may, occasionally, perform the part of chasseurs, and of a second line. But
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if the ground permits, and they are arrived within sixty yards of the enemy, the pike is the decisive weapon, and will render the victory more compleat. When this important moment arrives of coming to the close shock either to attack or defend, the rifle is instantly suspended by the hinder ring, beneath the trigger, to the clasp under the right arm; with the same face and direction that it is held in the hand; the pike is grasped, and levelled to the right of each file, and the files and ranks then closed more compact in all directions. If again, the enemy's cavalry advances with a rapid charge, some ranks will be loaded ready to receive them; and against horse there is no necessity for each rank to advance to the front and fire, on account of the greater height of the object. Every military writer deprecates the extreme peril of changing the order of arrangement in face of the enemy, and in many cases it is not practicable; but in the arrangement and arms here proposed, the line may be immediately converted into two fronts, and defend itself, though attacked in front, flank, and rear. This is instantaneously effected by two ranks turned each way, and still more effectually if its flank companies and artillery are posted with sloping faces, like bastions or ravelins.

ravelins. In this manœuvre our line performs, in some degree, the part of the dense column and square.

Perhaps, at first view, this system will not appear favourable to a *retreat*, on account of the two sets of arms. I take it for granted, that the retreat of a brigade, when unavoidable, will always be covered, so far as circumstances will admit, by the fire of the flanking companies, and the artillery, and by the cavalry when the ground admits of its acting; and if it does not, the enemy will have more impediments to overcome; and, exclusive of those combined aids, by the reserve. When the action has been maintained at some distance by missile weapons, a retreat will not be so difficult. If it is thought necessary to retreat gradually, with a wide front, and there are eight companies of each battalion, then four companies may retreat to the distance of half or whole musket shot, leaving the two flank, and the center companies standing and engaged; who will, in their turn, retreat, so soon as their companions marched to the rear are formed, and ready to cover them; and in these emergencies, there is no great embarrassment in
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carrying the rifle and pike in each hand. It would be insulting the reader's understanding to pursue this illustration any further; and I could only refer to the general principles of war, to the dense column and square, the wedge or triangle, and the other manœuvres of public notoriety. If our scrutiny, therefore, has not been partial, this system seems calculated for a close and open country, against infantry and cavalry, to resist, attack, and retreat; it requires no material change during the action, nor a second line but of cavalry, and a reserve. At the battle of Agincourt, Henry the Fifth's Archers were four in file, and besides bow and arrows, had battle axes and swords, and a stake pointed with iron at both ends to fix before them in the ground.

Let us make a few more comments on the above arrangement and weapons. From every thing I have read or seen, in even the least exceptionable, in G——l L——d's system, the three first ranks would find serious difficulties, were they to fire by ranks, standing; and the fourth or rear rank being unprovided with missile weapons, except pistols, could do the enemy no damage beyond the distance of his pike. We must keep in remembrance

membrance that, notwithstanding the tremendous aspect, and pomp of war, on a general average, by forty thousand shots not more than one hundred of the enemy will be killed and wounded; and the killed rarely amount to one third of the wounded. Were I to reason from analogy, I would assert that the system which enables a doctor to cure more patients, and a soldier to kill more of his enemies, and at the same time to run less risque of destroying his comrades, is to be preferred to every other. The file intervals in our arrangement will not be wider than those of the ancient Roman legions, and the depth, which in firing will not exceed 12 feet, is not so material. When the ranks are dressed, fixing the pike in the ground, and unlocking the rifle, can occupy but a few seconds; and "vice versa," the change of the rifle for the pike cannot occasion more embarrassment, or waste of time, and may be executed before the enemy's infantry could advance thirty yards in line. If it should so happen, and such instances must be rare, that the ground is rocky, and the pikes cannot be fastened by the ends, the two first ranks may lay their pikes flat on the ground and parallel with their files, and the two rear ranks lay theirs in the opposite direction.

rection. Acting behind cover, or in defensive posts, or against cavalry, this system seems still less objectionable: an incessant, steady, and well directed fire will be kept alive along the whole front, and hand weapons^s superior to the bayonet or sword are ready for any exigency. The exercise can be much sooner learnt, which is of infinite advantage in defensive war, for volunteer associations; or in those extraordinary emergencies where it is necessary to raise the mass: the front rank will run far less hazard of being shot or maimed by their comrades behind: all will fire with less impediment, confusion, noise, and alarm, and with more destructive efficacy. A very short practice will habituate the soldier to take out the cartridge with his left hand, as expeditiously as with the right. The pike may serve, occasionally, as a chevaux de frize, and will also assist the soldier in getting over hedges, and trenches. This ancient weapon is peculiarly adapted to the intrepid temperament of the British and Irish soldier, whom, it is well known, their officers find it difficult to restrain from rushing forward to close quarters with the enemy. It is also extremely well adapted to the long and cross bow in lieu of the rifle; and it may be provided with a spring rest, occasionally

occasionally to lean the rifle on, and to fire with surer aim. As to cavalry, I believe they likewise are commonly formed too close in the ranks, files, and squadrons; and that they would be of more real and general utility if, like the Turks and Asiaticks, they acted in smaller bodies, and with more velocity.

The *dress* of a British soldier or volunteer should be adapted to four cardinal objects, viz. defence, convenience, utility, ornament. We recommend the following. For protecting the principal vital parts, G—I L—d's round hat, made of the strongest sole leather, three inches in the brim, lined and quilted within; to which may be added a broad girdle, plate, and feather, and it may be glazed, or covered with black velvet; a helmet appendix may also be placed on the front. A cuirass of the same leather, covered over, suspended by a strap round the neck, and buckled behind the loins; or what would, perhaps, be as convenient, and equally useful, two pieces of the sole leather, the depth and breadth of the foreparts of the waistcoat, lined or padded with cotton or ticken, or quilted within with cotton or fine wool. This sort
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of cuirass, by means of four buttons or clasps, can be immediately fitted within the waistcoat, and removed, occasionally, when there is no probability of coming to action. Tapes behind will unloose or draw the waistcoat to the proper dimensions. The cross belts to be broader over the top of each shoulder, and there a double fold sewed together. The neck, which is also an important vital part, may be protected by a broad stock of the same sole leather, quilted within, covered without with black velvet, and fastened behind with clasps; or over a common leather or quilted stock, another may be, occasionally, added of buff leather, covered with small links of steel or brass, like women's necklaces or bracelets. The same defence will suit the cavalry; and, previous to an engagement, they may likewise draw on each arm a large loose sleeve, lined with buff leather, and covered with scarlet cloth, buttoned at the wrist and shoulder, and somewhat resembling the coat sleeves of his Majesty's yeomen. Perhaps this would be more useful than the ancient oblong shields worn on the left arm. Their face might also be protected with a mask of strong sole leather; and the ears and blood vessels beneath them

them with a strap and links, similar to the stock, hooked to the hat and tied under the chin. The great blood vessels running from each groin down the inside of the thighs, will be sufficiently guarded by the picked saddle and the holsters.

The coat or jacket of all British soldiers or volunteers, should, for obvious reasons, be *scarlet* universally, with different facings and lapels, and made in the light horse fashion. The waistcoat of the same colour as the facings, lapelled, and cut round at the bottom, but at the opening of the breast the inner lapel of the same colour as the coat. Long trowsers, with drawers, are preferable to breeches, and may be worn with half boots or with shoes. They are made of grey, blue, green, brown, yellow, or mixed cloth, drab fustian, Manchester stuffs, shagg, velveret, undyed cloth, flannel, camlet, ticken, &c. The cavalry trowsers must be seated with breeches leather, and the infantry with a smaller seat of the same. Great coats, hussar cloaks, and other preservations of health to be adapted to the climate, season, duty, habits, constitutions, &c. The Spanish fashion would also

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be

be a becoming and convenient military
and as Britain has a considerable share of the
fur trade, a border of this would be both or-
namental and useful.

CHAP. IX.

Some Miscellaneous Hints for the Improvement of the
Military Art.

THE immortal Bacon, Lord Verulam, suggested a variety of philosophical investigations, which have since been matured into the most interesting discoveries. In humble imitation of this transcendent genius, I shall here offer a few miscellaneous propositions for the improvement of the Military Art by land and sea. When that art is to be exerted in self-preservation, in the defence of every thing that is dear and valuable to a free and illustrious Island, no inquiry can be more laudable or beneficial. For my own part, I firmly believe, that if the domineering projects, the rapacity and ravages of the present maniacs of France, and of the Russian savage, are likely to be crowned with success, that, in this deplorable catastrophe, all the enlightened Europeans, who have any regard for property and liberty, and for the general interest of mankind, must take an active and manly part, in national and self-defence.

Muller recommends a revival of several of the ancient military engines for the defence of fortresses, especially when the enemy has made near approaches. They might be used to throw shells, grenades, stones, darts, and inflammable compositions. Archimedes, inventions for the defence of Syracuse, and the composition of the celebrated Greek fire are now lost. As to the latter, if we may form some conjectures from the effects, it would seem to have been a composition of inflammable substances, thrown to some distance from mortars, like the modern carcases, by means of gunpowder. But whether the Greeks of Constantinople had imported, with the silkworm, this latter secret from China, or India, where saltpetre abounds, or obtained it from the crucibles of European chemists, is now unknown. All we know for certain is, that Bacon and Schwartz are amongst the first Europeans, on record, who stumbled on this extraordinary composition. Sulphur, bitumen, and naptha, are commonly alledged to have been the principal ingredients of the Greek fire. Whether they had procured saltpetre as an addition to this destructive mixture, cannot now be ascertained. It is
of

of importance to learn that sand, urine, vinegar were found the most effectual in extinguishing the flames.

The laws respecting the force and velocity of projectile bodies, and the different resistances of the atmosphere, require further investigation. It should be inquired what further assistance the military art can derive from the vast powers of mechanicks, of the lever, screw, and pulley; from the sciences of pneumatics, hydraulicks, hydrostaticks, opticks, projectiles, electricity, chemistry; by what mechanism to apply to military uses, the principles and powers of the air pump, of steam, wind, and water engines; to inquire further respecting gaz and balloons; gunpowder; phosphorous, Greek fire, heat, phlogiston, light, burning glasses; respecting substances inflammable, and others capable of resisting or extinguishing fire; respecting suffocating vapours and smells carried by currents of air and wind; respecting luminous compositions, by means of which, objects in the night may be distinguished at a considerable distance: whether mines, in cases, might not oftner be successfully used in the field, and defence of redoubts, and more howitzers and carronades in land

actions: whether military, and artillery wag-gons, carriages, bridges, travelling hospitals, and vehicles for the sick and wounded might not be improved: whether carriages and wag-gons might not, without any additional incumbrance or expence, be occasionally adapted to defence, and to carry troops with rapidity to distant points of the line, like the war cars of antiquity: whether howitzers, shells, ignited balls, and even floating mines might not be more used at sea, together with some of the ancient artillery machines: what further improvements to make to ships of war, floating batteries, gun boats: how to facilitate the embarkation and debarkation of men, horses, and artillery on different coasts: whether generals should not investigate more profoundly the different passions, foibles, temperaments, periodical, daily, and necessary habits of mankind, the atmosphere, winds, rain, heat, cold, seasons, climates, and reap advantages from this philosophical warfare: by what artful manœuvres to debilitate and disease an enemy through fatigue, want of rest, and a sufficiency of generous nutriment: how to preserve troops healthy in all climates and seasons: what new or original combinations of sounds can be invented to inflame
military

military ardour : whether speaking trumpets might not be of service on land : by what mechanism or element to break strong floors of ice ?

To us as Islanders, it would be important to make further experiments respecting the most cheap and durable materials for constructing forts, piers, and embankments on the sea coast : whether sea sand and sea water mixed with lime is not a more durable cement than land sand, and fresh water : whether the natural cliffs along our shores, composed of sand, lime and pebbles, if properly confined by cases, banks or walls of large loose stones heaped together and entangled with sea weeds, would not become in time cemented into a firm rock ?

The Telegraphe system, as it is called, of conveying intelligence and correspondence on land, with the rapidity of vision, having very recently been first put into practice by the French, I think it necessary to state the original parent of this invention. An excellent paper on this subject was published, in the Philosophical Transactions, by Dr. Hooke. But several centuries earlier (1391) we find some clear hints of this discovery in the works

of our immortal countryman, R. Bacon the monk; and the British Archimedes. In his "Opus Majus" are the following words.

"*Specula or spying glasses* may be erected on
 "a rising ground opposite to cities and ar-
 "mies, in such a manner that all things
 "done by the enemy may be discovered; and
 "this may be done at any distance we please.
 "For according to the laws of Opticks, an
 "object may be viewed through as many
 "glasses as we think fit, if they are
 "placed; and they may be placed some
 "nearer, and some more remote, so that an
 "object may be seen at any distance we desire.
 "Spying glasses or telescopes may be so
 "formed, and so placed that we shall be able
 "to read the smallest letters at an incredible
 "distance; or to number even the dust and
 "sands, and to make the sun, moon, and
 "stars, to descend, or at least seem to descend
 "from Heaven."

CHAP. X.

Population, Reform, and Union recommended as additional means of Defence.

THE strength and defence of Great Britain is connected not only with the military force, fortresses, revenue, and *population*, but with its geographical position, its parliamentary representation and system of government. It would be easy to trace the evil effects of this imperfect or vitiated structure of our Legislature upon our general military system, our public expences, and wars.

If we search for the foundation and columns of substantial power and revenue, we shall find them to consist in *agriculture, mineralogy, manufactories, commerce, fisheries, population*. These may be termed the six elements, or orders of political architecture; they reciprocally assist and sustain each other, and are at the same time intimately connected with all the arts and sciences, and with political freedom. On each of these comprehensive

prehensive sciences, a separate professor and lecturer should be established throughout our universities; and likewise a monthly magazine, published for the instruction of all ranks. But upon the latter of these alone, population, representation and concord as being deeply involved in the subject of the present treatise, I shall make a few observations. Did time permit I should have no difficulty in demonstrating, that Britain and Ireland might, in one century only, be rendered equal in population to France, and that in a single generation her maritime strength might be trebled. In this and many other instances of political œconomy, we might learn important lessons from the Chinese and Japanese.

What made the Russians finally triumph over the Swedes? Numbers. A scanty population was one of the causes which diminished the resources of resistance, and at length rendered the Saxons, Danes, and Normans triumphant in this island. In what do all the French writers principally exult in the superiority of France over Britain and Ireland? In comparative population. The glare of an immense but oppressive revenue, and of a mighty catalogue of ships of war, must, in
time,

time, suffer an eclipse, should the subject of population continue to be treated with the same cold indifference by our legislators and ministers. For it is not disciplined soldiers alone, but the whole united and indignant mass of a numerous community, which, in extreme peril, must assist in rescuing the nation from a foreign yoke; especially from the firebrands that now threaten the overthrow of civil society. And this points out another important object of defence and resistance, *union.*

If we draw a line across the Southern base of Great Britain, from the Thames to the Severn, and another line from London to Harwich, we shall comprehend in these two segments of the coast all the parts of Great Britain most exposed to invasion, especially from a Southern foe: we shall also find, that they furnish almost one half of the representatives in the House of Commons, although their area does not amount to one fifth of the whole island. Reasoning, therefore, on principles of analogy, we should infer, that the lines of an entrenchment, or fortification, most exposed to attack, should have additional strength, population, and guards. In
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erecting ramparts of earth let us not forget ramparts of men to defend them. Indeed nature has, in many respects, endowed the Southern segment of our island with superlative pre-eminence. But except along the intersecting line of London, Bath, and Bristol, there are no other large cities throughout the whole Southern base of Great Britain. Our great manufacturing towns have been gradually migrating more to the centre and north of England; and one half of our parliamentary boroughs have been suffered to fall into decay, and, for the purposes of venality and monopoly to check and circumscribe population. It may be termed a war of corruption against the vital principles of national strength and health: a system more pernicious both in its objects and effects than that of monks; because it not only tends to counteract population, but likewise to corrupt the national morals, and to taint legislative purity.

It seems never to have occurred to our political orators and writers, in their discussions and proposals for a reform of parliamentary representation, to combine and contrast such propositions with the invasion, defence, and strength of the kingdom. For instance,

instance, when we take a geographical survey of Britain, as connected with the means of defence, and with parliamentary representation, it will appear wisdom or instinct in our forefathers, that the parts most exposed to invasion *should* be fortified with additional population, and a stronger frontier. This, amongst others, I conceive was one reason why political privileges and prerogatives were dealt out to the inhabitants of the channel coast, and why parliamentary boroughs were multiplied in the Southern and most vulnerable parts of our island. The population of the coasts, and above all of the Channel coast, would produce more sailors in proportion than the inland counties, and on the spot where they are most wanted. If half a million of men and a hundred thousand sailors could be collected in a few days on the channel frontier or between London and Liverpool, what enemy would make the desperate attempt of invasion?

The propositions for a parliamentary reform, which have been offered by men of transcendent abilities, the principles of which are, an increase in the number of representatives, and the amputation or purchase of the
decayed

decayed and rotten boroughs, are both liable to weighty objections ; and the articles of union with Scotland, limiting the proportionate number of representatives, would increase this embarrassment. As to the late proscription and disfranchisement of a numerous class of the community entrusted with the collection of the public revenue, I will not deign to term it a remedy, or even a palliative ; it appears to me absurd quackery, and an aggravation of the disease. I think it is a dubious proposition, whether parliamentary representation should bear an exact proportion to the geographical dimensions or area of the country ; whether parliamentary representation should travel after the population ; or *vice versa*, whether the latter should not be directed and guided to accompany the representation, and to be made subservient to the political organization and skeleton of the constitution, which time has rendered venerable.

For example, would it not be more beneficial to the joint security of the constitution, and of the kingdom, to strengthen the channel frontier, the glacis and covered way of Britain, and principal seat of the decayed boroughs, by one or two million of additional inhabitants ?

inhabitants? Holland is one proof how population may be compelled to follow a wise legislation, even against all the disadvantages of nature and situation. Decayed boroughs may be stocked like pastures, or engrafted like old trees, and rendered again vigorous and prolific. Would there be more difficulty, or less prudence and œconomy in concentrating the strength of Great Britain, by such domestic colonization, than in founding empires, and squandering millions across the Atlantic and the Pacific? Are there not disbanded officers, sailors, and soldiers? Some more encouragement should be dealt out to these defenders of their country. Sweden provides her soldiers with lands and houses; a policy far more beneficial and less expensive than our invalid hospitals. Are there not fisheries, manufactories, and extensive wastes of uncultivated commons, to encourage the necessitous and industrious? Are there not an exuberance of parochial and poor children in our overgrown and plethoric metropolis, who might be maintained at less expence, and with more utility to the nation, were they dispersed throughout the counties and boroughs which skirt the channel?

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I am persuaded that the proprietors of decayed boroughs, together with the legislature, and the nation, would be equally interested and benefited in adopting a mild remedy for parliamentary reformation; that is, by colonizing all decayed boroughs with additional houses and inhabitants. Without a certain standard of population, they should not be permitted to nominate representatives: and as long as they continue in this state, should be branded with political impotency. Alexander the Great, during the career of war, and whilst he was adding immense empires to the Macedonian, built many magnificent cities. The Romans also during their residence in Britain, were liberal benefactors in this way. By the simple method here suggested, the representation of our most odious boroughs might soon be recruited to a decent and respectable standard. The House of Commons should beware of persevering against every petition, remonstrance, and satire, to degrade themselves in the public estimation. To suffer the constitution to fall into ruins, or to pull it down by violence, appear to me equally criminal. It is for their own interest and credit, and indeed essential to the future stability of every branch
of

of the constitution, that one third of the popular elections should not be considered as a burlesque on representation, and that they should not be made a subject of ridicule throughout Europe. If they reject the projects of political re-edification, they cannot deny the propriety and necessity of political repair. They will not alledge that political or human constitutions, are like the planetary system. It is obvious, that by acting thus, they will likewise add to the strength, defence, union and security of the island, where it is most vulnerable, and most exposed to an invader.

Opinion is of infinite consequence to the peace and security of both the governors and the governed. I am apprehensive that the present political systems of Britain and Ireland will require some melioration, in order to invigorate and unite the armed mass of the community, against a serious invasion. Both nations are now surfeited with court intrigues, political factions, contests for power and emolument, and disgusted with other internal abuses.

There is in my opinion, an easy and safe method of setting at defiance all French stra-

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tagems and malevolence against our constitution, and property, and of soothing to rest the feverish discord on that score, which is as follows. By colonizing decayed boroughs, and applying a remedy against the dilapidations of age, or the corrupt views of self-interest; by giving all persons possessed of a certain fixed property, to wit, copyholders, tenants for terms of years or lives, together with householders paying a certain portion of rent and taxes, equal privileges, as freeholders, of voting for representatives in parliament; and, without any exception to the trifling shades and distinctions of Christian sectaries, or even to the place of their nativity. This, and abridging the time and expence of elections and of candidates, appears to me an unexceptionable remedy for all the purposes of rational representation. It might be demonstrated, by certain rules of political arithmetic, that the total number of electors would not then greatly exceed the present rabble system, but they would be infinitely more opulent and respectable; the total amount of the whole island would not be above half a million, or in the proportion of about one thousand electors to one representative in the Commons, and one fifth of the

the former would never vote. It is to this respectable class of the community that we must look for a counterpoise and barrier against political corruption, faction, and anarchy. Perhaps also it would be wisdom to revive the original system and practice of the electors allotting a certain daily maintenance to their representatives when engaged in public duty. As to the wild and ruinous chimeras of universal suffrage, the present tragical consequences in France, are a sufficient answer; and in truth, there is a glaring absurdity in proposing to give the superior right of parliamentary suffrage, to those who are excluded from a variety of petty parochial offices, and from juries. Surely there is both policy and justice in giving additional encouragement to industry, economy and useful talents. None but fools or parricides would endeavour to introduce the French system as a model of reformation in this island.

A Political and Military survey of *Ireland*, as connected with its invasion and defence, is recommended to those who have more leisure, and better opportunities of information than the Editor of the present work.

I have pointed out the most vulnerable parts and the proper cantonments of the defenders.

Why does not the Irish legislature attend more to agriculture, to the culture of hemp, of oak, and other useful timber; to fisheries, harbours, and to check the emigration and seduction of their inhabitants to the wildernesses of North America? They should give encouragement to the employment of oxen in agriculture: their hides, tallow, and flesh, would amply repay the national bounties. Russia drains one million and a half of British guineas, annually, for flax and tallow only. The bogs and wastes of Ireland, cleared out and cultivated, would produce hemp and flax in abundance for the British navy and the linen-manufactory. Great Britain should no longer depend for the wings and pinions of her marine on the treacherous cabinet of Peterfbourg; that capital would be far better applied in giving encouragement and employment to industry at home. The Irish should remove their University from Dublin, and divide it into two or four. It would be happy for both islands if their parliaments dealt less in rhetorick, and more in plans for the public prosperity, security, and happiness. A momentous

mentous epoch seems nearly approaching, when they will find it necessary to expunge some obnoxious portion of their political breviary.

It is now time for rational governments to pause, to look back upon the folly and misconduct of preceding ages, and even from their ignorance and inexperience to derive precepts of wisdom. Alas ! amongst the heterogeneous mass of Continental powers, there would seem to be everlasting embers of political discord. But from these hostile feuds and combinations, Great Britain and Ireland might, in most instances, be as secure as if they constituted a distinct planet. Let their legislators therefore direct more of their attention at home, and endeavour to correct or alleviate the errors and abuses which more or less pervade not only the Constitution, but likewise every group, department, profession, and rank of civil society. This would render these two fertile islands more contented and united, more respectable to their neighbours, and formidable to their enemies. It is discontent with their government which has greatly contributed to the present rapid triumph of the French over the neighbouring states

states with whom they have provoked hostilities. Discord, discord, the principal theme and moral of the immortal Iliad, has been, since the Trojan war down to the present moment, the principal cause of the decay and crash of every independent state.

To cement still more closely the union and strength of the British empire, I have long been convinced that *one Legislature* would be infinitely more beneficial for the general benefit and prosperity of both islands. The distance is not greater than from Scotland to the metropolis. But as the population is more than double, so should the representation. I think it even more honourable for Ireland, of which I am a native, to constitute a part of the British legislature and empire, than if she were totally independent. Without the aid of English stock and capital Irish agriculture and manufactories are doomed to struggle many generations with difficulties and penury. A few placemen, pensioners and idle drones, will exclaim against propositions of this tendency: I have no hopes nor wish of pleasing their selfish vanity and venality: my objects are the substantial comforts and happiness of the great majority

city and mass of the Irish nation, and the everlasting security of both islands against all external and internal enemies.

The period is now arrived for British statesmen to adopt the wise system of Augustus, Hadrian, and the Antonines, to set bounds to the empire, and to all wars of future conquest; and perhaps, like those judicious monarchs, to lop off all unprofitable appendages. Their talents will be more usefully employed in keeping the nation always prepared to resent and punish public injuries and insults, in cultivating the arts of peace, and in rendering all classes of the society as happy and contented as the circumstances of human affairs will admit. Lamentable would be the lot of mankind in our hemisphere if, after beginning to emerge from so many centuries of ignorance and wretchedness, they should be checked in their progress by folly and depravity.

As the recent rapid successes of the French arms on the Continent has rendered the situation of Europe, and of this country in particular, extremely critical, wisdom and prudence dictate the necessity of providing against
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even the possibility of future untoward contingences, of steering clear of those rocks upon which other nations are likely to be wrecked, The *Military Reform*, which has been so earnestly recommended in every edition of this Treatise, I apprehend must be speedily adopted. As to the other *Constitutional Reform*, I am aware that many of the *sincere* friends to this measure, and to this Constitution, are of opinion that, in the present crisis, it should be postponed until the termination of hostilities. The decision for the best becomes daily a more serious and important problem, on which, perhaps, the fate of Britain in a short time may hinge. United against external enemies alone, I have not the smallest despondency of final triumph. But the sad example of other independent governments lately laid prostrate in the dust, as well as my own observation and information, all convince me that the internal traitors of this country, the partizans of anarchy, the profligate and unprincipled, “ cum multis aliis,” should not be furnished, in the day of trial, with so many weighty arguments to damp public zeal and activity, and to facilitate the secret and open operations of an artful, vindictive, formidable and enthusiastic enemy.

enemy. He must shut his eyes and ears who does not or will not perceive that there are in this country, two hostile and dangerous extremes. Against both these classes of our internal enemies, I think it my duty to record this solemn protest.

Quere. As, at this instant, the Dutch and Spaniards seem likely to be overrun by these modern Arabians the French, would it not be politic in the parliaments of Britain and Ireland to hold out an asylum to the fugitive merchants, manufacturers, mechanicks, and fishermen, and thereby to prevent the enemy from reaping such abundant harvest from their conquests? This is at least one mode of extracting good out of evil. Let the Dutch sailors be accommodated with towns, houses, and ships, and encouraged in prosecuting the herring fishery; others in draining, and embankments to exclude the sea, and to convert morasses into dry land.

POSTSCRIPT.

A Catalogue of Military Authors.

MOST of the Statesmen and Orators of Greece and Rome, were renowned commanders by land or sea. In modern times, how many legislators, orators, historians, ministers, and officers of rank are shamefully deficient in military rudiments. Might not the disastrous event of the late American war be, in some degree, ascribed to this cause? Are there no reasons to fear that England may be plunged into future misfortunes from this cause? *Quis talia fando temperet a lachrymis*? I once asked an eminent military bookseller in London, why he did not reprint Vegetius: he returned for answer, "that he was apprehensive it would not repay him the paper, print, and advertisements, as very few of the British officers perused professional books, except a few of the Artillery corps." Notwithstanding the incessant wars in which our island has been engaged, ever since the revival of letters, the
scantiness

scantiness of good authors, in our language is a matter of astonishment and discredit. Exclusive of ancient and modern history, voyages, travels, especially those parts which relate to military subjects, and of particular histories of distinguished conquerors, and remarkable campaigns, the essential maxims of this most important profession may be found in a very compendious list of authors. It must however be obvious, that I do not here mean to include the preliminary sciences of mathematicks, natural philosophy, geography, drawing, &c. nor of navigation and astronomy, so indispensable to the navy. It is equally evident that in every thing relating to ships and the sea, the moderns infinitely surpass the ancients. The following are genuine sources of information in the military science, and in fortification. And there are translations, in either English or French, of the greatest part of the Greek, Latin, and German authors.

Greeks and Romans—Homer—Herodotus—Xenophon—Thucydides—Polybius—Cæsar—Arrian—Polyænus—Plutarch—Livy—Salust—Tacitus—Josephus—Vegetius—Leo.

Moderns—

Moderns—R. Bacon—Tamerlane—Muratori—Machiavel—Specle—Dilichius—Coehorn—Vauban—Pagan—Belidor—St. Remy—Valiere—Villeneuve—L. Beau—Goulon—Muller—Montécuculi—Folard—Saxe—St. Germain—Guichard—Guibert—Chenevieve—Antoni—Lloyd—Templehoff—Frederick, King of Prussia—Tielke—Soldern—Simes—Jones—Townhend—Cambridge—Fullarton—Dirom—Stedman.

Of the modern writers, expressly on the Naval Military Science, I have not sufficient information to select and present a correct catalogue. The few following I consider as entitled to the first rank.

Pere Hoste—Bouguer—Morogues—Bourde de Villehuet—Grenier—Elements of the Practice of Rigging and SeamanSHIP—On Naval History, Campbell, Entick, Barrow, and Anderson may be consulted.

FINIS.



